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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation offers an interpretation of cryonic suspension, or “cryonics,” the 
practice of preserving human corpses by way of perfusing them with chemical protectants and 
gradually subjecting them, at the pronouncement of legal death, to extremely low temperatures (-
360◦ F, -196◦ C), which are then controlled and maintained over the long term by liquid nitrogen 
filled “cryocapsules.”  Cryonics is ultimately motivated by the hope that medicine will at some 
future point achieve the requisite kinds and levels of technology to facilitate the rejuvenation and 
“reanimation” of the “deanimated,” those who lay in cryonic suspension.  
The interpretation of cryonic suspension that I set forth departs quite abruptly from 
existing academic engagements with the practice—it is rooted in a wealth of previously 
unutilized archival materials from the 1960s and 70s, all of which are virtually inaccessible to 
those operating outside the cryonics community.  The interpretation cuts across, takes as its 
substantive focus, and is periodized with respect to three different though related moments in the 
history of cryonic suspension: 1) the emergence of cryonics in 1962 and the previously 
unexamined ties of the practice to the postwar science of cybernetics and NASA’s Cyborg 
Spaceflight Program; 2) the subsequent performance and material instantiation of cryonics, 
marked by the plights of those who froze and were frozen throughout the American 1960s and 
70s; and, tied to and fomented by the lattermost especially, 3) catastrophic failure, marked by the 
collapse of the Cryonics Society of New York in 1974, and the discovery, in 1979, of several 
abandoned, thawed, and radically decomposed cryonics “patients” interned in the Cryonics 
Society of California’s underground “cryo-crypt” at the Oakwood Memorial Park Cemetery in 
Chatsworth, California; what is infamously known in cryonics circles as the “Chatsworth 
Scandal.” The dissertation as such offers several novel interpretive claims about cryonic 
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suspension, all of which take shape in sustained dialogue with cultural studies of science and 
technology, and especially the history of cybernetics.  
The dissertation’s principle theoretical intervention involves deploying these claims to 
offer an alternative to prevailing interpretations of cryonic suspension, both popular and 
academic, as an unintelligible pseudoscientific “anomaly.”  I argue to the contrary that cryonic 
suspension emerged in a space produced by what Anthony Giddens and especially Zygmunt 
Bauman regard as the principle constitutive feature of modern social life—the ultimately futile 
yet pervasive modern impulse to sequester death, dying, and the dead from the realm of the 
living.  I furthermore argue that the distinctly modern logic of sequestration is replicated in the 
reigning epistemic norms and practices that shape sociological theory and research proper, in that 
academic sociology, whatever its professed stripes and leanings, tends overwhelmingly to regard 
death, narrowly conceived in decidedly modern terms as an “end of life event,” as being only 
marginally important to apprehending the shape of the modern social, when in fact death’s 
sequestration constitutes the social realities upon which sociologists tend to train their analytical 
focus.  The key to the intervention I make with respect to cryonic suspension’s intelligibility thus 
hinges upon recognizing that the otherwise seemingly “anomalous” practice emerged in a space 
produced by the institutional shortcomings death’s sequestration under western modernity, and 
thus presents a lived reality that places considerable strain upon the conceptual comfort zones of 
modern epistemology and historiography.  It is in this sense that cryonic suspension, as I argue 
following Robert Orsi, evidences an abundant phenomenon.  Instead of “passing over in silence” 
the epistemic discomfort presented by cryonic suspension’s abundance, the narrative accounts of 
cryonics that I develop are pressed into the service of countering those authorized ways of 
knowing that safely accord with modernity’s sequestration of death.  I thus opt for an historical 
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sociological treatment of cryonics, one centered about death’s sequestration—that is to say, an 
abundant sociological history of cryonic suspension.  
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Chapter 1:  Origin Stories, Atrocity Tales, and Cold War Simulacra 
 
 
With all the breath-taking miracles modern medicine offers, and 
more still which it (given sufficient funds) promises, death …  
‘does not yield to science and rationality.’  Having cast death as  
a concern and responsibility for reason and reason-fed technology,  
modernity could not but expose reason’s inadequacy to the task.   
And so, in the end of the day, ‘we are perforce impelled to employ  
the heavy artillery of defense,’ namely, a recourse to magic and  
immortality.  
 
 -Zygmunt Bauman, 1992.1 
 
       
There is an “extraordinary cognitive power,” writes Jonathan Z. Smith, that comes with 
Viktor Shklovky’s strategy of “‘defamiliarization’—making the familiar seem strange in order to 
enhance perception.”2  The other side of this is also true—there is an extraordinary cognitive 
power that comes with rendering the seemingly strange familiar, part of the ordinary every day.  
Taking principle direction from this lattermost positon, the present study sets out to underscore 
the ordinariness of a seemingly strange if not all together bizarre practice indeed: cryonic 
suspension, or “cryonics,” the practice of preserving human corpses—and in some instances only 
human heads—by way of perfusing them with chemical protectants and gradually subjecting 
them, at the pronouncement of legal death, to extremely low temperatures (-360◦ F, -196◦ C), 
which are then controlled and maintained over the long term by liquid nitrogen filled “cryostats” 
or “dewars”—technological coffins of fiberglass and stainless steel.  The narrative threaded-
through cryonics is as explicit and straightforward as it is fantastic: science and modern 
medicine, cryonics proponents forecast, will at some future point achieve the necessary kinds 
and levels of technology to repair virtually any damage sustained by the human body, cure 
                                                            
1 Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality, and Other Life Strategies (Stanford, CA: The Stanford University Press, 
1992), 143.  
 
2 Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1982), xiii. 
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disease, halt and initiate a reversal of the aging process, and yes, rejuvenate and “reanimate” the 
“deanimated,” those who lay in cryonic suspension.  Radically extended life spans, cryonics 
advocates maintain, if not immortality and eternal youth, may soon be within reach.  Thus the 
quirky expression, coined in the tumultuous American 1960s, but which has since become 
something of a hallowed commonplace among latter day cryonics advocates: “freeze-wait-
reanimate.”   
Cryonics has suffered significant, perhaps irreparable, setbacks since its emergence in the 
American 1960s.  The history of cryonics is indeed quite dramatic; the lives of its progenitors, 
early advocates and practitioners are punctuated by episodes of internal strife, heartbreaking loss, 
catastrophic failure, and venomous accusations of fraud and pseudoscientific quackery.  This 
history, however, these lives (and deaths), have for the better part of fifty years remained out of 
focus, unexplored, not at all well understood.  Indeed, what few academic treatments of cryonics 
there are have tended overwhelmingly to engage the practice tangentially and in its more 
contemporary manifestations, i.e. post-1980, and from quite conventional analytical vantages.
3
   
While researchers have in a variety of ways gestured toward the question of cryonics’ history,4 
no existing treatment of cryonics reflects a serious attempt to understand and reconstruct the time 
                                                            
3 See Richard Doyle, Wetwares: Experiments in Postvital Living (Minneapolis and St. Paul: The University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003); Carl Elliott, “Humanity 2.0,” The Wilson Quarterly (Autumn 2003); John Gray, The 
Immortalization Commission: Science and the Strange Quest to Cheat Death (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and 
Giroux, 2011); Céline Lafontaine, “The Postmortal Condition: From the Biomedical Deconstruction of Death to the 
Extension of Longevity,” Science as Culture 18, no. 3 (September 2009):297-312; Tiffany Romain, “Extreme Life  
Extension: Investing in Cryonics for the Long, Long Term,” Medical Anthropology 29, no. 2 (2010):194-215. 
   
4 See Stephen B. Harris, “The Immortality Myth in Technology,” in Immortal Engines: Life Extension and 
Immortality in Science Fiction and Fantasy, ed. George Slusser, Gary Westfahl, and Eric S. Rabkin (Athens, GA: 
The University of Georgia Press, 1996), 45-67; Oliver Krüger, “The Suspension of Death: The Cryonic Utopia in 
the Context of the U.S. Funeral Culture,” The Marburg Journal of Religion 15 (2010):1-19; Jill Lepore, “The 
Iceman,” The New Yorker, January 25, 2010, 24-30; Jill Lepore, Mansion of Happiness: A History of Life and Death 
(New York: Vintage, 2012), Ch. 10; W. Patrick McCray, The Visioneers: How a Group of Elite Scientists Pursued 
Space Colonies, Nanotechnologies, and a Limitless Future (Princeton, NJ: The Princeton University Press, 2013), 
Ch. 6; Bronwyn Parry, “Technologies of Immortality: The Brain on Ice,” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
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bound and highly contingent “social work”5 that was performed by the progenitors and early 
advocates of the practice; with minimal regard for delineating and analyzing the context and 
cultural elements that conspired in producing the technoscientific expectations, existential fears, 
and futuristic imaginings that both motivated and guided their activities in the real time of 
practice.
6
  Similarly, existing treatments of cryonics consistently come up short on the most 
significant defining event in the history of the practice—the discovery, in 1979, of nine 
abandoned, thawed, and decomposed cryonic suspension “patients” interned at the (now defunct) 
Cryonics Society of California’s underground crypt at the Oakwood Memorial Park Cemetery in 
Chatsworth, California.
7
  
These events in the history of cryonic suspension, emergence in 1962, catastrophic failure 
by 1979, mark the approximate sociohistorical parameters of the present study.  It merits heavy 
underscoring that my ability to focus the study on this period in cryonics’ history, marked as it is 
by events on which existing scholarship is all but silent, is owed entirely to my having been 
granted access to a veritable wealth of primary cryonics materials, which range across four basic 
types: (1) original documents of the early cryonics organizations, their founders, members and 
dissenters: newsletters, personal notes, correspondences, public relations materials, mortuary 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2004):391-413; Arlene Sheskin, Cryonics: A Sociology of Death and 
Bereavement (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1979); Grant Shoffstall, “Freeze-Wait-Reanimate: Cryonic 
Suspension and Science Fiction, Bulletin of Science, Technology, and Society 30, no. 4 (2010):285-297.   
 
5 On “social work” and attending to it in historical studies of science and technology, see Fred Turner, “How Digital 
Technology Found Utopian Ideology: Lessons from the First Hackers’ Conference,” in Critical Cyberculture 
Studies, eds. David Silver and Adrienne Massanari (New York: New York University Press, 2006), Ch. 22; see also 
Stuart Hall and Lawrence Grossberg, “Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall,” Journal of 
Communication Inquiry 10, no. 2 (1986):45-60.   
   
6 See John R. Hall, Cultures of Inquiry: From Epistemology to Discourse in Sociohistorical Research (Cambridge: 
The Cambridge University Press, 1999), 210-215.   
 
7 Charles Platt, “Robert Nelson and the Chatsworth Scandal,” The Immortalist 37, no. 11-12 (Nov.-Dec. 2005):10-
13. 
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records, technical manuals and reports; (2) films and photographs; (3) legal documents; and (4) 
news and popular press coverage from the early 1960s through the 1980s.  These materials are 
quite obscure; all but a small fraction are generally inaccessible to those operating outside the 
cryonics community.  Indeed, the overwhelming majority of these materials have neither before 
been systematically archived by a professional historian or librarian nor utilized as sources for 
the purpose of conducting sociohistorical research.
8
   
Given the quite limited accessibility of the requisite materials to engage cryonic 
suspension historically, the “presentist” focus exhibited by existing accounts of cryonics is in a 
sense understandable.  This tendency, however, understandable though it may be, has not been 
without historiographical consequence.  Lacking recourse to a robust account of the historical 
record, existing interpretations of cryonic suspension have been haunted by the combined effects 
of what I will call an “origin story” and an “atrocity tale”—caricatured surrogates, in other 
words, respectively, for sociohistorical treatments of cryonic suspension’s emergence and 
catastrophic failure.  Access to the aforementioned source materials has allowed me to discern 
these surrogates and their effects, and has furthermore led me to adopt the position that grasping 
the nature, contextual complexity, and sociohistorical significance of cryonic suspension in many 
ways follows from their undoing.  In other words, deflating the “origin story” and the “atrocity 
tale” both reveals the significance of and opens up for analysis the period which is bookended by 
the historical emergence of cryonics and its catastrophic failure at Chatsworth.  Thus the 
periodization of the present study has not been arrived at willy-nilly, but instead reflects a basic 
historiographical intervention that follows from careful examination of previously unutilized 
                                                            
8 I offer an overview of these materials and how I came to access them in “Chapter 2: Theory, Method, and Source 
Materials.”  Here, my aim is simply to introduce them for the purpose of underscoring how they have enabled me to 
conceptualize and pursue the present study.   
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source materials, up against existing treatments of cryonic suspension, both academic and 
otherwise.
9
  
 
 
Of Origin Stories… 
 
The cryonics origin story and atrocity tale have over time had the combined effect of 
bracketing from consideration matters of cultural and historical context.  This follows principally 
from the fact that both center attention on individuals—lone men—in reference to whom the 
emergence and failure of cryonic suspension tend to be explained, discussed, and attributed.  The 
origin story, to this end, centers about a lone man, Robert C. W. “Bob” Ettinger, and his book, 
The Prospect of Immortality.  Privately published and circulated in 1962, and significantly 
expanded for distribution by Doubleday and & Co. two years later, the commercial release of 
Ettinger’s “freeze and wait” manifesto, the story goes, launched the so-called “cryonics 
movement.”10  Indeed, in one way or another virtually all of those active in cryonics, past and 
present, credit The Prospect Immortality or Ettinger’s 1972 follow-up, Man into Superman,11 
with bringing them into the cryonics fold.  Consequently, and in no small measure due to the 
                                                            
9 Aside from the other relevant sources cited below, the style of analysis that involves deconstructing “origin 
stories” and “atrocity tales” has been adopted principally from John R. Hall, Gone from the Promised Land: 
Jonestown in American Cultural History (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987).  The mechanics of the 
intervention presented here furthermore draw from Hall’s methodological remarks on events, turning points, and the 
temporality of narrative emplotment in Cultures of Inquiry, 210-216, and William H. Sewell Jr.’s remarks on 
context, historical structure, and eventful temporality at the crossroads of history and sociology in Logics of History: 
Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), Ch. 3.  
 
10 Saul Kent, “The First Cryonicist,” Cryonics 32 (1983):9; R. Michael Perry, “Rare Cryonics Book to be  
Reissued by the Venturists,” Cryonics 10, no. 3 (March 1989):2.  
 
11 Robert C. W. Ettinger, The Prospect of Immortality (New York: Doubleday, 1964); Robert C. W. Ettinger, Man 
into Superman (New York: Avon, 1972).   
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commercial distribution of these texts, Ettinger is widely revered as the “father” of cryonic 
suspension.
12
  
 Ettinger’s canonization and the cryonics origin story it harbors have clear affinities with 
one of the “classic foundation myths” of modern science and technology—the lone man of 
science (and it usually is a man), generates ideas, which others then assimilate and put into 
practice.
13
  Recitations of cryonic suspension’s historical emergence that accord with the 
conventions of this myth have had the effect of concealing far more than they reveal about the 
practice and its history.  For such an “origin story” attributes all credit for cryonic suspension to 
Ettinger himself, as if the idea somehow sprung from within him de novo; lending to Ettinger an 
internal coherence and agentive capacity that he does not and cannot possess.
14
  Thus, in 
academic texts, journalistic accounts, and the popular media alike, repeated recitations of this 
cryonics “origin story” have had the effect of bolstering Ettinger’s mythological resilience, 
placing sociohistorical inquiry all the more in abeyance.
15
  Even those who have made an effort 
to locate the cultural source(s) of Ettinger’s inspiration for cryonics have not gone nearly far 
enough in decentering him.  When Tiffany Romain, for instance, claims that Ettinger “directly 
lifted” cryonics from the pages of science fiction16; when Arlene Sheskin notes that Ettinger 
conceived of cryonics as a result of encountering French biologist Jean Rostand’s experiments 
                                                            
12 Anonymous, “Robert Chester Wilson Ettinger,” The Immortalist: Robert Ettinger Memorial Issue (August 
2011):3-4; Charles Platt, “Bob Ettinger and the Cryobiologists,” Cryonics 32, no. 4 (4th Quarter—2011):19. 
 
13 David A. Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing before Cybernetics 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 5.  
 
14 See Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge, MA: The 
Harvard University Press, 1988), Introduction; see also Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, 
Modernity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 2002), 29-34. 
 
15 See Hall, Gone from the Promised Land, Introduction. 
   
16 Tiffany Romain, “Extreme Life Extension: Investing in Cryonics for the Long, Long Term,” Medical 
Anthropology 29, no. 2 (2010): 195.   
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using glycerol to freeze frog sperm
17; when Bronwyn Parry ties Ettinger’s idea to the successful 
freezing, thawing, and “reanimation” of whole animals carried out by cryobiologist Audrey U. 
Smith and colleagues in the 1950s
18; and when Jill Lepore draws parallels between Ettinger’s 
call to “freeze now” and the otherwise “unthinkable” Cold War connivings of Stanley Kubrick’s  
Dr. Strangelove,
19
 these are all moves in the right direction—but they miss the mark on several 
counts.  Left unexplored is the peculiar style of “social work” that Ettinger performed in writing 
Prospect; the nature of the milieu that inspired, enabled, and fed this work; his status as a 
community college instructor of math and physics, and thus an amateur scientist at best; and 
namely the fact that Ettinger was not alone in his initial convictions regarding what was at first 
called the “freeze and wait” idea.  Indeed, Etttinger’s Prospect was not even the first book of its 
kind! 
 In 1957 a small reading group formed in Washington, D.C., some five hundred miles 
removed from Robert Ettinger’s home in Detroit, Michigan.  The group came together with the 
common aim of “improving” the Great Books of the Western World program, “making it more 
contemporary, scientific, and germane to the existence of modern man.”20  The group’s leader, 
Evan “Ev” Cooper, was a shy remittance man, boat enthusiast, and irregular liberal arts student 
at the University of Baltimore.
21
  Under his guidance, the reading group devised a supplementary 
program, 20
th
 Century Books.  Over the course of three years the group worked through Einstein, 
                                                            
17 Arlene Sheskin, Cryonics: A Sociology of Death and Bereavement (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1979), 12-13. 
 
18 Bronwyn Parry, “Technologies of Immortality: The Brain on Ice,” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 34 (2004): 404-405.  
 
19 Lepore, Mansion of Happiness, Ch. 10.   
 
20 Nathan Duhring, Immortality: Physically, Scientifically Now (Washington, D.C.:20th Century Books, 1962), 1.  
 
21 Mike Darwin, phone interview by the author, 11 June 2013.  
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Freud, Pavlov, and Russell, at which point, not insignificantly, they began to “read closely and to 
analyze and discuss [Norbert] Wiener and the other cyberneticians.”22  By November of 1962,23 
shortly before the first, privately published draft of Ettinger’s Prospect saw print, Cooper, 
writing under the pseudonym Nathan Duhring—i.e. N. Duhring, enduring24—was moved to 
privately publish and circulate a short book manuscript arguing for the feasibility of reviving and 
resuscitating the frozen dead, Immortality: Physically, Scientifically, Now.  Both Ettinger and 
Cooper, though writing at the approximately the same time, were initially unaware of each 
other’s efforts.  They became acquainted and began correspondence in 1963, only subsequent to 
the completion of their respective texts.  Ettinger’s mailing copies of The Prospect of 
Immortality to several of those listed in Who’s Who in America, however, eventuated in both 
Isaac Asimov and Frederik Pohl publicly attesting to the feasibility of his version of the “freeze 
and wait” idea.25  Ettinger’s manuscript, in no small measure following from these endorsements, 
was eventually picked up by Doubleday & Co; thus The Prospect of Immortality went on to see 
fairly wide distribution and readership.  Cooper’s text did not.26  While Ettinger enjoyed a brief 
moment of pseudo-celebrity in the wake of his text’s commercial release, Cooper and his text 
faded into relative obscurity.
27
  This is today readily evidenced by the fact that extant scholarly 
                                                            
22 Duhring, Immortality, 1.   
 
23 R. Michael Perry, “Rare Cryonics Book to be Reissued by the Venturists,” Cryonics 10, 3 (March 1989):2. 
 
24 R. Michael Perry, “Robert Ettinger: Some Brief Historical and Personal Notes,” Cryonics 32, 4 (2011):16. 
 
25 Lepore, “The Iceman,” 24-30.  
 
26 In the estimation of Saul Kent, cryonics pioneer and friend of Cooper’s, only 50 or so copies Immortality were 
printed and circulated.  Perry, “Rare Cryonics Book to be Reissued by the Venturists,” 2.  
 
27 Mike Darwin, “Ev Cooper: 1926-1983,” Cryonics 32 (March 1983):7-12. 
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and extra-scholarly recitations of cryonic suspension’s historical emergence are overwhelmingly 
silent on Evan Cooper.
28
   
Cooper’s role in facilitating the emergence of cryonic suspension extends far beyond his 
having penned a “freeze now” manifesto that preceded Ettinger’s Prospect, however.  For it was 
Cooper, not Ettinger, who organized the first major cryonics conference (The First International 
Conference on the Scientific Prospects for Physical Immortality [January 1,1964]),
29
 formed the 
first cryonics organization (Immortality Communication Exchange [I-C-E, “ICE”], later renamed 
The Life Extension Society [LES]), coordinated the development of LES satellite chapters in the 
US and abroad,
30
 and wrote, edited and distributed the first cryonics newsletter (The Life 
Extension Society Newsletter, later renamed Freeze-Wait-Reanimate).
31
  Cooper had a heavy 
hand in guiding the development of all this before the Doubleday edition of Ettinger’s text hit 
bookshelves on June 5, 1964.
32
  Ettinger’s Prospect, then, certainly popularized, but did not 
initiate, the so-called “cryonics movement.”  The lion’s share of credit for that belongs to Evan 
Cooper.
33
   
The point in attending here to Cooper, however, is not to supplant one “origin story”—
and thus as well one “father” of cryonic suspension, one “canonical” cryonics text—with 
                                                            
28 I am exempting from this claim engagements with cryonics history as recounted by the cryonics insiders I am 
drawing from presently.  In my reviews of the existing academic literature, however, I have managed to locate only 
one treatment of cryonic suspension that recognizes Evan Cooper: Krüger, “The Suspension of Death.”  Given the 
aims of his research, however, Krüger simply mentions Cooper’s name in passing, neither citing nor seriously 
engaging the substantive thrust of Cooper’s corpus.   
 
29 Anonymous, “The Conference,” Life Extension Society Newsletter 1, 1 (January 1964):1-2. 
 
30 Ibid; R. Michael Perry, “Unity and Disunity in Cryonics,” Cryonics 13, 8 (August 1992):5. 
 
31 R. Michael Perry, “Notes,” Freeze-Wait-Reanimate Newsletter Collection, ii, Alcor.  
 
32 Anonymous, “Big News of the Summer,” Life Extension Society Newsletter 1, 3(August 1964):1. 
 
33 Kent, “The First Cryonicist,” 9.   
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another.  The point, rather, is to call attention to the fact that the Ettinger origin narrative’s 
silence on Cooper has long conspired in obscuring the ties of cryonic suspension to one of the 
dominant intellectual paradigms of Cold War America—cybernetics.  Indeed, the chief claim of 
Cooper’s “freeze and wait” manifesto is that “cybernetics [contains] either intentionally or 
unintentionally […] a message about immortality.”34  Reading The Prospect of Immortality in 
tandem with Cooper’s Immortality furthermore evidences that Ettinger’s thinking is informed by 
cybernetics and, more broadly, the pervasive Cold War computational metaphor, of which 
cybernetics is a theoretical formalization.
35
 
As I elaborate in Chapter 3, cybernetics figured prominently in facilitating the emergence 
of cryonic suspension, in two principle ways.  The first of these follows from the argument that 
existing treatments of cryonic suspension have unduly emphasized the freezing aspect of the 
practice.  In terms of accounting for and understanding the emergence of cryonics in the 
American 1960s, freezing is notable only insofar as it is recognized as a form of activity that was 
initially prompted, organized and carried out in anticipation of the arrival of then emerging 
digital computers—“electronic brains,” “machines that can think”—otherwise known as 
cybernetic (communication) machines.
36
  Indeed, both Cooper and Ettinger issued their 
respective calls to “freeze now” in direct response to Norbert Wiener’s famed proclamation that 
systems of computerized control would soon usher in a “second industrial revolution”37—a 
                                                            
34 Duhring, Immortality, 1.   
 
35 Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 147-173.   
 
36 Ronald Kline, “Beyond The Closed World,” History and Technology 28, no. 4 (2012):408. 
 
37 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (New York: John 
Wiley, 1948), 36-37.  
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cybernetic “new age” in which machines would outstrip human intelligence and capabilities.  
The religious and even millenarian connotations of Wiener’s pronouncement have been heavily 
underscored by Geoff Bowker.
38
  For Cooper and Ettinger, as Immortality and Prospect readily 
attest, with the pronouncement of this coming “new age” came the hope of intelligent 
machines—“robot surgeons of the future,” Ettinger called them—that would possess 
unprecedented medical capabilities; machines capable of “fixing” disease, aging, and even 
death.
39
  Those for whom death, then—“deanimation”—was certain to occur prior to the arrival 
of the machines, could be frozen and maintained as such, “shuttled” to the future, through a kind 
of medical “time travel.”  For intelligent machines of the order anticipated, Ettinger and Cooper 
reasoned, in addition to fixing the “cause” of deanimation—cancer, for instance—would 
certainly also be able to repair the catastrophic cellular damage caused by the freezing process 
itself, facilitate revival, and ultimately enhance the revived cryonics “patient.”  Thus the 
expression, coined by Evan Cooper, which captures the temporal logic of cryonics as an 
anticipatory practice, conceived and pursued in relation to Wiener’s heralding of a “second 
industrial revolution”—“freeze-wait-reanimate.”40 
Wiener’s pronouncement, then, his aims in issuing it notwithstanding, had the 
(unintended) effect of producing a space of anticipation, of hope, that mobilized Ettinger and 
Cooper, and thus facilitated the emergence of cryonic suspension in the American 1960s.  
But cybernetics was also quite prominently at play within this space.  Indeed, Cooper’s 
Immortality and Ettinger’s Prospect are to be understood as the products of an imaginative style 
                                                            
38 Geoff Bowker, “How to be Universal: Some Cybernetic Strategies, 1943-1970,” Social Studies of Science 23, no. 
1(1993):107-127. 
 
39 Ettinger, The Prospect of Immortality, 37.   
 
40 Perry, “Notes,” ii. 
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of “social work” quite uniquely enabled by cybernetics.  This then is the second way in which 
cybernetics figured in facilitating the emergence of cryonic suspension in the American 1960s. 
 Because cybernetics, in formalizing the computational metaphor, established ontological 
equivalence in the informational constitution and behavior of organisms, humans, and machines 
alike, it effectively collapsed otherwise conventional disciplinary boundaries, the trespassing of 
which it furthermore both prescribed and enabled under the (pretentious) auspices “universal  
science,” i.e. a science of “everything,” from “cells to society.”41  This in turn enabled the 
perpetration of what historians of cybernetics have termed legitimacy exchange, “a process by 
which experts in one area draw on the authority of experts in another area to justify their 
activities.”42  Cybernetics provided a site, in other words, where “an isolated scientific worker 
making an outlandish claim could gain rhetorical legitimacy by pointing to support from another 
field.”43   
In Chapter 3, I demonstrate that Ettinger and Cooper, in composing their “freeze now” 
manifestos, drew from several (techno)scientific fields, cybernetics among them, in an effort to 
win legitimacy for their proposed freezings of the recently deceased.  I furthermore demonstrate 
that in an effort to buttress these legitimacy claims, they also perpetrated several instances of the 
discontinuous transmission of ideas.  Cybernetics, Bowker explains, carved out a space in which 
“conceptual tools” could be “yanked out of one context (e.g. philosophy of mind) and plugged 
into another (e.g. automata theory), with the translation into the language of cybernetics,” i.e.  
                                                            
41 Kline, “Beyond the Closed World,” 408. 
  
42 Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of 
Digital Utopianism (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 25.  
 
43 Bowker, “How to Be Universal,” 116.  
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the language of organism-machine equivalence, “doing the work of glossing the discontinuity.”44  
Taking as unproblematic cybernetics’ ontological flattening of organisms, humans, and 
machines, I demonstrate that Ettinger, Cooper, and cryonics devotees more broadly stitched 
together seeming continuities between ideas, empirical findings, devices, and especially 
predictions appropriated from a range of fields, among them cybernetics, cryobiology, transplant 
medicine, automata studies, and artificial intelligence.   
While scholars of pseudoscience would likely insist that what I have outlined here are 
merely instances of “cherry-picking,” i.e. that Ettinger and Cooper simply “mined” data to locate 
findings and examples that would support their strange proposals,
45
 the wager of this study is that 
something more significant, more complicated, and by far more interesting is at play.  For one, 
tying the emergence of cryonic suspension to cybernetics is significant in that it lends evidence  
to historian Ronald Kline’s “disunity of cybernetics” thesis.  While most cybernetics originators 
had universal aspirations, and while an earlier trajectory of scholarship on cybernetics tended to 
emphasize this aspect of the science—perhaps most notably Paul Edwards’ The Closed 
World
46—Kline argues that cybernetic universality operated as a metadiscourse, under which the 
science itself assumed, in practice, and through the work of legitimacy exchange and the 
discontinuous transmission of ideas, a range of forms and meanings, “depending on its national, 
                                                            
44 Ibid; Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture, 24-28; Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A 
History of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 89-101.  
 
45 See Michael Shermer, “Science and Pseudoscience: The Difference in Practice and the Difference it Makes,” in 
Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconstructing the Demarcation Problem, ed. Massimo Pigliucci, Maarten Boudry 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 217.  
 
46 Edwards, The Closed World; see also Bowker, “How to Be Universal.” 
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historical, and disciplinary context.”47  Both Andrew Pickering’s The Cybernetic Brain, a history 
of British cybernetics, and Slava Gerovitch’s From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, a comparative 
study of Soviet and American cybernetics, are notably apiece with Kline’s thesis in that they 
attend to how interpretations of cybernetics have differed quite significantly across national 
contexts.
48
  Eden Medina’s more recent Cybernetic Revolutionaries furthermore emphasizes 
cybernetics’ transnationalism, explicating the prominent place of British cybernetics, specifically 
the work of Stafford Beer, in Salvador Allende’s outline for Chilean socialism.49  Fred Turner’s 
From Counterculture to Cyberculture brings to the fore a quite significant though understudied 
aspect of cybernetics’ disunity, namely the circulation of cybernetics throughout American 
(popular) culture, i.e. beyond scientific disciplines and institutions, attending to how cybernetic 
concepts and techniques were appropriated, repurposed and elaborated by largely non-scientific 
actors, who figured centrally in the emergence of the American counterculture.
50
  Turner’s work 
sets the strongest precedent for the present study.  Not because the emergence of cryonics is 
intimately tied to the American counterculture, but rather because Ettinger and Cooper, in a vein 
quite similar to Turner’s counter-cultural entrepreneurs, engaged cybernetics, and exploited the 
rhetorical strategies of legitimacy exchange and the discontinuous transmission of ideas, as non-
scientific actors, giving rise to cryonic suspension outside the institutional spaces of “legitimate” 
technoscientific production. 
                                                            
47 Cited in Eden Medina, Cybernetic Revolutionaries: Technology and Politics in Allende’s Chile (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2011), 9; see also Kline, “Beyond the Closed World”; Ronald Kline, “Where are the Cyborgs in 
Cybernetics?” Social Studies of Science 39, no. 3 (2009):331-362.   
 
48 Andrew Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2009); Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak.   
 
49 Medina, Cybernetic Revolutionaries. 
 
50 Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture.  
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Attending to the emergence of cryonic suspension not only lends evidence to Kline’s 
disunity of cybernetics thesis, but also offers a quite striking illustration of how science and 
technology more broadly acquire unintended meanings, and thus as well give rise to otherwise 
unanticipated projects, as they are variously consumed, appropriated, and repurposed, 
“downstream,” as it were, by “lay,” “amateur,” or “non-” scientific actors.51  This then represents 
a sizable portion of the interpretive payoff that follows from interrogating the Ettinger origin 
narrative, an intervention enabled by the aforementioned and previously unutilized source 
materials to which I have been given access.  This intervention also opens up a space through 
which to articulate one of the principle theoretical claims of the present study: Ettinger’s 
Prospect and Cooper’s Immortality are simulacra of cold war technoscientific proposals and 
predictions, and thus cryonic suspension itself is a simulacrum of cold war technoscience.  I 
return to these claims momentarily, after having established the broader cultural and theoretical 
contexts their elaboration requires.  
 
 
…and Atrocity Tales 
 
As with the Ettinger origin story, the cryonics atrocity tale centers about a lone man, 
Robert F. “Bob” Nelson, aka “Robert Buccelli”—prize fighter, TV repairman, Robert Ettinger 
devotee, and co-founder and former president of the long-since defunct Cryonics Society of 
California (CSC).  Nelson first rose to prominence in cryonics circles on January 12, 1967, when 
he helped put the “freeze and wait” idea into practice by coordinating, under the auspices of the 
CSC, the first cryonic suspension to be carried out under “controlled conditions”—that of James 
                                                            
51 On the recent turn to studies of science and technology “downstream,” see Steven Epstein, “Culture and 
Science/Technology: Rethinking Knowledge, Power, Materiality, and Nature,” The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 619 (September 2008):165-182.   
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H. Bedford, Ph.D., UCLA Professor of Psychology Emeritus—the details of which Nelson later 
recounted in his (somewhat fictionalized) 1968 memoir, We Froze the First Man.
52
  Ten years 
after Bedford, Nelson’s fame was on the fast track to becoming notoriety.  His amateurish and 
highly suspect subsequent toilings in cryonics through the 1960s and 70s conspired in producing 
the most disastrous, damaging, and arguably the most significant defining event in the history of 
the practice—the abandonment, thawing, and decomposition of nine cryonic suspension 
“patients” interned at the CSC’s underground crypt at the Oakwood Memorial Park Cemetery in 
Chatsworth, California; what is infamously known in cryonics circles as the “Chatsworth 
Scandal.”53   
It would be difficult to underscore the macabre nature of this incident too heavily.  
Bodies, and tens of thousands of dollars, went missing.  In cryo-suspension capsules designed for 
one, Nelson had crammed two, three, even four cryonics “patients,” leaving scant room for liquid 
nitrogen.  Questions were evaded.  Visitations were denied.  Relatives were kept in the dark.  
Rumors of something amiss at Chatsworth circulated among cryonics activists from coast to 
coast.
54
  Valley News reporter David Walker, who discovered the abandoned CSC facility on the 
morning of Friday, June 8, 1979, described a ghastly site: “Directly under the ladder [which 
descends into the crypt] are two 10-ft.-long white capsules, one stacked on top of the other.  A 
blowtorch may have been used to sear open a gaping hole in the top capsule,” the bottom of 
which “is coated with a thick, murky slime.”  “Dials and gauges designed to measure liquid 
                                                            
52  Robert F. Nelson with Sandra Stanley, We Froze the First Man: The Startling True Story of the First Great Step 
Toward Human Immortality (New York: Dell, 1968).    
 
53 See Platt, “Robert Nelson and the Chatsworth Scandal.”  Bedford, miraculously, was not one of them.  Indeed, 
Bedford is the only person frozen before 1974 who has not been thawed.  He is presently in the care of the Alcor 
Life Extension Foundation in Scottsdale, Arizona.  See Mike Darwin, “Dear Dr. Bedford (and Those Who Will Care 
for You After I Do), A Thank You Note to a Pioneer,” Cryonics 12, no. 7 (1991):15-22.  
 
54 Saul Kent, “Trouble in Southern California?” Cryonics Reports 4, no. 12 (1969), 2.  
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nitrogen pressure,” Walker continues, “register zero…a thermostat indicates the temperature 
in…the high 50s.”  In the corner of the crypt, “a black body bag … soaked and rotting.”  All of 
this, and then the smell: “The stench near the crypt is disarming, strips away all defenses, spins 
the stomach into a thousand dizzying somersaults.”55  When cryonics activist Mike Darwin made 
a visit to the Chatsworth site years later, on November 3, 1981, he could still smell the offensive 
intermingling of rot and DMSO
56—a lingering testament to the horrors befallen; the unsavory 
residue of Bob Nelson’s negligence. 
Nelson defended his actions in an interview conducted shortly after Walker discovered 
the crypt in its abandoned state: “I haven’t done anything criminal, anything wrong other than a 
lot of bad decisions.”  Nelson furthermore insisted that he “never promised anything.”  “They 
were told they would be frozen for a period of time.  Five minutes is a period of time.”57  The 
bereaved and ultimately the state of California disagreed.  In June of 1981, a California civil 
court found Bob Nelson guilty of “fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress,” and 
ordered him to pay upwards of one million dollars in damages to those who brought the suit 
against him—the adult children of the CSC patients who under his watch were left to thaw and 
decompose at Chatsworth.
58
  
                                                            
55 David Walker, “Valley Cryonic Crypt Desecrated, Untended.” The Valley News, June 10, 1979, p. 11.   
  
56 Mike Darwin, phone interview by the author, 18 March 2014.  Dimethyl sulfoxide, or DMSO, is a substance 
known to protect the integrity of biological tissue at low temperatures by inhibiting the formation of ice crystals.  
The bodies of many if not all of the patients at Chatsworth were perfused with DMSO. 
 
57 David Walker, “Former Head of Cryonics Society Defends Actions,” Valley News, June 13, 1979, 1, 7.  
 
58 Los Angeles Superior Court Case C-161229, First Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 
Breach of Contract, Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud, prepared and filed by Michael Worthington, December 
1, 1970, Alcor.  
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Figure 1.   Cryonics Society of California (CSC) suspension  
capsule, blowtorched and evacuated, post-Chatsworth, 
ca.1979.   
 
  Source: PAMD 
 
As I write this, Academy Award winning director Errol Morris (The Fog of War) and 
writer-director Zac Helm (Stranger than Fiction) are involved in the early stages of a film 
project set to chronicle the plight of Bob Nelson and the events at Chatsworth.  The film, 
tentatively titled Freezing People is Easy, will draw from Nelson’s We Froze the First Man and 
“Mistakes Were Made,” the overwhelmingly popular “cryonics” episode of Ira Glass’s hit radio 
program, This American Life.  What transpired at Chatsworth was so bizarre, so revolting, so 
tragic, it is perhaps fitting that Morris and Helm have opted to engage the scandal through 
stylistic conventions approximating those of the cinematic genre deployed to such masterful 
effect by Stanley Kubrick in Dr. Strangelove—nightmare comedy.59  Boasting a first-rate cast 
                                                            
59 The comparison of cryonics to Dr. Strangelove is owed to Lepore, Mansion of Happiness, Ch. 10.  On Dr. 
Strangelove as nightmare comedy see Charles Maland, “Dr. Strangelove (1964): Nightmare Comedy and the 
Ideology of Liberal Consensus,” in Hollywood as Historian: American Film in a Cultural Context, ed. Peter C. 
Rollins (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 1998), Ch. 10.  
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that will include Paul Rudd (as Nelson), Owen Wilson (as mortician Joseph Klockgether, 
Nelson’s collaborator), the one-and-only Kristen Wiig (as Nelson’s wife), and the legendary 
Christopher Walken (as Robert C.W. “Bob” Ettinger), Freezing People is Easy will very likely 
make for a good laugh.  I suspect, however, that Helm and Morris’s decision to portray Nelson as 
a naïve but otherwise good and loveable American everyman, who naively makes promises he 
can’t keep and gets in way over his head, will evoke howls of protest from the contemporary 
cryonics fraternity, a minority but quite vocal faction of which regards Nelson as a conman who 
perpetrated unspeakable evil at Chatsworth and beyond, branding cryonics a “pseudoscientific” 
practice at best, a predatory funeral scam at worst.
60
  
Bob Nelson’s culpability in the events at Chatsworth will remain open to debate; Morris 
and Helm have simply announced their intentions to make a film.  It is already apparent, 
however, that their planned treatment of Nelson will likely have a discursive effect similar to that 
of the Ettinger origin narrative.  Which is to say that in offering a cinematic rehabilitation of 
Nelson, even though satirical, Freezing People is Easy may end up concealing far more than it 
reveals about cryonic suspension, the events at Chatsworth, and Bob Nelson himself.  This is not 
to say, of course, that the villainous Nelson of cryonics lore is somehow closer to the truth; that 
Morris and Helm’s Nelson is somehow “wrong.”  No.  The point, rather,  and as well the real 
challenge, belongs to an entirely different order of argumentation: namely, not to pinpoint Bob 
Nelson as a saint or the devil incarnate, but to recognize as dubious any attempt to “explain” a 
complex sociohistorical event like Chatsworth by attributing its horrific outcome to a lone man’s 
flawed moral character.
61
  While such an atrocity tale is freighted with the sort of cinematic 
                                                            
60 See Darwin, “Dear Dr. Bedford”; Platt, “Robert Nelson and the Chatsworth Scandal.”  
 
61 The present remarks are significantly indebted to Hall, Gone From the Promised Land, Introduction and Ch. 12.   
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possibilities that tend to resonate so powerfully with the twin American cults of hyper-
individualism and personal responsibility, it is also sociologically and historically anemic.  
As with the Ettinger origin narrative’s elision of the ties of cryonics to cybernetics, then, 
the Nelson atrocity tale has also long bracketed from consideration matters of context.  One 
consequence of this is that significant aspects of cryonic suspension’s complexity and 
sociohistorical significance have long remained hidden.  To recover both context and 
complexity, therefore, I focus far less on Nelson and far more on the cryonic suspension patients 
who were lost at Chatsworth—and elsewhere.  For the historical threads tying the Chatsworth 
patients to their common fate inevitably also lead to the (long-since defunct) Cryonics Society of 
New York (CSNY): East Coast rival of the CSC and breakaway group from Ev Cooper’s Life 
Extension Society.  Under principle direction from cryonics activists Curtis Henderson, an 
attorney, and Saul Kent, a student at Hunter College, six patients were frozen during the CSNY’s 
years of operation from 1965-1974.  None of the CSNY’s patients remain in cryonic suspension 
today.   
In Chapter 4, I consider the CSNY patients in tandem with those lost at Chatsworth.  
Who were they?  When and under what circumstances did they learn of cryonic suspension?  
What ultimately happened to them?  Attending to these questions brings into focus complex sets 
of relationships that existed between the CSC and the CSNY, as well as the chaotic 
circumstances under which early cryonic suspensions generally were carried out.  These 
questions, however, also court narratives dealing in pain, loss, anguish and desperation—death.  
Often moving, at times disturbing, the narratives, whatever their shortcomings, nevertheless 
humanize the patients lost by the CSNY and thus as well the victims of Chatsworth.  Most 
importantly in this vein of argument, the narratives offer a counter to the implicit charge that the 
21 
 
Chatsworth victims especially were mere “dupes.”  As Nelson was found guilty of fraud, it 
necessarily follows that the victims and their families were found to have been defrauded.  In no 
way does this diminish, however, the significance of the very real circumstances which prompted 
the victims and their families to pursue cryonic suspension.  Nor does it diminish the meaning 
and significance that the practice had acquired for them.  Nor, for that matter, do the matters of 
cryonic suspension’s scientific (il)legitimacy and technological (in)feasibility figure here in any 
significant way.  Regardless of whether or not cryonic suspension one day “will” or even “can” 
prove efficacious; regardless of Bob Nelson’s acts and intentions, what matters is that a group of 
people were in the American 1960s drawn to the technique, believed in it, and were ultimately 
moved to act.  
The nature of the circumstances under which the Chatsworth victims and the CSNY 
patients came to believe and act—indeed, the circumstances under which the practice of cryonic 
suspension acquired for them meaning and significance—these issues are introduced in Chapter 
2 and taken up again in Chapter 4.  These same circumstances, I maintain, motivated Ettinger 
and Cooper to write their respective manifestos, and furthermore prompted Nelson and 
Henderson to answer, in practice, their calls to “freeze-now.”  These circumstances are also the 
familiar subject of a broad wealth of scholarship, the principle contributors to which, whatever 
their divergences otherwise may be, nevertheless converge on the point that death, under western 
modernity, has been and generally is handled “uniquely badly.”62    
Following Zygmunt Bauman’s interpretation, this at base is attributable to the position of 
“sovereignty” assumed by reason under western modernity.  For over time reason undercuts, 
renders problematic, and ultimately places under suspicion those forms of intersubjective 
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meaning and ritual practice which have historically worked to make sense of and assuage the 
existential terror that death necessarily presents.  Reason, however, left alone in the cultural-cum-
epistemic lacunae its sovereignty ultimately carves out, is in no way up to the task it has created 
for itself, for death does not yield to reason.  It is in this sense precisely, Bauman writes, that 
under modernity death is scandalous—death “loudly declares reason’s lie.”  Death, consequently, 
is modernity’s “guilty secret.”  As it is impotent in the face of death, then, reason, principally in 
its instrumental form as science and technology, is pressed into the service of excluding death, 
concealing it from modern life.
63
  
Bauman’s argument has powerful resonances with a broad institutional trend that 
Anthony Giddens has referred to as the “sequestration of experience.”  Anticipating a return to 
these issues in Chapters 2 and 5, for now it will suffice to say that for Giddens, modern 
institutional arrangements are characterized by routinization, predictability, and the operational 
control of internally-referential technological systems.  In order to emerge and maintain, 
however, modern institutional arrangements require the “sidelining,” the “sequestration” from 
the routines of everyday life, of a cluster of fundamental existential issues which raise profound 
moral and ethical dilemmas for human beings, among them criminality, madness, sickness, 
sexuality, nature, and chiefly, of course, for our purposes here, death.
64
  As it pertains to death 
specifically, Giddens’ sequestration thesis connotes the familiar historical narrative by which 
death, dying, and the dead, under western modernity, are gradually removed from communal 
space and drawn into the institutional contexts of hospital, funeral home, nursing home, and later 
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hospice.
65
  Sequestration as such hardly entails the “resolution” of death, but rather its removal 
and institutional concealment from everyday life; the individuation and “management” of death, 
the dead, and the dying by cadres of technical experts.
66
  Insofar as death is ultimately 
unresolvable, however, uncontrollable, this means that its institutional sequestration will always 
fall short.
67
   
To this point sequestration, Giddens writes, is hardly a “once-and-for-all phenomenon,” 
and as such “does not represent a set of frictionless boundaries.” It is “internally complicated,” 
rather, and “throws up contradictions,” as the “frontiers” of sequestration are “full of tensions 
and poorly mastered forces.”68  Sequestration is thus an ongoing process characterized by 
leakages, breakdowns, and failed containments; it is a “modernizing project” that will always 
come up short.
69
  Just like everyone else, “we moderns” are in one way or another fated to 
encounter death.  But because death has been more or less removed from the experiential 
routines of everyday life in the modern world, the ability to develop a shared normative 
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awareness of death has been considerably frustrated.
70
  Moreover, following Bauman, the 
sovereign position assumed by reason has significantly diminished both the perceived legitimacy 
and thus the efficacy of those intersubjective forms of meaning and ritual practice which have 
historically made sense of death; reason has failed to replace with scientific certainties the 
religious and moral certainties it has placed under suspicion.
71
  Thus, people are in effect left to 
“their own resources when searching for meanings to cope with the limits of individual 
existence.”72  One profound consequence, then, of death’s sequestration, is that the onus of 
responsibility for devising meaningful strategies to cope with death ultimately falls to individuals 
who lack the requisite and experientially grounded psychic faculties and cultural resources to 
effectively confront, let alone cope with and assuage, the existential terror that death ultimately 
presents.  Confusion, anxiety, shame, and terror prevail.
73
  
As I elaborate in Chapter 4, the American 1960s represent a low point in modernity’s 
“uniquely bad” handling of death and dying, evidencing a particularly pronounced moment of 
“failed containment” in the history of institutional sequestration.  While the televised atrocities of 
the Vietnam War brought death to heightened levels of awareness—a key dimension of the 
cultural malaise of the 1960s broadly—American ways of death and dying were also during this 
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time “examined critically and found wanting.”74   The hospice, death education, and death 
awareness movements emerged at this moment of widespread disaffection.
75
  So did cryonic 
suspension.  
 
 
Cold War Simulacra 
 
It is at this point that links appear evident between the interpretive payoff that follows 
from moving beyond the Ettinger origin narrative—namely, cryonic suspension’s ties to 
cybernetics—and the preceding contextual complexities revealed by moving beyond the Nelson 
atrocity tale.  Cryonic suspension, in other words, appears to be the product of a tension, or, 
better, an affinity, between the “failed containment” of and ensuing cultural malaise surrounding 
death and dying, and the circulation of cybernetic concepts and predictions throughout the 
broader culture of 1960s America.
76
  Indeed, this affinity defines the circumstances under which 
the practice emerged and was pursued.  For as we have seen, Norbert Wiener’s pronouncement 
regarding the coming of a “second industrial revolution” had the effect of producing a space of 
anticipation, of hope, into which Cooper and Ettinger were drawn.  The true significance of their 
shared anticipation of the “robot surgeons of the future,” however, and their motivation to pen 
“freeze now” manifestos in light of this anticipation, can only be understood up against the 
broader context of modernity’s “uniquely bad” handling of death coming to a head in 1960s 
America.  Wiener’s pronouncement of a second industrial revolution created an expectation for 
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the intelligent machines that would herald its arrival—an expectation manifest, in Ettinger and 
Cooper initially, and later those who would heed their call to “freeze now,” as a wish for 
immortality by way of robot surgeons. Cryonic suspension, then, and the work that Ettinger, 
Cooper and others carried out to propose and help put the technique into practice, emerged in 
this gap between the wish and its anticipated fulfillment—a gap both produced and enveloped by 
an affinity between Wiener’s pronouncement and the sad state of death and dying in the 
American 1960s.  
In defining the conditions under which cryonics emerged, this affinity also points towards 
what kind of practice cryonic suspension “is.”  There is a potential for enormous confusion here.   
For cryonics, as both a technique conceived and a practice ultimately carried out in anticipation 
of the arrival of “machines” capable of facilitating the repair, rejuvenation, and “reanimation” of 
the “deanimated,” is modeled in its form as Cold War technoscience.  This technoscientific form, 
however, is entirely exterior.  Cryonics, moreover, both in terms of the frozen bodies themselves 
but also the ideas set forth in Ettinger and Cooper’s manifestos, is a clear exaggeration of 
technoscience, to the point of blatant excess.  This is hardly insignificant.  For considered in light 
of the fact that both Ettinger and Cooper were non-scientists, i.e. uncredentialed laymen, who 
imagined and operated far outside the formal institutional contexts of Cold War technoscientific 
production, this exterior technoscientific excess is a clear indicator of cryonic suspension’s status 
as a simulacrum.   
I am departing here from the more commonplace definition, typically associated with the 
work of Jean Baudrillard,
77
 which posits the simulacrum as a “copy of a copy whose relation to 
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[its] model has become so attenuated that it can longer properly be said to be a copy.”78  Instead, 
following Gilles Deleuze,
79
 I regard the simulacrum, at least as it relates to cryonic suspension, 
as less a copy several times removed from its model and more a “phenomenon of a different 
nature altogether.”80  
If we say of the simulacrum that it is a copy of a copy, an infinitely degraded 
icon, an infinitely loose resemblance, we then miss the essential, that is, the 
difference in nature between simulacrum and copy, or the aspect by which they 
form two halves of the same division.  The copy is an image endowed with 
resemblance, the simulacrum is an image without resemblance. […] Without 
doubt, [the simulacrum] still produces an effect of resemblance; but this is an 
effect of the whole, completely external and produced by totally different means 
than those at work within the model.
81
   
 
What this means is that there is a severe internal discord between cryonic suspension and its 
putative technoscientific model—it is something other than that the technoscience it simulates.  
This internal discord is masked, however, camouflaged, by cryonics’ external and excessive 
technoscientific form—thus the effect of resemblance to which Deleuze alludes.  Masked 
internal differences such as these are at the root of the simulacrum’s calling card—it produces an 
effect of “uncanniness,” a sense that something is “off,” “strange,” “not quite right.”82  As I 
elaborate in Chapter 2, this is a quite common reaction to cryonic suspension, and is certainly the 
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most formidable obstacle one will encounter in attempting to understand the practice.  For any 
resemblances cryonics bears to its putative model—technoscience—are external, superficial, 
deceptive, and remarkably confusing.  And as with simulacra more broadly, the uncanny affect, 
the lack of orientation produced by cryonic suspension’s masked internal differences, make the 
practice remarkably resistant to narration, for at base cryonics is at once both “removed from 
and proximate to its point of origin,”83 its putative technoscientific model.   
Just what kind of practice, then, “is” cryonic suspension?  It is obviously a death practice, 
and this is certainly part of the internal discord its external technoscientific form masks.  Two 
points merit consideration here, both of which will receive extended treatment in Chapter 3.  
First, while Ettinger and Cooper operated outside the contexts of formal technoscientific 
production, they did so at a time when cybernetics was becoming a “cult topic,” circulating 
broadly throughout the culture of the American 1960s, its concepts and attendant rhetorical 
strategies of legitimacy exchange and the discontinuous transmission of ideas being made 
available for new and unanticipated forms of use
84—“downstream,” as it were, by amateurs like 
Ettinger and Cooper.
85
  This is the source of cryonic suspension’s external and excessive 
technoscientific form.  Second, this was preceded by cybernetics having rapidly fallen out of 
favor in intellectual circles, losing virtually all scientific credibility in the United States and 
Britain.
86
  This, coupled with the fact that Ettinger and Cooper were credentialed neither as  
scientists, engineers, nor medical doctors, conspired in barring them from participation in and 
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being taken seriously by the technoscientific mainstream. Mortuary and cemetery operations 
were the only viable institutional spaces through which to pursue the “freeze and wait idea.”  
This is where the technique of cryonics, as proposed in Ettinger’s Prospect especially, gained 
traction and was most vigorously pursued.  The CSC, under the direction of Robert Nelson, 
partnered with mortician Joseph Klockgether.  The CSNY, under the direction of Curtis 
Henderson and Saul Kent, partnered with mortician Fred Horn.  The freezings, as I chronicle in 
Chapter 4, the actual cryonic suspensions carried out by these base partnerships of lay, non-, or 
amateur scientific actors, thus rendered concrete a very strange set of articulations between Cold 
War technoscience and mortuary techniques.  
Thus cryonics is certainly a death practice, but this only gets at part of the confusion 
deriving from its status as a simulacrum.  To get at the true source of the internal discord that its 
external and excessive technoscientific form masks, it must be asked: What kind of death 
practice is cryonics?  If we accept, as sketched above, that cryonics emerged in a gap between a 
wish for immortality and its anticipated fulfillment by robot surgeons of the future; a gap 
produced, moreover, and enveloped, by an affinity between Wiener’s famed pronouncement and 
the sad state of death and dying in the American 1960s; if all this is accepted, then we need not 
venture too far to find an answer, for this at base is how Marcel Mauss defines magic: “Between 
a wish and its fulfillment there is, in magic, no gap.”87  Magic arises, in other words, in the 
“hiatus between the wish and its fulfillment.”88  Thus cryonics’ status as a simulacrum—it is a 
magical practice masquerading as the technoscience it simulates.
89
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***** 
 
Throughout the remaining chapters, this interpretation of cryonic suspension as a magical 
practice is further developed and contextualized in a number of ways.  In Chapter 2, I provide an 
overview of the source materials, methodology, and theoretical commitments which have 
together led me to this interpretation.  To this lattermost point, I offer a two-pronged theoretical 
discussion.  First, I discuss cryonics as a simulacrum and ultimately a magical practice in 
relation to two additional concepts: the uncanny and abundant phenomena.  I offer discussions of 
these concepts to the reader as something of a cognitive map, and I do so for several reasons.  On 
the one hand, I want to relate the nature of the unease and confusion I that have permeated my 
efforts get a handle on the “something strange” about cryonics, thereby situating myself in 
relation to my research topic; acknowledging the discomfort and confusion it has caused me; 
how these concepts helped me sort through it; and ultimately how they enabled me to clear a 
space in which to conceptualize and carry out the present study.  On the other hand, my aim is 
simultaneously to minimize, at the outset, the potential for such discomfort and confusion as I 
experienced to consume the reader, by offering a set of guiding concepts with which to 
productively engage and think about cryonic suspension.  
 The second prong of theoretical discussion draws considerably from the work of 
Zygmunt Bauman, who has argued that reason, in its instrumental form as science and 
technology, has come to operate as a powerful channeling agent for the very sorts of magical 
practices, expectations, and forms of association that theorists of secularization, for instance, 
expected modernity to displace.
90
  I consider Bauman’s theorization up against Anthony 
Giddens’ sequestration of death thesis, and ultimately move to advance the argument, drawing 
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principally from Bauman, that modernity’s “uniquely bad” handling of death has eventuated, 
paradoxically, in a modern recourse to magic.
91
   
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, in different ways, position cryonics as a case through which to 
elaborate this argument.  In Chapter 3, I focus on the historical emergence of cryonic suspension, 
and in so doing explicate the ties of the practice to the postwar science of cybernetics, thereby 
lending evidence to Ronald Kline’s disunity of cybernetics thesis.  This chapter will also 
elaborate Kline’s thesis by arguing that the style of “social work” performed by Ettinger and 
Cooper, that is to say, their use of the rhetorical strategies of legitimacy exchange and the 
discontinuous transmission of ideas, evidences a form of bricolage—magic—a means through 
which they constructed their freeze now manifestoes; piecemeal arguments that fail in terms of 
legitimating technoscientific criteria, but which serve to render death knowable and thus 
manageable.
92
  In this sense, I argue, cryonics belongs to an emergent class of (magical) 
practices that Bauman has termed survival strategies.
93
 At the same time, however, cryonics is a 
simulacrum of Cold War technoscience. I develop this claim and sharpen cryonics’ intelligibility 
by comparing it to two other kinds of cybernetic entities, both of which emerged in the same 
sociohistorical context, and which, like cryonic suspension, harbor considerable uncanny 
potential—“cybernetic monsters” (Andrew Pickering’s apt phrase94), and the iconic figure of the 
cyborg.  All of this, finally, is set within a broader discussion of Norbert Wiener’s famed 
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pronouncement that systems of computerized control—“thinking machines”—would herald the 
coming of a second industrial revolution; how these pronouncements circulated broadly 
throughout American culture; produced spaces of hope and anticipation, such as that into which 
Ettinger, Cooper, and their followers were drawn; and which furthermore created anxiety for fear 
of dehumanizing automation, which ultimately led Wiener himself to reflect upon what he saw 
as cybernetics’ parallels with sorcery and black magic, most notably pronounced in the figure of 
the Golem—the artificial man of Jewish legend.95 
Chapter 4 then moves to trace the grim adventures of those who took up the call of 
Ettinger and Cooper to “freeze now”—Bob Nelson and his associate, mortician Joseph 
Klockgether, and Curtis Henderson, Saul Kent and mortician Fred Horn—and thus as well the 
lives of those who were frozen and ultimately lost.  The payoff of this chapter is fourfold.  First, I 
offer answers to the questions about the cryonics patients set forth above: Who were they?  
When and under what circumstances did they learn of cryonic suspension?  What ultimately 
happened to them?  Second, in proceeding as such, I show how the manifestos produced by 
Ettinger and Cooper circulated and brought together various families and individuals into shared 
spaces of anticipation, under the auspices of the CSC and the CSNY, thereby rendering their 
hopes and fears intelligible, humanizing them, and furthermore demonstrating the material 
instantiation of cryonic suspension as an emergent survival strategy.  Third, in so doing I 
demonstrate the catastrophic events at Chatsworth “in the making.”96  All of this, lastly, is set 
within a broader consideration of the particularly pronounced moment of “failed containment” in 
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the history of attempts to institutionally sequester death, dying and the dead under western 
modernity.  
Chapter 5, finally, following a recapitulation of the study overall, returns to the Ettinger 
origin story and the Nelson atrocity tale, in a bid to throw into sharp relief what these narratives 
have conspired in concealing, namely, those conditions of American culture that gave rise to 
cryonic suspension in the first place.  By offering an interpretation of cryonic suspension as a 
(magical) survival strategy, the emergence of which is tied to the shortcomings of modernity’s 
institutional sequestration of death, I make good on the claim, adapted from Jonathan Z. Smith 
and Viktor Shklovsky, set forth at the outset of this chapter—that “extraordinary cognitive 
power” comes with rendering the seemingly strange familiar, part of the ordinary every day.  For 
what such an interpretation ultimately reveals, I maintain, is that cryonics reflects a desperate 
turn to technoscience in an effort to escape the world technoscience has created; a turn to 
technoscience to overcome the very issue that reveals its outer limit—death.  Cryonics’ 
marginality, in this sense, the seemingly “bizarre” nature of the practice, is thus inseparable from 
one of modernity’s key constitutive features—the institutional sequestration of death, dying, and 
the dead from everyday life.   The broader payoff of the study, following from this, is that it 
demonstrates the necessity of (re)positioning death at the center of social theory and analysis 
broadly, lest this institutional sequestration be replicated and reinforced at the level of 
disciplinary knowledge generated about modern social life.  
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Chapter 2: Materials and Method 
 
 
The previous chapter, in addition to offering an outline of the overall architecture of the 
present study, set forth a preliminary interpretation of cryonic suspension as a simulacrum of 
Cold War technoscience—it is ultimately a magical practice masquerading as the technoscience 
it simulates.  In no small measure, my ability to arrive at this interpretation follows from my 
having been granted access to a veritable wealth of previously unutilized historical materials.  
Taking these materials as a common point of reference, my aim in this chapter is threefold.  First, 
I begin with an overview of the source materials and provide an account of how I came to access 
them.  I then move to offer a discussion of two absolutely crucial concepts: abundant phenomena 
and the uncanny.  In the course of my research on cryonics, it was only when I discovered the 
language afforded by these concepts that I was able to really begin making sense of the 
narratives my source materials disclosed; to relate these narratives to broader theoretical 
concerns; and to present cryonics intelligibly and without embarrassment to other people.  The 
entire study, in other words, hinges quite considerably upon these two concepts.  I offer 
discussions of them in this chapter, then, for two principle reasons: first, to relate the extreme 
confusion and frustration that haunted my research in their absence, and second, to provide 
something of a cognitive map; to minimize the potential for such confusion and frustration as I 
experienced to overwhelm the reader.  The chapter concludes, finally, with a discussion of the 
methodological strategy I relied upon in arriving at the architecture of the overall study, 
anticipating the interpretive claims I develop in Chapters 3 and 4.   
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Materials 
 
This interpretation of cryonic suspension draws from a veritable wealth of primary 
materials, which range across four basic types: (1) original documents of the early cryonics 
organizations, their founders, members and dissenters: newsletters, correspondences, personal 
notes, public relations material, mortuary records, technical manuals and reports; (2) films and 
photographs; (3) legal documents; (4) news and popular press coverage from the early 1960s to 
the 1980s.  These materials are quite obscure; all but a small fraction are inaccessible to those 
operating outside the cryonics community.  Indeed, the overwhelming majority of these materials 
have neither before been systematically archived by an historian or librarian nor utilized as 
sources for the purpose of conducting sociohistorical research. 
My access to these materials came through contacts I established with two of the cryonics 
community’s veteran activists: Mike Darwin (aka Michael Federowitz) and R. Michael Perry.  
Darwin, a dialysis technician by trade, is former President of the Alcor Life Extension 
Foundation in Scottsdale, Arizona (previously Riverside, California) where during his tenure 
(1982-1988) he carried out research and assisted in the performance of several cryonic 
suspensions.  Perry, who holds a Ph.D. in computer science, is presently the care service 
manager at Alcor; he monitors and helps maintain Alcor’s 122 cryonic suspension patients in 
liquid nitrogen.  In addition to having actively and consistently moved in the innermost circles of 
the practice since the late 1960s, both Darwin and Perry are deeply committed to preserving and 
interpreting the history of cryonic suspension.  Perry, to this end, also serves as Alcor’s principle 
archivist and historian.  In fact, since 1981, he has authored a column devoted to recalling key 
moments and figures in the history of cryonics, “For the Record,” which appears regularly in 
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Alcor’s quarterly (previously monthly) magazine, Cryonics.97  It was through Perry’s column 
that I was first awakened to the dizzying expanse of truly rare and fascinating historical materials 
he has amassed over the years at Alcor.  Unable to independently locate even a fraction of the 
primary materials noted in Perry’s citations—despite having at my disposal the resources of the 
world-class research library at the University of Illinois—in the fall of 2009 I wrote to Perry, 
explained my interest in the history of cryonic suspension, and simply asked if he would be 
willing to share materials with a fellow historian.  He kindly obliged, providing me with digital 
copies of several cryonics newsletters, most notably among them Freeze-Wait-Reanimate (1964-
1969), the very first cryonics newsletter, published and circulated monthly by the first cryonics 
organization, Evan Cooper’s Washington D.C.-based Life Extension Society (1963-1969), and 
The Outlook (1970-1976), the monthly newsletter of the Cryonics Society of Michigan (now the 
Cryonics Institute), an organization founded by Robert C. W. Ettinger.  Upon several subsequent 
requests for additional materials, Perry ultimately went so far as to obtain permission from 
Alcor’s current CEO, Max More, to provide me with digital copies of highly sensitive 
photographs, mortuary records, and droves of legal documents pertaining to Robert Nelson, the 
Cryonics Society of California (CSC [1966-1976]), and the several cryonics patients who were 
lost at Chatsworth (of which more below).  
I first encountered Mike Darwin’s name quite early in my research; however, it was only 
when I discovered his cryonics blog, Chronopause: A Revolution in Time, that I was prompted to 
initiate contact with him.  In a July 2011 post titled “Casual Conversation: A Remembrance of 
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Things Past,”98 Darwin, who has been active in cryonics since his early teens, made it known 
that for several years he had been at work digitizing his personal collection of cryonics materials: 
literally thousands of rare photographs and documents (approximately sixteen cubic feet of 
historical material).  Moreover, as he was the protégé of Curtis Henderson (1926-2009), cryonics 
pioneer and Cryonics Society of New York (CSNY [1965-1974]) cofounder, Darwin inherited 
sizable portions of the long-since defunct CSNY’s core archival holdings.   
As with many things in the world of cryonics, “Casual Conversation” has an air of 
urgency about it.  I was quite shocked to read Darwin’s lamentations about the cryonics 
community’s pervasive disinterest in the history of the practice, and the attendant indifference to 
the fate of the historical materials he had been laboring so diligently to preserve.  “Apparently,” 
Darwin wrote, “with the exception of Dr. Mike Perry, no one else gives damn whether these 
resources survive or perish.”99  Darwin went on to explain that he was motivated in part to 
digitize and make available these materials in the hope that academic historians would one day 
find them to be of interest.  With this I promptly wrote to Darwin, explained, as I had done with 
Mike Perry, my interest in the early history of cryonic suspension, and simply asked if he would 
be willing to share certain materials with me.  He happily agreed, granting me full access to his 
personal collection of cryonics materials, most notably the CSNY archives, which contain 
organizational records, correspondences, and complete runs of Cryonics Reports (1966-1970) 
and Immortality (1969-1971), the monthly newsletters published and circulated by the CSNY.   
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 Imagining the future of cryonics, it would seem, at least for the majority of those 
invested, is indeed by far more important than reflecting upon and learning from the practice’s 
history; Darwin and Perry are in this respect quite anomalous.  I learned through correspondence 
with Darwin, for instance, that Evan Cooper (1926-1982/83[?]), who in 1969 walked away from 
cryonic suspension due to “over-load, burn-out, and a general sense that it was not going to be a 
viable option in his lifetime,” in May of 1982 collected his personal papers and correspondences 
and “deep-sixed” them, i.e. disposed of them at sea.  Not long thereafter, in December of 1982, 
Cooper, an avid sailor, disappeared in his sailboat, “Pelican,” off the New England coast, never 
to be seen or heard from again.
100
  Robert Ettinger (1918-2011), moreover, so-called “father” of 
cryonic suspension, several years ago, and for undisclosed reasons, burned his own and most of 
the CSM’s [Cryonic Society of Michigan’s] correspondence, photos,” and so forth.101  Ettinger’s 
legacy of disregard (contempt?) for the past lives on at the Michigan-based Cryonics Institute 
(CI), a latter-day incarnation of the CSM.  When I attempted to establish a line of 
correspondence at CI regarding potential access to historical sources, a CI staff member replied 
that all the information I could possibly need is accessible via the CI website 
(http://cryonics.org).  Alas, the remarkably dated and unnavigable CI website is precisely what 
prompted me to initiate correspondence in the first place!
102
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My efforts to establish correspondence with representatives of the other active cryonics 
organizations have met with similar outcomes.  With Mike Perry vouching for me, I was able to 
open a brief line of communication with Jim Yount, Chief Operations Officer of the American 
Cryonics Society (ACS), formerly the Bay Area Cryonics Society (BACS).  Founded in 1969, 
the ACS is the oldest cryonics organization presently in operation.  The ACS is also highly 
secretive.
103
  Yount was initially receptive to my plans to extend a conference trip to the Bay 
Area into a research opportunity to both interview him and go through ACS/BACS archives.  He 
simply asked to know a bit more about me and my intentions, a request to which I happily 
replied with a CV and an extended description of my overall interest in cryonics’ history.104  He 
never replied.  Subsequent emails went unanswered.  My attempts to establish correspondence 
with Art Quaife, moreover, mathematician, BACS veteran, and former President of Trans Time, 
Inc., partner organization of the ACS, were, in the course of planning a subsequent conference 
trip to the Bay Area, similarly unsuccessful.  
Much more recently, in the course of working through the wealth of source materials 
gathered from Perry and Darwin, I came across a brief essay, “And Now, for the Rest of the 
Story,” authored by a man named Kenneth Bly.105  It offered what struck me as an amateurish, 
warped, and very one-sided account of Robert Nelson’s involvement in the CSC and the events 
at Chatsworth.  Further investigation revealed Bly to be closely acquainted with Nelson.  After 
having been found guilty of fraud in California Civil Court in 1981, Nelson returned fulltime to 
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his television repair business; Bly was initially one of his employees, with no ties to cryonics 
previously.  In the course of his employment, however, Bly seemingly became Nelson’s 
confidant regarding the latter’s involvement in cryonics during the 1960s and 70s.  Indeed, 
according to Bly, Nelson granted him “unimpeded access” to a “large chest he kept stored in his 
garage,” which contained “court documents from the trial in ’81, correspondences, newsletters, 
etc.”106  In an online post to a defunct cryonics forum from 2004, Bly furthermore announced 
plans for a website that would showcase a range of Nelson’s materials, as well as photographs 
and digitized films of early cryonic suspensions.
107
  I wrote to Bly at the email address indicated 
in his essay, inquiring about the website and access to Nelson’s materials more broadly.  He 
replied surprisingly fast, addressing both the failed launch of the website and the contents of 
Nelson’s storage chest.  He furthermore made it a point to mention that he was helping Nelson 
write a cryonics memoir, Freezing People is (not) Easy, the release of which is slated to coincide 
(of course) with Morris and Helm’s upcoming film, discussed in the previous chapter, Freezing  
People is Easy.  Bly seemed quite willing to discuss and even share materials, asking only that I 
give him a sense of what I was looking for.  I responded with a three page letter, outlining in 
some detail my interests in cryonics’ history and the CSC, and how this translated into a need to 
see certain kinds of materials, e.g. the CSC’s newsletter, Cryonics Review.  A month went by.  
No response.  I followed up with another email, to which Bly replied, “I like the idea of talking 
to you before I send anything.”108  I called the number he provided.  The ensuing conversation 
was brief, strained, and strange.  He seemed confused, and I soon came to doubt that he bothered 
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to read the letter I had sent.  He asked me over and over again what I would like to see from 
Nelson’s collection, as if I somehow knew what it contained.  The first few times he asked I tried 
to stress, historically speaking, that I would like to see anything and everything he would be 
willing to show me; that ideally I would be granted “unimpeded access” to these materials, much 
as Nelson had granted him; much as Darwin and Perry granted me to their collections.  This got 
me nowhere, so I finally resorted to asking, specifically, for any and all photographs, films, and 
legal documentation pertaining to the patients lost at Chatsworth and the ensuing civil trial.  He 
replied, defensively, “but that’s just all the bad stuff!”109  And with that I moved to end the 
conversation swiftly and gracefully, for at this point it became clear to me that Bly’s comfort 
zone regarding Nelson’s involvement with cryonics was quite narrow, extending neither beyond 
nor into potential criticism of the narrative version of events he had constructed in “And Now, 
for the Rest of the Story.”  I suggested that we simply arrange to talk again after I had a chance 
to read the book he and Nelson were writing, so I could ask questions that were more to his 
liking.   
As a final note, it should be known that early in my dealings with Mike Darwin I offered 
to search out research institutions that might have an interest in completing the costly digitization 
process he had begun and ultimately take stewardship over his personal collection of cryonics 
materials.  He happily agreed to let me search out institutions and serve as a liaison on his behalf.  
I first presented his collection to the University of Illinois Archives at Urbana-Champaign.  
While there was serious interest in acquiring the collection, as evidenced by a series of meetings 
between myself, a University Archivist, and the Director of University Collections, the 
University of Illinois ultimately passed, citing what struck me as needlessly conservative worries 
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over copyright issues.  With this I moved to offer the collection to the Director of the Science 
and Technology Special Collections Library at Stanford University.  Interest was expressed, to 
the extent that samples of the collection were requested and sent.  Little more than this took 
shape, however, and upon subsequent unanswered email follow-ups I decided to next offer the 
collection to New York University (NYU).  I did so principally because the collection contains a 
very rich record of the CSNY, and because the first person frozen by the CSNY, Steven J. 
Mandell, was at the time of his death an undergraduate student at NYU.  As with my previous 
two efforts, this one came up short as well—but for a very different and quite tragic reason.   
On October 10, 2014, Mike Darwin’s house in Northern Arizona burned to the ground.  
He and his partner escaped with their lives and their two dogs.  It was a total loss otherwise.  His 
personal collection of cryonics material—sixteen cubic feet of historical documents and 
photographs—is gone.  While Darwin provided Mike Perry and myself with copies of everything 
he had managed to digitize over the years, all else is now lost.  This tragic event consequently 
bestowed upon me the dubious honor of possessing what is now in all likelihood the third 
(possibly the second) largest cryonics archive in the world.  Finding myself in this position has 
led me to find new and quite tragic meaning in John R. Hall’s recent and otherwise humorous 
transposition of Donald Rumsfeld—that historians go to war with the archives they have, not the 
archives they would like.
110
  Being in this position has also led me to understand, sadly and 
anew, the urgency and truth contained in one of the first and best pieces of advice that Mike 
Darwin ever gave me:  
                                                            
110 The original passage reads as such: “Many people laughed at former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
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Some things I learned about cryonics early and well are that it is a tremendously 
dynamic and unstable thing—and not in a good way.  I learned to grab onto to 
information and opportunities quickly, because they so often disappeared—more 
often forever, than not.
111
 
 
 
Unsafe Categories 
 
Abundant Phenomena  
 
Access to a wealth of primary source materials notwithstanding, cryonic suspension is a 
baffling practice; it is maddeningly difficult to pin down.  My research into cryonics has led me 
to attribute this affective quality of the practice to the fact that it seems to be located within the 
register of cultural and historical experience which is home to phenomena that historian Robert 
Orsi calls “abundant events,” among which he includes:  
relationships (among living persons, between generations, between humans and 
saints, and so on), objects (such as the Host or a corpse), sense perceptions (the 
smell of sanctity, for example, or the feel of blood), special beings (ghosts, 
demons, ancestors, imagined-desired-feared persons), the body-in-culture (among 
the sick and those in pain, for instance, the “crippled,” “children,” the “insane” 
and all other such marked categories) and memory.
112
 
 
Abundant events are those “uncanny things” residing “beyond the narratives that frame our 
understandings of the world and constitute authorized knowledge.”  In other words, those aspects 
of “human imagination” at play in abundant events far exceed the “authorized limits” of what 
can be taken as worthy of inquiry; spoken of and written about as actual.
113
   
Hauntings, possessions, exorcisms, UFO sightings, divine apparitions and interventions; 
faith healings, prophecies, communication with deities, saints, or the dead; magic—Orsi’s 
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characterization of such events and practices as “abundant” is remarkably apt, for it is precisely 
this experiential surplus, this something “more” at play in abundant phenomena, which 
consistently eludes the rationalist underpinnings of the modern intellectual cultures of the 
humanities and especially the positivist social sciences.  Abundant events are often simply 
ignored, “passed over in silence.”114  In those instances in which they are acknowledged, 
abundant events tend overwhelmingly to be derided, dismissed as delusions—“Children are 
susceptible to scary stories; desperate people do whatever they need to do to get comfort or 
relief.”115  At best, Orsi writes, abundant events are accounted for as “distorted refractions of the 
real circumstances of life,” which those of us laboring in the social sciences are authorized to 
know, represent and speak about as social, political, and economic.  Make no mistake, Orsi is 
denying neither the reality of these forms of power nor that they decisively shape and are 
threaded through the practices, works of imagination, and kinds of experience that characterize 
abundant events.  He is objecting, rather, to the tendency of modern forms of analysis to 
transpose abundant events and reified categories of social power—Orsi calls them “safe 
categories”116—by which the former come to be read in terms of and are often reduced to the 
latter.  Transposition thus understood erases the existence of abundant events, and in so doing 
denies the significance of those myriad practices, labors of imagination, and forms of experience 
in which people search out meaning and direction, and through which they offer accounts of their 
lives, the world, and other people.
117
  Orsi, therefore, has called for an “abundant history,” which 
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foregoes the work of transposition; which incorporates yet moves several steps beyond the 
ethnographic aim of empathetic understanding; which aspires to a hermeneutics of respect 
attuned to the cultural and historical conditions in and through which abundant phenomena 
emerge, take shape and “happen;” which allows abundant phenomena the requisite room in our 
analyses to exist and breathe; which ultimately treats abundant phenomena as real.
118
   
From the “freeze now” manifestos penned by Robert Ettinger and Evan Cooper to the 
catastrophic events at Chatsworth that played out under Bob Nelson’s watch, cryonic suspension 
is a practice that is freighted with abundance—it evidences a lived reality that strains the 
conceptual comfort zones, the “safe categories,” of modernist epistemology and 
historiography.
119
  To take cryonics seriously; to endeavor to understand what cryonics is, how it 
emerged, and why it matters, requires not a wholesale abandonment of, say, academic sociology 
as such, but rather an insistence that sociology be pushed beyond its conceptual comfort zones 
and forced to contend with and reorient relative to those “unsafe” categories required to 
understand and speak about the lived realties it would otherwise mute and “pass over in 
silence.”120  In the case of cryonics, what is of course called for is a reorientation of inquiry 
around the most unsafe category of all—death.  
Keeping here with Orsi, academic sociology is so tightly and inextricably bound up with 
the “project of modernity” that the modern institutional sequestration of death is replicated in 
sociological theory and practice.  As Zygmunt Bauman, Chris Shilling, and Philip Mellor have 
pointed out, this is nowhere more plainly apparent than with the presence of a well-defined 
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subfield devoted to the sociological study of death, dying, and bereavement.
121
  For the presence 
of such a subfield both reflects and reinforces the tendency of academic sociologists, whatever 
their stripes and leanings, to regard death as being only marginally important to the study of the 
modern social, when in fact the sequestration of death is one of—in Bauman’s parlance the—
principle constitutive element of the “apparently more familiar topics of social and cultural 
life”122—the “real” realities—upon which sociologists proper, guided by “safe categories,” tend 
to train their analytical focus.  One of the principle wagers of this study is that cryonic 
suspension is a baffling practice, one which is maddeningly difficult to pin down, only to the 
extent that it is read in epistemic terms that safely accord with modernity’s sequestration of 
death.  To the extent that the modern sequestration of death is thrown into question, however, 
and death (re)located to the center of social inquiry writ large, cryonic suspension’s intelligibility 
increases accordingly.  This will become most evident in Chapters 3 and 4.  For in these chapters 
especially, instead of transposing cryonic suspension’s abundance, I use the abundant lived 
reality of cryonics to throw into question those authorized ways of knowing that would otherwise 
variously deride cryonics as a “cult,” a funerary “scam,” “pseudoscience,” or simply pass over 
the practice in silence.  Those ways of knowing, in other words, that safely accord with 
modernity’s sequestration of death.  
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The Uncanny 
 
As a practice freighted with abundance, cryonic suspension tends to produce an unusual 
and discomforting affect; it taps into that register of cultural and historical experience known as 
the uncanny.  (My own experiences with cryonics as such are what ultimately led me to locate 
the practice amid Orsi’s abundant phenomena, as I discuss below.)  Following the German 
psychiatrist Ernst Jentsch, the uncanny (das unheimlich) refers to an order of experience: being 
“ill at ease,” or “not quite at home,” which is at base affected by the “lack of orientation” 
produced by an uncanny object or incident.  Jentsch wisely avoids offering an “essential” 
definition of the uncanny, recognizing that considerable variance exists among people in terms of 
experiential sensitivity; indescribability, moreover, is in his view a key source of the cognitive 
distress, the terror of the uncanny.
 123
  And yet to this Jentsch is quick to add the following:  
Among all the psychical uncertainties that can become a cause for the uncanny 
feeling to arise, there is one in particular that is able to develop a fairly regular, 
powerful and very general effect: namely, doubt as to whether an apparently 
living being is inanimate and, conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless object 
may not in fact become animate—and more precisely, when this doubt only 
makes itself felt obscurely in one’s consciousness.124  
 
Waxwork figures, dolls, puppets and automatons: these are among the entities Jentsch 
considered to be key sources of the kind of doubt that gives way to the experience of the 
uncanny.  Following Jentsch, Sigmund Freud argued subsequently that most people experience 
the feeling of the uncanny “in the highest degree in relation to death and dead bodies, the return 
of the dead, and to spirits and ghosts.”125  Much more recently, researchers have drawn from 
both Jentsch and Freud to account for the confused sense of revulsion that tends to be elicited by 
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cyborgs and humanoid robots, lifelike CGI, and zombies.
126
  Following from this, given that the 
practice ultimately involves the material instantiation of liminal entities, i.e. entities seemingly 
neither alive nor dead, cryonic suspension is perhaps something of an exemplar of the 
uncanny.
127
  For here is a death practice that entails the management of corpses over the long-
term, as if they were potentially alive; the effect is a kind of frozen undecidability, doubt as to 
what cryonics and its patients “are,” which furthermore carry a strangely disconcerting affect.    
This flirtation with psychoanalysis is fitting beyond what it offers in the way of an 
interpretive guide to cryonic suspension: my early efforts to come to grips with cryonics, absent 
the conceptual language of the uncanny, drove me close to madness.
128
  Now this is not to say 
that the uncanny somehow “explains” cryonic suspension, but rather that the concept, paired 
with Orsi’s abundant phenomena, lends a much needed measure of interpretive leverage in 
getting a handle on the nature of the practice.  What I now regard as the uncanny affect at play in 
my first encounters with cryonics, the undeniable sense of “weirdness” about it, is initially what 
prompted me to commit to studying it.  In retrospect, I can also now say with a good deal of 
certainty that I believed, if only tacitly, that part of my task in pursuing a properly sociological 
study of cryonics was to explain away this sense of weirdness, which I had set out to achieve by 
accessing as much archival material as possible, as if that alone would allow me to determine 
just what cryonics is a “case” of.  Moving through droves of primary materials in tandem with a 
range of academic literatures, I stubbornly pursued this misguided task: from the sociology of 
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death and dying to social studies of science, technology and pseudoscience; from critical 
whiteness studies to the history and sociology of (bio)medicine; from histories and sociologies of 
new religious movements to accounts of the American counterculture and cold war science and 
technological innovation.  My moves from literature, to literature, to literature, to literature were 
accompanied by exhausting cycles of emotional extremes: “Aha, that’s it!” moments, were 
followed, ad nauseam, by manic fits of writing, lengthy spells of doubt, and then 
disappointment, panic, and writer’s block, before moving on yet again: “Aha, finally, that’s it!”  
I learned as I went, certainly, but that “something weird” about cryonics that kept confronting me 
in my archival research—that something about it that just didn’t seem right—I couldn’t explain it 
away; I couldn’t figure out what, exactly, cryonics is a “case” of.   
Only much later in my research did I come to the realization that what I was attempting 
to suppress by way of explanation, I should have been embracing and foregrounding as the 
principle route to achieving a more nuanced understanding of cryonic suspension, and the 
sociohistorical milieu in which the practice emerged—the tumultuous American 1960s.  This 
realization was preceded by a number of strange and uncomfortable situations, which over the 
past few years have arisen with great frequency in discussions of cryonics with friends and 
family, in the course of presenting segments of my research and early cryonics imagery to 
students in the Technology and Society seminar I taught at the University of Illinois, and to 
colleagues at a range of professional meetings. “I don’t understand,” my mother gasped, “why on 
earth are you studying that.”  A distinguished sociologist, whose pleasant company I briefly 
shared while standing in line for coffee outside a conference venue, echoed my mother’s lament, 
with a hearty chuckle: “Well, there’s really not much of a demand for research on stuff like 
that?”  Yet another distinguished sociologist, with whom I was discussing my research en route 
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to a departmental luncheon, was considerably less restrained in her remarks: “Why, it’s simply 
hedonism!  Pure hedonism!”  In one quite memorable instance, the expressed sentiments shared 
by my mother and distinguished colleagues was taken to their logical conclusion when one of my 
undergraduate students abruptly packed her things and exited the classroom midway through a 
lecture on cryonic suspension.  She later apologized, explaining that she simply found the topic 
to be “profoundly disturbing.”  (The same has happened at professional conferences, though 
notably without the courtesy of apologies after the fact.)    
Most disturbing of all, perhaps, is the remarkable frequency with which public 
presentations of my research on cryonics have occasioned my audiences, students and 
professionals alike, to erupt in laughter—howling, unrestrained, uncomfortable laughter.  While 
the comedic has been neither my adopted style nor intended aim, it is in retrospect hardly 
surprising that I have so frequently, yet unintentionally and quite embarrassingly, managed to 
elicit laughter in the course of presenting my research on cryonic suspension.  For as we know 
from Freud and others, laughter is often conjured by anxiety.  Indeed, it could even been said that 
the existential anxiety provoked by death is “the first cause of laughter.”129     
Though the evidence is at best anecdotal, and the argument at best conjectural,
130
 I 
attribute these all too frequent outcomes, in very large part, to the fact that in presenting my work 
on cryonics I have succeeded far less in clarifying the practice than in simply subjecting captive 
and unsuspecting audiences to refined doses of the uncanny, and thus as well to the very 
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cognitive discomfort that any given presentation of mine has meant to explain.  In other words, I 
have regrettably though quite unknowingly made people uncomfortable, without warning, and 
without offering anything in the way of an effective cognitive map with which to contextualize 
and make sense of the disturbing affective mood that my topic of study and its attendant imagery 
has tended to conjure.   
This is not to say, however, that I am somehow locating the source of this affective mood 
in cryonic suspension alone.  Indeed, it would be quite mistaken to do so; it would attribute to 
cryonics an “essentially” uncanny nature, outside of time and space, which it otherwise does not 
possess.  As I discussed in the introductory chapter, and as I note time and again throughout the 
following chapters, the conditions under which cryonics emerged were defined by an affinity 
 
 
Figure 2. Uncanny Imagery.  Mrs. Ann Deblasio, frozen and  
wrapped in aluminum foil, being placed in her  
“forever flask,” soon to be filled with liquid nitrogen   
and sealed by personnel of the Cryonics Society of  
New York, ca. 1969.   
 
      Source:  Curtis Henderson, “The Cryonic Suspension of Ann 
  DeBlasio,” Cryonics Reports 9, nos. 9-10 (1969):10, 
  PAMD.   
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between the failed sequestration of and ensuing cultural malaise surrounding death and dying, 
and the circulation of cybernetic concepts and predictions throughout the broader culture of 
1960s America, ultimately resulting in cryonics’ emergent status as a simulacrum of Cold War 
technoscience; a (magical) death practice masquerading as the technoscience it simulates.  An 
effect of uncanniness is one of the calling cards of simulacra broadly,
131
 and in this sense 
cryonics’ status as a simulacrum is arguably the practice’s principle source of the uncanny.  
Additional confusion, however, stems from the fact that the sequestration of death, the chief 
conspirator in producing the conditions in which cryonics emerged, has also conspired in the 
production of epistemic norms and practices of inquiry, as noted above, with which it is “safely” 
in accord.  Thus the epistemic blind spot vis-à-vis cryonics’ abundance; thus the confusion and 
frustration I have encountered in the course of my research; thus the anxious and personally 
embarrassing laughter of my audiences—death brought to awareness, by way of a simulacrum, 
under sociohistorical conditions in which death has been institutionally sequestered.  Cryonic 
suspension is in this sense less a “case” of something than it is an abundant phenomenon. 
 In sum, then, abundant phenomena and the uncanny have afforded me a language 
through which to achieve considerable interpretive leverage on cryonic suspension. Indeed, they 
at base are what led to me to an understanding of cryonics as a simulacrum; to advance an 
interpretation of cryonics as a magical practice; and ultimately to the realization that cryonics’ 
intelligibility requires a (re)orientation of inquiry into the modern social around the “unsafe” 
category of death.   I return to and develop these matters momentarily, following a discussion of 
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method, with the overall aim of highlighting their formative bearing upon the theoretical 
commitments and thus the architecture of the present study.   
 
 
Method 
 
In conceptualizing, periodizing, and ultimately carrying out this study of cryonic 
suspension, I have relied principally upon an interpretive “practice of inquiry” that John R. Hall 
terms “specific history.”132  A latter-day iteration of Max Weber’s project of verstehende 
soziologie, specific history “aligns” with cryonic suspension in that the latter is an “intrinsically 
constituted sociohistorical object.”  That is to say, cryonics was meaningful to the historical 
actors who pursued and participated in it prior to the practice having become meaningful as an 
object of inquiry.  Its coherence, in other words, is not the result of forced colligation based on 
the imposition of some abstract analytical criteria (as would be with an extrinsically constituted 
sociohistorical object), but rather follows from how cryonics was actually conceived, 
constructed, and carried out by social actors in the real historical time of practice.
133
  In light of 
this, the methodological prescriptions of specific history include the following: attention to the 
temporality and context of events and characters, with the overriding aim of teasing out and 
(thickly) describing and interpreting (intrinsically linked) narrative plots; attention to cultural 
elements, i.e. meanings, metaphors, tools, techniques and their sources, travels and linkages to 
plot; and finally, dialogue with social theory.
134
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Cambridge University Press, 1999), 210-216.   
133 Ibid., 210-211.  
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Dialogue with theory is in this study at play in two principle ways.  First, as evidenced in 
the course of the preceding several pages of the present chapter, I have leaned considerably upon 
social theory—especially the concepts of simulacrum, the uncanny, and abundant phenomena—
in an effort to achieve some semblance of leverage on cryonic suspension, ultimately eventuating 
in a (preliminary) interpretation of cryonics as a magical (death) practice masquerading as the 
technoscience it simulates. At the same time, however, following Bauman and others, this 
interpretation of cryonics is predicated upon and thus evidences the need for a (re)orientation of 
social theory and inquiry writ large around the unsafe category of death.  In this sense, to offer an 
account of the historical emergence of cryonic suspension, such as this study sets out to do, is to 
perform at the same time a theoretical intervention, one which is in keeping both with Bauman’s 
call for a move away from sociologies of death and Orsi’s call for histories of abundant 
phenomena.  
The following two chapters proceed along these lines, and in so doing take recourse to 
specific history’s core methodological strategy of emplotment.  Attention to historical plot 
simply requires one to attend to the very basic questions: “What happened and how?”135  In 
terms of the historical emergence of cryonic suspension in 1962 and its catastrophic failure by 
1979, sketches of the present study’s responses to these questions, which derive principally from 
interrogations of the Ettinger origin narrative and the Nelson atrocity tale, were introduced in 
Chapter 1.  So also was the base contention that cryonic suspension is the product of an affinity 
between the “failed containment” of and ensuing cultural malaise surrounding death and dying, 
and the circulation of cybernetic concepts and predictions throughout the broader culture of the 
American 1960s.  In the course of developing in the following two chapters the manifold 
                                                            
135 Hall, Cultures of Inquiry, 212.  
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historical plots of historical emergence, material instantiation, and catastrophic failure, I attempt 
to render cryonic suspension intelligible as a simulacrum, a (magical) practice masquerading as 
the technoscience it simulates.    
 In Chapter 5, I then move to use these historical plots and the interpretation of cryonics 
they facilitate in order to reassert the theoretical intervention I am attempting to make following 
Orsi, Bauman, and others, namely the importance of reorienting social theory and research 
around the unsafe category of death, lest modernity’s institutional sequestration of death be 
replicated at the level of disciplinary knowledge and practice.  
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Chapter 3: Cybernetic Sorcery: The Emergence of Cryonic Suspension 
 
In the preceding two chapters I have focused principally on developing interpretive 
claims regarding what kind of practice cryonic suspension “is.”  In proceeding as such, I have 
brought several (“unsafe”) concepts to bear upon cryonic suspension—the uncanny, abundant 
phenomena, magic, and simulacra.  Using the collective interpretive leverage of these concepts 
to render cryonics intelligible, ultimately relating the practice to Anthony Giddens’ and 
especially Zygmunt Bauman’s broader theoretical claims about the modern sequestration of 
death, I have furthermore developed a (preliminary) interpretation of cryonic suspension as a 
magical practice.  The present and remaining two chapters draw from and continue to develop 
these claims, while moving the study into a different register of interpretation—from a concern 
with what cryonics “is” to a concern with how and under what conditions cryonics emerged, was 
carried out in practice, and ultimately met with catastrophic failure.   
My consideration of these issues is organized with reference to the contention that 
cryonic suspension is the product of an historically contingent affinity between the “failed 
containment” of, and the ensuing cultural malaise surrounding, death and dying, and the 
circulation and appropriation of cybernetic concepts and predictions throughout the broader 
culture of 1960s America.  As I discussed at some length in Chapter 1, this affinity broadly 
defines the circumstances under which cryonics emerged and was pursued, undergirding 
cryonics’ emergent status as a simulacrum of Cold War technoscience; magical practice 
masquerading as the technoscience it simulates. The present chapter treats the cybernetic side of 
this affinity, attending, that is to say, to how the postwar science of cybernetics figured quite 
prominently in facilitating the construction and historical emergence of cryonic suspension as a 
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(magical) survival strategy—an attempt to “keep death at bay through a strategic maneuvering 
between various life options.”136 Chapter 4 will treat the death side of this affinity, attending to 
how and with what effects cryonic suspension, largely through the “freeze now” manifestos 
written by Evan Cooper and Robert Ettinger, circulated as a (then) emergent survival strategy, 
was taken up, realized in practice, and ultimately met with catastrophic failure.  Chapter 5, 
finally, will bring my treatments of each side of this affinity together; develop my overall 
interpretation of cryonic suspension as an abundant phenomenon, and conclude the present study 
as an exercise in and contribution to Zygmunt Bauman’s call for a move away from sociologies 
of death, and thus as well Robert Orsi’s call for histories of abundant phenomena.  
As for the cybernetic side of this affinity, then, explicating cryonics’ previously 
unexamined ties to cybernetics locates the practice in the milieu of Cold War technoscience, 
thereby rendering it intelligible.  At the same time, in proceeding as such cryonics is positioned 
as a case through which to arrive at contributions to social studies of science and technology 
more broadly.  To this lattermost point, the present chapter should be taken as evidence in 
support of Ronald Kline’s disunity of cybernetics thesis137; it furthermore presents the historical 
emergence of cryonics as a quite striking illustration of how science and technology can acquire 
unintended meanings and give rise to otherwise unanticipated projects, as they are variously 
consumed, appropriated, and repurposed “downstream,” as it were, by “non-” scientific actors.138   
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In the case of cryonic suspension’s historical emergence, the principle non-scientific 
actors in question are Evan Cooper and Robert C. W. Ettinger, the two key progenitors of 
cryonics who each penned a “freeze now” manifesto in the early 1960s: respectively, 
Immortality: Physically, Scientifically, Now and The Prospect of Immortality.  Offering 
interpretations of these texts in relation to the broader sociohistorical contexts in which Ettinger 
and Cooper imagined, wrote, and operated; demonstrating, that is to say, how they constructed 
their texts, I develop two distinct though deeply interrelated sets of claims about the relationship 
between cryonics and cybernetics.  First, I demonstrate that the cybernetic language of organism-
machine equivalence was a key cultural source and the root ontological-metaphorical basis upon 
which cryonics was constructed by Ettinger and Cooper.
139
  Relatedly, I demonstrate that both 
Ettinger and Cooper issued their respective calls to “freeze now” in light of expectations 
produced by Norbert Wiener’s famed proclamation that systems of computerized control would 
soon usher in a “second industrial revolution”140—a cybernetic “new age” in which machines 
would outstrip human intelligence and capabilities.  In terms of construction, I argue that 
Prospect and Immortality clearly evidence a form of bricolage—magic—piecemeal, 
unpredictable argumentation that fails in terms of legitimating technoscientific criteria, but which 
nevertheless serves to render death knowable and thus manageable.  In terms of expectation, 
likewise, I argue that magical thinking is evidenced by Cooper and Ettinger’s tendency to 
enlarge upon the virtues of certain objects, specifically “thinking machines,” i.e. computers, in 
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140 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (New York: John 
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the perceived ability of the latter to eventually be capable of reversing any given “cause” of 
death.
141
   
Thus, if in the previous chapter I argued that cryonics “is” a magical practice, in terms of 
both construction and expectation I move now in the present chapter to demonstrate how 
cryonics emerged as such.  The same holds for my identification of cryonics as a simulacrum of 
Cold War technoscience.  This then is the second claim I develop below.  Identifying cryonics as 
a magical practice locates the otherwise masked internal discord between cryonics and the 
technoscientific proposals, predictions, and entities it masquerades as—external simulation, 
which is an illusory effect produced by the cybernetic language of human-machine equivalence; 
the computational metaphor up through which the practice emerged.  This furthermore identifies 
the principle source of the uncanny affect that is the chief calling card of simulacra broadly, a 
point I develop by comparing cryonics with two other forms of cybernetic entity, both of which 
emerged in the same sociohistorical context, and which, like cryonic suspension, harbor 
considerable uncanny potential—cybernetic “monsters” (Andrew Pickering’s apt phrase142), and 
the iconic figure of the cyborg. 
 
Of Cyborg Astronauts and Terrestrial “Cryonauts” 
On August 5, 2005, at the Life Extension Conference in Atlanta, Georgia, representatives 
of the Immortality Institute, an international, not-for-profit organization (US 501-3-c) the 
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expressed mission of which is to “conquer the blight of involuntary death,”143 unveiled an “Open 
Letter” signed by more than sixty scientists, physicians, and philosophers endorsing the scientific 
credibility of cryonic suspension, the highly contested practice of freezing the recently deceased 
in the hope that medical technology capable of “reanimating” the “deanimated” will at some 
future point be achieved.    
 To whom it may concern,  
   
Cryonics is a legitimate science-based endeavor that seeks to preserve 
human beings, especially the human brain, by the best technology available.  
Future technologies for resuscitation can be envisioned that involve molecular 
repair by nanomedicine, highly advanced computation, detailed control of cell 
growth, and tissue regeneration.  
  With a view toward these developments, there is a credible possibility that 
cryonics performed under the best conditions achievable today can preserve 
sufficient neurological information to permit eventual restoration of a person to 
full health.  
  The rights of people who choose cryonics are important, and should be 
respected.
144
 
 
This letter is but a recent installment in an ongoing, decades-long rehabilitation effort; as 
discussed in the introductory chapter, cryonics has suffered significant setbacks since its 
emergence in the tumultuous American 1960s, culminating in the so-called “Chatsworth 
Scandal” of the 1970s, which is arguably the most disastrous and damaging event in the 
practice’s history.  The details of this rehabilitation effort are not my concern here, however.  
Rather, I call attention to the preceding letter because one of the signatures it bears gestures 
towards a complex set of significant though curiously unexplored sociohistorical relationships.  
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The signature in question is that of Manfred E. Clynes—pianist, neuroscientist, inventor—the 
man who coined the term “cyborg.”145    
Is it surprising to find that Clynes lent his name to a letter endorsing the scientific 
credibility of cryonic suspension?  Given the history of the cyborg, I submit that it is not.  Unlike 
the history of cryonics, of course, the cyborg’s history is quite well known, having been 
recounted by a range of scholars for a variety of ends.
146
  Yet the elevation of the cyborg to 
iconic status, coupled with the advent and popularity of so-called “cyborg studies” in the 
1980s,
147
 has tended to elide the fact that that cyborg was in fact initially set forth as a 
hypothetical solution to a set of colossal engineering problems facing NASA in the wake of 
Sputnik—facilitating an American moon landing and, ultimately, interplanetary human 
spaceflight.
148
   
With the Cold War operating as an impetus to “think the unthinkable,” Clynes and his 
collaborator, Nathan S. Kline, then laboring as research scientists at the Rockland State Mental 
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Hospital in New York, on May 26 and 27, 1960 attended an interdisciplinary symposium, 
“Psychophysiological Aspects of Space Flight,” at the US Air Force School of Aviation 
Medicine at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas.  The symposium was organized with the aim of 
strengthening what General Thomas D. White, then US Air Force Chief of Staff, described as the 
“weakest link” in the chain of American aerospace development: the “sea-level, low-speed,  
one-g, 12-hour animal” called “man.”149  The symposium’s participants were to this end invited 
to offer surveys of present knowledge and recommendations for research that would expedite the 
arrival of technologies capable of resolving the “psychophysiological impasse” presented by the 
human organism.
150
  
The paper that Kline and Clynes prepared, “Drugs, Space, and Cybernetics: Evolution to 
Cyborgs,” departed from the symposium’s much more conventional engineering fare of 
proposing earthlike environments to carry American astronauts through outer space.
151
  When 
the proceedings of the symposium were published by Columbia University Press in 1961, their 
offering was placed near the end of the volume under the aptly-titled heading, “Special 
Techniques of Control.”  Their paper called for the direct incorporation of exogenous material 
technologies into astronauts’ bodies, thereby adapting them to hostile extraterrestrial 
environments under the guise of cybernetic “enhancement”—the creation of “self-regulating 
man-machine systems,” or “cybernetic organisms,” for which Clynes coined the term cyborg.152  
The manner in which Kline and Clynes invoked cybernetics accorded with the definition given 
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by Norbert Wiener, i.e. as adjectively denoting the “entire field of control and communication 
theory, whether in the machine or the animal.”153  All organisms are in some sense “cybernetic”: 
homeostasis is regulated by feedback deriving from an organism’s interactions with its 
environment, keeping entropy at bay.
154
  Cybernetic organisms, however, cyborgs as proposed 
by Kline and Clynes, are to be differentiated from living organisms as such in that cyborgs are 
characterized by artificial homeostasis—they are organisms the capacities of which are extended 
by way of cybernetic technologies, thus enabling adaptation to, operation in, and exploration of 
environments for which human life has otherwise not been evolutionarily prepared.
155
   
The “cybernetic aids for space life” Kline and Clynes proposed included artificial lungs 
and organs, and prosthetic devices to modify and/or do away with cardiovascular and 
gastrointestinal functioning; prophylactic drugs to mitigate deadly radiation; and 
psychopharmaceuticals to heighten awareness and assuage anxieties.  Most importantly for our 
purposes here, however, Kline and Clynes also presented hypothermic control as a means by 
which to reduce astronauts’ metabolic processes during especially long spaceflights, placing 
them in a state of suspended animation.
156
  In “Cyborgs and Space,” a subsequent article based 
upon their symposium paper, Kline and Clynes elaborated their position on this technique: 
During a flight of a year or longer, assuming that the vehicle was operating 
satisfactorily, there would be little or no reason for the astronaut to be awake for 
long periods unless some emergency arose.  Hypothermia (reduction of body 
temperature) would appear to be a desirable state in such long voyage in order to 
reduce metabolism, and thus human “fuel” consumption.  The use of external 
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cooling, reduction of the temperature of the blood in an arterial-venous shunt, and 
hibernation (through pituitary control), alone or in combination with 
pharmaceuticals, all seem to offer possibilities in attempting to obtain and 
maintain such a state.
157
 
 
In light of the preceding especially, is it surprising to find that Clynes, nearly fifty years 
later, would lend his name to a letter endorsing the scientific credibility of cryonic suspension? 
To push the matter further, consider that Clynes felt it appropriate to append the 2005 letter in 
question, extending his endorsement of cryonics thusly:  
Cryonics holds promise because controlled freezing can preserve, and controlled 
unfreezing can restore life.  Lobsters that are frozen apparently return to life at 
times and experiments with small animals have also confirmed similar results.  
The difficulty lies in the human size.  Today’s technology is not adequate for the 
job.  However sectional freezing, and unfreezing may be extended into the future 
so that in effect a human becomes as large as several small animals, as far as the 
freezing is concerned, and other technologic advances are likely in the various 
techniques that now prevent the process from being harmless.   
The preservation of an individual in cold has been successfully carried out by 
nature through its hibernation solution, which works.  Also some species of frogs 
bury themselves in hot sand for several years until rains come again in central 
Australia. 
 
So a solution for prolonging life span through temperature control is not 
unnatural, and it is likely that a good way will be found to do it, supplementing 
nature by conscious intelligent design, as has been done in so many other areas, 
such as spectacles, and bicycles already for centuries.
158
 
  
To push the matter even further yet, Clynes has intimated that he himself intends to be 
placed in cryonic suspension.
159
  Thus Clynes’s involvement with cryonics is not at issue here.  
What is at issue is the fact that no existing treatment of cryonic suspension has noted, let alone 
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seriously attended to, what Clynes’s involvement with cryonics gestures towards—namely, a 
complex set of sociohistorical relationships between cybernetics, cyborg spaceflight, and the 
emergence of cryonic suspension in the American 1960s.   
On the one hand, then, suspended animation, a highly speculative technique proposed by 
Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline as a means by which to facilitate “time travel” by cyborg 
astronauts to distant moons and planets; on the other hand cryonic suspension, a highly 
speculative technique endorsed by Manfred Clynes as a means by which to facilitate “time 
travel” by terrestrial cryonauts to the medical technologies, the “robot surgeons” of the future.  
The similarities between these techniques are quite striking, especially considering Clynes’s 
involvement with both.  But what is the nature of these similarities?  Indeed, how are the two 
techniques related?  Given the iconic status of the cyborg, moreover, and the heightened interest 
among science and technology studies researchers (since the 1990s) in the history of 
cybernetics,
160
 how is it that so striking a similarity as that between suspended animation and 
cryonic suspension, between cyborg astronauts and terrestrial cryonauts, has for so long stood 
unacknowledged? 
As to this lattermost question, I set out in Chapter 1 to demonstrate in broad terms the 
effects wrought by the Ettinger origin narrative in bracketing from consideration matters of 
cultural and historical context, an overriding consequence of which has been the discursive 
elision of cryonic suspension’s complexity and historical significance, chiefly, by way of Evan 
Cooper, the relationship of the practice to the postwar science of cybernetics, and now, we can 
add, by way of Clynes and suspended animation, its relationship to the figure of the cyborg.   
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Speaking to the preceding questions, however, attempting to arrive and an understanding of the 
nature of the similarities between suspended animation and cryonics; an understanding of how 
the two techniques are related and with what consequence, first requires attending to the 
emergence of the computational metaphor, its theoretical formalization under the auspices of 
cybernetics, and ultimately its undisciplined circulation throughout the broader (popular) culture 
of the American 1960s.  
 
Cybernetics: Emergence, Circulation, and Appropriation 
 
 The science of cybernetics took shape during the crucible of World War II and publicly 
emerged, via Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics, in its immediate aftermath.  Cybernetics, as is well 
known, carried Wiener’s prophetic announcement that systems of computerized control would 
soon usher in a “second” industrial revolution:  
Perhaps I may clarify the background of the present situation if I say that the first 
industrial revolution, the revolution of the ‘dark satanic mills,’ was the 
devaluation of the human arm by the competition of machinery […] the modern 
industrial revolution [i.e. the computer revolution] is similarly bound to devalue 
the human brain.
161
  
 
Cybernetics also set forth a theoretical elaboration and formalization of what would become the 
defining metaphor of the Cold War—the computational metaphor.162  Paul Edwards, perhaps 
most notably, has argued that Cold War America was definitively shaped by the computer, 
understood as both machine and metaphor.  Indeed, in Edwards’ account, computers enabled the 
practical construction of complex, large-scale, “real-time military control systems,” while at the 
same facilitating “the metaphorical understanding of world politics as a sort of [informational] 
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system subject to technological management.”163  The result was a defensive “dome of global 
technological oversight,”164 both real and metaphorical, what Edwards aptly terms the “closed 
world.”  The science of cybernetics, according to Edwards, figured in the closed world as a 
“grand theory” of information.  Specifically, by effecting an instrumental (re)articulation of 
human minds as information processing entities, i.e. computers, Edwards casts cybernetics as a 
somewhat monolithic science of control,
165
 the principle aim of which was to enable and 
facilitate the integration of humans into the complex technological systems of the closed 
world.
166
  
 Fred Turner, while generally in agreement that the computational metaphor operated as a 
key discursive support for the closed world, departs from Edwards’ account of cybernetics and 
how it emerged and operated (and to what ends) in the context of Cold War America.  Turner 
locates the emergence of the computational metaphor, later formalized as cybernetics, amid the 
radical transformations wrought by WWII on the institutional structure and practice of American 
science.  The urgent demand for technologies to support the allied war effort saw researchers 
from any range of disciplines being drawn together for purposes of project-based collaboration. 
For instance, at places like MIT, Caltech, Los Alamos, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
“theoretical physicists, experimentalists, and electrical and mechanical engineers began to work 
together on a daily basis toward common [ends] for the first time.”167  While the technologies 
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they produced, Turner notes—e.g., radar, digital computers, the atomic bomb—like the military, 
industrial, and academic institutions that housed and funded them, tended to be “large, complex, 
and under centralized command” (and thus in accord with Edwards’ closed world vision), the 
laboratories, the sites were the actual labor of research and development played out, “witnessed a 
flourishing of nonhierarchical, interdisciplinary collaboration.”168  Following Peter Galison’s 
account of the Radiation Laboratory (Rad Lab) at MIT, Turner demonstrates that this 
collaborative style of “work,” which received its impetus from the war effort, was facilitated by 
local “contact languages,” which researchers had developed as practical tools through which to 
communicate and exchange ideas and techniques, across often rigid disciplinary boundaries.  The 
computational metaphor, later formalized as cybernetics, emerged in precisely this context, a 
forgotten space of “openness” in an otherwise “closed world.”169 
 As is well known, the term cybernetics itself, deriving from the Greek root kybernētēs, 
meaning “steersman” or “governor,” was coined by the mathematician and physicist Norbert 
Wiener.
170
  The title of Wiener’s first full-length and foundational book on the topic, 
Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, expresses the 
principle aim of the science: the development of a theory of communication and control that 
would apply equally to animals, organisms, and machines.
171
  Historians of postwar science and 
technological innovation generally agree that Wiener’s formulation of cybernetics was an 
outgrowth of his efforts at the MIT Rad Lab to develop, along with engineer Julian Bigelow, an 
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effective antiaircraft weapons system for the Allied forces, efforts which ultimately eventuated in 
the construction of the “antiaircraft (AA) predictor,” a “remarkably ambitious […] calculating 
device […] designed to characterize an enemy pilot’s zigzagging flight, anticipate his future 
position, and launch an antiaircraft shell to down his plane.”172  As Peter Galison has 
demonstrated,
173
 and as Fred Turner, N. Katherine Hayles, and Andrew Pickering have 
subsequently elaborated,
174
 the AA predictor conspired in constructing a characterization of the 
“Enemy Other” that in significant ways departed from the otherwise highly racialized and 
dehumanizing renderings of the enemy as portrayed in war propaganda and technical reports.  
Rather than conjuring the enemy as a subhuman Other necessitating eradication (as when 
characterized as lice, ants, or vermin, for instance), Wiener and Bigelow’s rendering of the 
Enemy as Other was thoroughly mechanistic.  As Galison to this point observes, the real-time 
operational logic of the AA predictor, coupled with the notion of negative feedback, for Wiener 
and Bigelow came to serve as an operational prototype, a model of the operation of the Axis 
pilot’s mind, and eventually a model of the operation of the mind of the Allied antiaircraft gunner 
as well: mechanical, calculating, and through observation and feedback, capable of learning and 
self-regulation.
175
  In modeling the operation of human minds as such, then, Wiener and Bigelow 
effectively collapsed any hard and fast ontological distinction between humans and machines, 
thereby (re)articulating humans as information processing entities.
176
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 “Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology,” the oft-cited 1943 paper coauthored with 
physiologist Arturo Rosenblueth, took Wiener and Bigelow’s Rad Lab models as points of 
departure, and proposed that the kinds of behavior in biological systems took shape in 
accordance with the same dynamics of feedback at play in mechanical systems.
177
  With this 
move, they in effect expanded the category of the machine to take in biological (and social) 
systems, thereby doing away with the boundaries between organisms and machines.   Following 
from this, as Jackie Orr has pointed out, this paper’s principle move “staged” the “cybernetic 
perception of the human nervous system as an electrical machine, and of the computing machine 
as a network of interacting neurons.”178  The resulting behavioral/material “equivalences” are 
ultimately what set the path for Wiener’s vision of cybernetics as a universal science.179  
The sense of excitement surrounding cybernetics in postwar America was tied to hopes 
bound up with then emerging computers—“electronic brains,” “machines that can think”—and 
thus ought not to be underscored too lightly.
180
  Between 1946 and 1953, for instance, at a series 
of conferences funded by the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation, the so-called “Macy Conferences,” 
cybernetics was developed and refined, and to various degrees and ends appropriated, 
implemented, and advocated, by North American and European representatives of those laboring 
at the forefront of the natural and social sciences, among them Norbert Wiener himself, John von 
Neumann, Claude Shannon, Heinz von Foerster, W. Ross Ashby, Gregory Bateson, and Talcott 
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Parsons.
181
  As scores of historians have documented, the Macy Conferences operated as a key 
set of vectors through which cybernetics was dispersed, beyond the military-industrial-academic 
context in which it emerged, through the broader reaches of postwar American culture.
182
   
So much was this the case, Geof Bowker notes, that beginning with the publication of 
Wiener’s Cybernetics in 1948, cybernetic concepts and claims overtime came to be increasingly 
abstracted from their contexts of emergence and ultimately subjected to (re)interpretation as they 
began to circulate throughout the broader culture, eventually becoming a “cult subject” for a 
much wider lay audience.
183
  Ronald Kline has furthermore noted that the “extensive enthusiasm 
for cybernetics,” in large measure resulting from the popularity of Wiener’s writings on the 
subject, caused serious problems, ultimately “leading to a loss of scientific status in the 
1960s.”184  Kline cites the noteworthy claims of several leading cyberneticians and philosophers 
on these developments, among them W. Grey Walter, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, M.E. Maron, and 
Michael Apter, who by this time had variously observed (respectively) that a “peculiar gap 
between theory and practice” had become a “feature of cybernetics”185; that cybernetics had in 
the United States especially been “usurped […] by an overt or covert science fiction”186; that 
“the vagueness of cybernetics had caused a ‘pseudoscientific fringe’ to make ‘nonsensical claims 
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[…] under the banner of cybernetics”187; and finally, that cybernetics “seemed to attract a lunatic 
fringe among scientists, particularly those with a penchant for the obscure and a facility for 
creating neologisms.”188  Amid these developments, one observer went so far as to say that 
cybernetics was on the way to becoming “an up-to-date form of Black Magic, a sort of twentieth 
century phrenology.”189   
 While one could certainly pursue these developments and their attendant epithets with an 
eye to the significance they hold for understanding the demise of cybernetics’ scientific 
legitimacy,
190
 I am far more concerned here with attending to how they indicate that the 
language of cybernetics, its concepts and claims, were during this time opened up, made 
available as cultural sources for new ways of thinking and doing and with what effects, their 
overall scientific “legitimacy” notwithstanding.  Indeed, such a concern is not without precedent.  
For as Fred Turner has demonstrated, the New Communalist thread of the American 
counterculture, at the very moment cybernetics was losing scientific credibility in the 1960s, 
nevertheless found in cybernetics’ informational flows and feedback loops a non-hierarchical 
ideological alternative to the rigidly hierarchical Cold War America, and thus as well a holistic 
alternative to the alienated and alienating modes of consciousness upon which it depended.  
Indeed, cybernetics was martialed by the New Communalists to justify at once a turn away from 
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the kind of agonistic movement politics pursued by the New Left and a move “back to the land,” 
ultimately in pursuit of a “politics of consciousness”; that is to say, a politics of changing the 
world by changing and expanding one’s mind, not least of which through the integration of LSD 
and Eastern religious traditions into a kind of “acid mysticism.”191  
 Mapping onto this, Andrew Pickering has called attention to a strong affinity, most 
evidently manifest in the 1960s counterculture, between cybernetics and New Age spirituality, 
which he attributes to the former’s ontological flattening of western modernity’s foundational 
dualisms, e.g. nature/culture, people/things, mind/body, spirit/matter.
192
  In The Cybernetic 
Brain, moreover, he details how this ontology variously fed and prompted interests in spirituality 
and spiritualism among prominent British cyberneticians; interests in “strange performances and 
altered states”; in clairvoyance, hypnotism, mediums, telekinesis, and out-of-body 
experiences.
193
   
 In the United States, the affinity Pickering underscores between cybernetics and New 
Age spirituality is furthermore evidenced by Maxwell Maltz’s self-help classic Psycho-
Cybernetics (1960),
194
 a guide to personal development through positive self-image, and 
Katherine Cover Sabin’s The Cybernetics E.S.P. Breakthrough: Can You Foresee Future 
Events? (1967),
195
 the subtitle of which says it all.  Lastly, none other than L. Ron Hubbard 
premised his (in)famous Scientology on an information model of mind/brain derived from 
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cybernetics.
196
  The influence is perhaps most evident in Hubbard’s term “dianetics,” which of 
course closely resembles cybernetics.
197
 The influence is also apparent, however, in 
Scientology’s cybernetic-derived language of (mind) “command-and-control,” i.e. by way of the 
church’s esoteric devices and technologies of the self.198  Indeed, Hubbard initially envisioned 
dianetics as belonging to “that class of sciences to which belong General Semantics and 
Cybernetics and, as a matter of fact, [forming] a bridge between the two.”199 
 The travels of cybernetics noted in the preceding several developments are at one with 
what Andrew Pickering has underscored as the remarkably “undisciplined” tendency of 
cybernetics to “wander,” and in so wandering to give rise to otherwise unanticipated projects and 
developments, resulting from otherwise unintended appropriations and applications.
200
  
Pickering’s characterization of cybernetics as such has strong resonances with Ronald Kline’s 
disunity of cybernetics thesis.  In contrast to Paul Edwards’ claim that cybernetics operated as a 
monolithic science of control, a “grand theory” of information within the context of the closed 
world, Kline’s disunity thesis holds that, in practice, cybernetics assumed a range of forms and 
meanings, varying in accordance with the contexts and domains through which it circulated, and 
the ends to which it was put.  Keeping here with Pickering and Kline, then, the preceding 
developments—empirical effects of cybernetics’ “wanderings,” evidence of its “disunity”—also 
evidence the “downstream” consumption and repurposing of cybernetic knowledge by decidedly 
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“lay” or “non-” scientific actors; those operating at the fringes if not entirely outside of the 
scientific mainstream, appealing to cybernetics as a cultural source through which to produce 
new ways of knowing and doing.
201
  Considering the spiritual if not religious nature of the 
preceding several developments, moreover, all of this squares with John R. Hall’s much broader 
observation, contra the expectations of secularization theorists, that the diffusion of 
technoscience has not, per se, “spelled the end” of collective synchronic forms of social 
organization; eventuated in disenchantment or the “waning of religion,” but has rather 
constituted conditions that have conspired in facilitating the emergence of new sacred 
communities of identity, practice and belief.
202
  It is here especially that we can begin charting 
the emergence of cryonic suspension by way of cybernetics.  For as noted in the introductory 
chapter, Evan Cooper most strikingly found in Wiener’s cybernetics a “message about 
immortality.”203  In light of this it would be a mistake, however, to read cryonics too broadly as 
“religious” or even “spiritual.”  Rather, as I will demonstrate below, it is a magical idea, a 
magical practice.  
 
Prospects of (Cybernetic) Immortality 
  
 The emergence of cryonic suspension thus evidences both the “wandering” and 
“disunity” of cybernetics; the downstream consumption and repurposing of cybernetic concepts 
and ideas by social actors located well outside the scientific mainstream; and ultimately an 
appeal to cybernetics as a key cultural source enrolled in the production of an outward seemingly 
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yet decidedly non-technoscientific practice—an emergent (magical) survival strategy, which as a 
recipe for action to maneuver vis-à-vis death received its definitive articulation in two “freeze 
now” manifestos: Evan “Ev” Cooper’s Immortality: Physically, Scientifically, Now (1962) and 
Robert C. W. Ettinger’s The Prospect of Immortality (1962/1964).  Focusing primarily on these 
two texts, in the following sections I demonstrate how Ettinger and Cooper, in arriving at their 
respective calls to “freeze now,” took recourse to cybernetics in two principle ways.  First, I 
show that both texts were written in a space of anticipation created by Norbert Wiener’s 
pronouncement, noted above, regarding the coming of a “second industrial revolution,” a 
cybernetic “new age” in which machines would outstrip human intelligence and capabilities.  
This decenters the actual freezing component of the practice, upon which existing interpretations 
of cryonic suspension have tended to fixate.  I maintain that “freezing” is to be understood as a 
form of anticipatory action that was conceived, proposed, and ultimately pursued in relation to 
Wiener’s proclamation.  Following from this, both “freeze now” manifestos evidence cybernetics 
having been at play within this space of anticipation created by Wiener’s pronouncement.  In 
other words, while cybernetic predictions worked to organize freezing as a form of anticipatory 
action, cybernetics also figured prominently in Ettinger’s and Cooper’s respective argumentative 
efforts to make the case to “freeze now.”   
With respect to this lattermost point especially, both Cooper’s Immortality and Ettinger’s 
Prospect should be read as products of an imaginative style of “social work,” quite uniquely 
enabled by cybernetics, and more broadly the pervasive computational metaphor, of which 
cybernetics is a theoretical formalization.
204
  The unique “style” of this form of work derives at 
base from the fact that cybernetics, recalling from above Fred Turner’s historical account of the 
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science, emerged as “contact language” among interdisciplinary wartime researchers. In 
formalizing the computational metaphor, cybernetics established equivalence in the 
informational constitution and behavior of organisms, humans, and machines alike; it effectively 
collapsed otherwise conventional disciplinary and thus as well ontological boundaries, the 
trespassing of which it enabled.  Bound to this context, as a “contact language,” cybernetics 
served a set of practical functions, principally facilitating collaboration.    
Removed from this context, however, as it embarked upon is characteristic “wanderings” 
throughout the broader culture of the American 1960s; as it became subject to remarkably 
undisciplined (re)interpretation, appropriation, and repurposing, the metaphorical potential of 
cybernetics became especially pronounced in two somewhat unwieldy rhetorical strategies, 
which Geof Bowker has termed legitimacy exchange and the discontinuous transmission of 
ideas.
205
  Legitimacy exchange refers to a process by which an expert or worker, laboring in a 
given domain, borrows or simply references concepts and terminology from a different domain, 
in a wager to both increase legitimacy and thus justify activity.  As Bowker puts it, (rhetorical) 
legitimacy could in this sense be marshaled for “an outlandish claim” in one domain, by simply 
pointing to support from another.  Related to this is the discontinuous transmission of ideas.  
Cybernetics, Bowker explains, carved out a space in which “conceptual tools” could be “yanked 
out of one context (e.g. philosophy of mind) and plugged into another (e.g. automata theory), 
with the metaphorical translation into the language of cybernetics,” i.e. the language of 
organism-machine equivalence, “doing the work of glossing the discontinuity.”206  Set within the 
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space of anticipation created by Wiener’s proclamation, both rhetorical strategies are evidenced 
in the writings of Cooper and Ettinger; how and to what extent, and how they constitute a form 
of bricolage—magic—are matters best arrived at through considerations of their actual texts, to 
which I now turn.  
 
Evan “Ev” Cooper  
 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, Evan Cooper’s “freeze now” manifesto, Immortality: 
Physically, Scientifically, Now (1962), was influenced by his participation in a Washington D.C.-
based reading group, which formed in 1957 with the expressed aim of devising a program, 20
th
 
Century Books, which was envisioned to be a supplement to the (then relatively new) Great 
Books of the Western World Program.  As the group set out to render Great Books more 
“contemporary, scientific, and germane to the existence of modern man,” under Cooper’s 
guidance they considered a range of 20
th
 century figures, among them Einstein, Freud, Frazer, 
Sherrington, Pavlov, and Russell.
207
  Working through selections from these figures over the 
course of three years, the group eventually made their way to the work of Norbert Wiener.  It 
was in the context of the group’s consideration of Wiener, Cooper writes, that he believed to 
have located in cybernetics a “message about immortality.”208  From this “message” Cooper then 
proceeded to deduce that “immortality might eventually become a down-to-earth physical reality 
via science.”209  
As we will see in what follows, Cooper derived this “message” from the ontological 
equivalence between humans and machines posited by the language of cybernetics, through 
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which the mechanical and the organic, under the auspices of informational “pattern,” become 
undifferentiated from one another.  Indeed, for in collapsing the distinctions between human and 
machine, organic and mechanical, cybernetics, the computational metaphor, necessarily 
collapses as well any hard and fast ontological distinction between living and dead.
210
  In theory, 
Cooper conceived of and penned his “freeze now manifesto” up through this space of collapsed 
dichotomies; in practice, as demonstrated in the following chapter, cryonic suspension is to be 
understood in part as a material instantiation of this relative absence of distinction between living 
and dead.  
Cooper opens Immortality with a barrage of direct quotations, passages taken (out of 
context) from Wiener’s 1950 follow up to his landmark Cybernetics, The Human Use of Human 
Beings, which he presents to the reader in block quote form.  A sampling of these passages is in 
order here, both for substantive reasons and to impart a sense of the piecemeal nature of 
Cooper’s argument and appropriation of Wiener:  
The metaphor to which I devote this chapter is one in which the organism is seen 
as message.  Organism is opposed to chaos, to disintegration, to death, as message 
is to noise.
211
 
 
We can continue to live in the very special environment which we carry forward 
only until we begin to decay more quickly than we reconstitute ourselves.  Then 
we die.
212
  
A pattern is a message, and may be translated as a message.
213
 
 
To recapitulate: the individuality of the body is that of a flame rather than that of a 
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stone, of form rather than of a bit of substance.  This form can be transmitted or 
modified and duplicated, although at present we know only how to duplicate it 
over a short distance.  It is a pattern maintained by this homeostasis, which is the 
touchstone of our personal identity.  We are not the stuff that abides, but patterns 
that perpetuate themselves.
214
 
 
It is my thesis that the physical functioning of the living individual and the 
operation of some of the newer communication machines are precisely parallel in 
their analogous attempts to control entropy through feedback … in other words, 
the all-over system will correspond to the complete animal with sense organs, 
effectors and proprioceptors, and not as in the ultra-rapid computing machines, to 
the isolated brain, dependent for its experiences and for its effectiveness on our 
intervention.
215
  
 
What is at issue here is not the (in)accuracy of Cooper’s reading of Wiener, but rather 
that Wiener’s text served as a cultural source for Cooper, who appropriated and used the 
preceding passages as key elements in constructing and issuing his call to “freeze now.”  Indeed, 
following his opening barrage of block quotes, Cooper in effect proceeds to repurpose Wiener’s 
general thesis in Human Use as the general thesis of his Immortality: “that the physical 
functioning of the living individual and the operation of some of the new communication 
machines are precisely parallel in their attempts to control entropy through feedback.”216   
Cooper is especially taken by Wiener’s notion of human-machine “parallel” operation and, 
following from it, Wiener’s notion of individuals (and machines) as “patterns” of varying 
complexity.  Indeed, throughout Human Use Wiener writes of the individual as a “pattern 
maintained by […] homeostasis,” i.e., staving off entropy, maintaining equilibrium through 
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feedback, as the “touchstone of personal identity.”217  In an oft-cited passage in the academic 
literature on cybernetics, the lattermost sentence of which Cooper quotes time and again 
throughout Immortality, Wiener elaborates: 
Our tissues change as we live: the food we eat and the air we breathe become 
flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone, and momentary elements of our flesh and 
bone pass out of our body everyday with our excreta.  We are but whirlpools in a 
river of ever-flowing water.  We are not stuff that abides, but patterns that 
perpetuate themselves.
218
 
 
As we will see momentarily, Cooper proposed a set of interrelated methods by which to achieve 
physical immortality, all of which derive from Wiener’s notion of human identity as a “pattern,” 
parallel to that of the machine, different only in degrees of patterned complexity.  (To preserve 
the “pattern” is to preserve the “person.”) Proceeding to that end first requires understanding, 
however, that Cooper, not inconsequentially, pieced together these proposals in a space of 
anticipation, which itself derived from cybernetics.  
Specifically, taking recourse again to Wiener, Cooper offers that “evolution is at work in 
the growth of machines as it is in every other part of the universe.”219  In that cybernetics, as 
discussed above, enlarged the category of “machine” to take in the operation of biological and 
social systems, the resulting mechanization of all life inevitably gave rise to the notion that 
machines operate and “evolve” just as organisms do—as  entities that “move toward survival via 
the repetition of equilibrium positions or homeostasis.”220  The notion of human-machine 
equivalence, animated by a set of evolutionary processes in which the patterned complexity of 
the latter would come to rival and ultimately outstrip the former—this is how Cooper interprets 
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Wiener’s famed pronouncement of a coming “second industrial revolution,” i.e. to be heralded 
by intelligent machines.
221
  Indeed, “with the coming of Wiener,” Cooper writes, “the world 
enters the second industrial revolution.”  And with it, he continues, “mankind receives another 
striking blow to his ego.”222  
It wasn’t enough that Einstein removed all absolutes from the world, especially 
that last hope: time.  It wasn’t enough that Freud shocked mankind into accepting 
that man’s libidinal desires determine [sic] most behavior.  But the crowning 
strike is the fact that if some of the newer communication machines are not 
already they increasingly will be smarter, keener, vastly more intelligent than 
men.
223
  
 
Stressing, then, that “intelligence” will be the “forte of the newer communication 
machines,”224 Immortality is a document permeated with Cooper’s enthusiastic anticipation of 
the arrival of “intelligent machines.”  Pointing to the growing use of “thinking machines,” and 
the “vital functions” they have come to perform in “business, the military, in universities and 
governments”; their role in the space program—“they are orbiting in space right now, doing 
mental jobs no human alone cold dream of doing”—Cooper offers that as this “spectral capacity” 
of machines becomes more and more “integrated,” it will form the “basis of a higher 
intelligence,” in relation to which human intelligence will come to pale.225  To this end Cooper 
speculates that “the 21st century may bring communication machines with very high IQs, 
machines that”—in keeping with the evolutionary theme noted above—“begin to form an 
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independent kingdom and independent behavior.”226  Despite this evolutionary momentum, 
however, Cooper is nevertheless confident that ways will be found to “press the machines into 
the service of solving or helping to solve our problems.”227  Finding “no theoretical reason why 
men should not be able to build a machine with an IQ up to a million or beyond,” Cooper sees in 
the expected mental capacity of such machines the “fulcrum of the second industrial 
revolution.”228  As for what the machines as such will deliver, Cooper anticipates that they will 
first be brought to bear upon problems in the domains of military and production, then “the more 
important social problems.” Eventually, Cooper holds that the intelligent machines will “be used 
in all types of research relevant to immortality.”229   
Wiener’s intentions notwithstanding, then, his pronouncement of a “second industrial 
revolution,” to be heralded by the arrival of cybernetic “thinking machines,” had the effect of 
producing a space of anticipation, of hope, in which Cooper was moved to propose a set of 
interdependent methods by which physical immortality might become “a down-to-earth physical 
reality via science.”230  Furthermore, Cooper’s proposed methods, discussed below, take as their 
point of departure the aforementioned cybernetic notion of human identity as “pattern,” to be 
differentiated from machines only in terms of complexity.  To these elements we can now add a 
third in piecing together the “message about immortality” that Cooper ultimately derived from 
cybernetics: Wiener’s fantastic speculations regarding the possibility of one day scanning and 
transmitting human beings—understood, again, as informational patterns.  
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What Cooper ultimately tapped into in Wiener is the latter’s contention that, at least in 
theory, there is no “fundamental absolute line between the types of transmission which we can 
use for sending a telegram […] and the types of transmission […] possible for a living organism 
such as a human being.”231  Indeed, “it is amusing as well as instructive,” Wiener writes, driving 
home his thesis: 
to consider what would happen if we were to transmit the whole pattern of the 
human body, of the human brain with its memories and cross connections, so that 
a hypothetical receiving instrument could re-embody these messages in 
appropriate matter, capable of continuing the processes already in the body and 
the mind, and of and of maintaining the integrity needed for this continuation by a 
process of homeostasis.
232
  
 
Wiener goes on to write that the idea itself “is not intrinsically absurd,” and indeed “quite 
plausible,” though the difficulties in facilitating human “travel by telegraph” are themselves 
quite “enormous.”233 He concludes on an optimistic note, however, maintaining that the inability 
to (presently) “telegraph the pattern of a man from one place to another” is exclusively due to 
technical difficulties, which in Cooper’s interpretation of Wiener stand to be resolved by the 
“communication machines” that will mark the arrival of the “second industrial revolution.” 
Cooper writes:   
[…] the ideas keep coming back, and back again: if men are a pattern, and so are 
machines similarly, and if communication machines can precisely parallel men, 
patterns may eventually be transmitted to machines then immortality may be 
eventually achieved for humans.
234
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As the preceding passage indicates, the kind of “cybernetic immortality” Cooper envisions 
entails the transmission of a human pattern to an artificial being, an automaton.  This, again, is 
appropriated from Wiener, who envisioned a hypothetical “scanning” apparatus, which would 
“probe” all parts of the human organism, destroying tissue as it scanned, “with the intention of 
re-creating it out of other material elsewhere.”235  Cooper elaborates what he calls the “human-
to-automaton” technique of achieving “cybernetic immortality”:  
The idea comes to mind quite readily that if the scanner can pick up the pattern 
and recreate a duplicate individual it might even be easier and more advantageous 
to reconstruct the equivalent pattern in the frame of a unitary semi-isolated mobile 
communication machine.  This assumes there are advantages to plastic and metal 
contrasted with flesh and bone.  Or, conceivably, there could be some 
combination of them.  In short, the pattern of the human may more easily be taped 
into the communication machine with its numerous structural advantages.
236
  
And yet this is only one of the methods by which Cooper envisions achieving 
immortality.  Though he refers to human “transmission-recreation” itself as the “cybernetic 
method,” the other two methods he proposes, which he calls “regenerative” and “transplant,” are 
no less derived from cybernetics, in that he regards them as avenues by which to maintain over 
time the integrity of human identity, understood again as informational pattern.  Cooper’s 
discussion of regeneration, for instance, takes in research on the regenerative capacities of 
crayfish, crabs, starfish, and flatworms, and the replacement, in humans, of skin, hair, and teeth.  
“Within the body we know that the body fluids, elements and cells are continuously being 
replaced,” thus reinforcing Wiener’s cybernetic maxim: “we are not stuff that abides, but 
patterns that perpetuate themselves.” 237   As for regeneration, Cooper writes, “there is no logical 
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reason why the forestalling of death could not be continuous if we knew enough about the 
processes.”238 Similarly with transplantation, a “method theoretically akin to the regeneration 
processes already spoken of,” Cooper envisions achieving immortality by way of successive 
exchanges of organs and tissues, both real and artificial—“spare parts”—such “that the original 
pattern, the individual, could indefinitely extend his existence.”239  
The “message about immortality” that Cooper derives from Wiener, and thus as well his 
proposed “methods” for achieving immortality, all take shape within a space of anticipation.  At 
base, three components define this anticipatory space.  First, on the near side, is Wiener’s 
account of human-machine equivalence, established under the cybernetic auspices of 
“information pattern.”  Second, directly following from this, are Cooper’s proposed “methods” 
by which physical immortality might be achieved: regeneration, transplantation, and 
“transmission-recreation.”  Third, on the far side, is Wiener’s prediction about the arrival of 
“communication machines” that will eventually outstrip human capacities, i.e. the coming of the 
“second industrial revolution.”   
Cooper takes the notion of the human as “pattern” as an ontological given.  The 
“methods” are imagined possibilities that derive from the base ontological claim: “if humans are 
a pattern, then it should be possible to...”  The methods are not actual; the procedures cannot 
(yet) be carried out.  It is precisely the machines that, for Cooper, will be able to carry them out 
in the future.  Indeed, Cooper writes that the machines will be able to “[solve] the problems of 
the transmission of human patterns into automatons,” and offer solutions to “any other 
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problem.”240  As such, he sees cybernetics as the “crucial field for breakthroughs,” noting that it 
has “already provided several in computing machinery and automation,” has “fertilized the rest 
of the sciences,” and furthermore has a potentially untouched “remaining capacity.”  Cooper thus 
calls for investment in cybernetics, anticipating the arrival of “thinking machines that [will] 
provide the solution for any reasonable problem we can pose.”241  However, this also gets at the 
root of Cooper’s dilemma: How to close the gap between imagined technological possibilities, 
on the one side, and their anticipated realization, with the coming of intelligent machines, the 
“second industrial revolution,” on the other?  
Suppose you wish to be immortal but tomorrow you die from any one of a 
number of causes.  Are you out of luck […]?”  “Are you out of luck because 
scientists and the communication machines haven’t figured out the practical 
methods of […] transmission of human to re-created human?  The answer is no.  
[…]  Despite your recent and unexpected demise, all hope is not lost.242  
 
“If you die before the methods of [regeneration, transplantation, and transmission-recreation] are 
effectively achieved,” Cooper continues, “and if you wish immortality physically, your body 
must be preserved.” Indeed, for Cooper, the “most logical method of preserving the body,” and 
thus the “pattern,” upon death, is “low temperature preservation.”243 For in his view, freezing 
will ensure that one’s “identity,” one’s “original pattern,” will not “[deteriorate] to any 
significant degree,” thus ensuring a successful outcome “by the time resuscitation methods are 
practical and reliable.”244  Thus the expression, coined by Cooper himself, which captures the 
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temporal logic of freezing human corpses as an anticipatory practice, one conceived, proposed,  
(and ultimately pursued) in relation to Norbert Wiener’s heralding of a “second industrial 
revolution”—“freeze-wait-reanimate.”245  
 
Robert C. W. “Bob” Ettinger 
 
Robert Ettinger’s The Prospect of Immortality is a strangely playful text, and thus, given 
the subject matter, somewhat baffling if not disaffecting.  Consider, for instance, that in 1964, on 
the heels of its commercial release, a reviewer for Science wrote that Prospect can “only be 
considered the work of an utterly confused optimist.”  For “only a fervent and naïve believer in 
the immanence of ultimate good” would so completely underestimate “the inertia, complexity, 
and inconsistency of human thought and behavior, as well as the complications of biological 
structure.”  “Only such a man,” the reviewer continues, noting that the bulk of Ettinger’s text is 
constructed through second-hand appeals to expert authorities and references to popular press 
writings, “could quote people so uncritically and so out of context.”  The reviewer, indeed, 
comes up just short of dismissing Prospect as pseudoscience, settling instead for the more 
genteel epithet, “science fiction.”246    
 Ettinger’s Prospect is quite similar to Cooper’s Immortality, in that both texts operate in a 
register of anticipation, a gap between the perceived limitations of certain technoscientific fields 
of their day and the seemingly limitless futures they believe those same fields are fated to usher 
in, with the eventual arrival and aid of “thinking machines.”  Both prescribe a course of action, 
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an interim measure to fill the proverbial gap—freezing the recently deceased.  While no less 
fantastic, then, reading Immortality is nevertheless manageable in a way that reading Prospect is 
not, largely because Cooper’s argument is much more direct, taking shape around and in frequent 
reference to a collection of claims set forth by Norbert Wiener.  This has the effect of explicating 
the computational metaphor in Cooper, i.e., individual as “pattern,” evidencing its prominence as 
the principle point through which legitimacy for the “freeze now” endeavor, vis-à-vis Wiener’s 
predictions, is claimed, and ideas from cybernetics and other fields (discontinuously) transmitted 
and appropriated.  In Ettinger, there is nothing comparable in the way of a recurring point of 
reference explicated in the text itself.  Taken at face value the result, as noted above by the 
reviewer for Science, is a kind of confused optimism, a pastiche of 1960s American (pop) 
technoscience.  A closer, contextualized reading, however, evidences the computational 
metaphor at play in Prospect—Ettinger assumes and elaborates its ontology.   This is easily 
elided, however, by his frenetic writing style.   
 In what follows I set out to recover and explicate Ettinger’s assumptions and 
elaborations, drawing out his reliance on the computational metaphor, principally by working 
across and between three key touchstones that ground his overall argument: cryobiology, 
thinking machines, and speculative techniques of human enhancement.  I take each of these up in 
turn below.  Before proceeding it is worth recalling, as with Cooper, that what is at issue here is 
neither the (in)accuracy of Ettinger’s readings nor the (in)appropriateness of his engagements 
with these fields, but rather that they served as a set of cultural sources, which Ettinger turned to 
and appropriated in constructing Prospect, his formal call to “freeze now.”  
 Having arrived, then, at Ettinger’s Prospect, we have arrived as well at a vantage from 
which to begin reconsidering the questions posed much earlier in the present chapter, i.e. those 
90 
 
regarding the manifest similarities between the suspended animation technique outlined in the 
cyborg spaceflight proposal offered by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline, and the “freeze now” 
technique, what would ultimately become cryonic suspension, as offered by Ettinger and Cooper.  
On the one hand, cyborg astronauts, shuttled to distant moons and planets; on the other hand, 
terrestrial cryonauts, shuttled to the medical technologies of the future.  While the similarities are 
evident, what is their source?  Indeed, beyond the fact that Manfred Clynes proposed the former 
and was decades later moved to endorse the former, just how are the two techniques related?  
 A major mid-twentieth century break-through in cryobiology formed the backdrop to 
both the suspended animation component of Clynes and Kline’s cyborg spaceflight proposal, and 
Cooper’s and Ettinger’s respective calls to “freeze now.” The breakthrough resulted from a 
serendipitous accident that transpired in autumn of 1948, at the National Institute for Medical 
Research Laboratory at Mill Hill, London.  Assisted by Alan S. Parkes and Christopher Polge, 
Audrey U. Smith, following results obtained by other researchers,
247
 was experimenting with the 
“use of laevulose [fructose] solutions to protect fowl spermatozoa against the effects of freezing 
and thawing.”248  The aim was to develop protocols for the prolonged storage of living cells.  
After months of experimentation: nothing.  Despite the presence of laevulose, the low 
temperatures still caused the water between cells to expand and crystalize, resulting in cellular 
freezing injuries.  Consequently, less than 5% of the frozen fowl spermatozoa regained motility 
when thawed.  And then one day: success.  In the routinized course of experimentation, Smith 
and colleagues began to observe post-thaw motility rates exceeding 50% in fowl spermatozoa 
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frozen to -79˚C (solid CO2).  The reason: two bottle labels had become detached while in storage 
in the lab refrigerator; when reapplied they were switched.  In the successful experiment, Smith 
and her team unknowingly employed the chemical glycerol, not laevulose solution.  The 
suspended animation of living cells had become a reality by way of accident, and Dr. Audrey U. 
Smith was hailed as the mother of modern cryobiology.  Smith and colleagues soon found 
subsequent experimental successes with bull and human semen; mammalian embryos and 
ovaries; red blood cells and bone marrow cells before moving in the 1950s to develop successful 
protocols for the suspended animation and reanimation of small living mammals—most notably 
among them golden hamsters.
249
   
 Smith herself saw no immediate prospect of freezing larger mammals, let alone human 
beings, without in the process incurring catastrophic cellular and neurological damage.  In her 
words: “I know of no scientific evidence to support the notion that human beings could presently 
survive prolonged periods with the entire body frozen.”250  Smith and colleagues’ experimental 
successes nevertheless opened up a space in which optimistic speculation was fostered about the 
possibility of achieving the suspended animation of human beings at extremely low 
temperatures.
251
  
 Following from this, it is not insignificant that NASA received Clynes and Kline’s 
cyborg spaceflight proposal with general enthusiasm, so much so that by 1962 the space agency 
had agreed to allocate funding for an eight month study to determine the feasibility of realizing 
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the cyborg techniques and entities that Clynes and Kline proposed.
252
  By this time, moreover, 
the cyborg and its constitutive “cybernetic aids for space life” had made their entry into 
American popular culture, receiving coverage in media outlets such as Life and The New York 
Times.
253
  By 1964, however, NASA had all but abandoned the project, and had even dropped 
term cyborg itself, officially citing lack of feasibility given that the requisite kinds and levels of 
(bio)technology did not exist. (The official account of NASA’s departure from the cyborg is 
highly contested, a matter to which I return below.) What merits heavy underscoring presently is 
that the project’s final report, issued in May of 1963—Engineering Man for Space: The Cyborg 
Study—notably expressed optimism about controlled human hypothermia, i.e. suspended 
animation, predicting that the automated technologies required to facilitate extended space travel 
would likely be available within five to fifteen years.
254
   
Well within this window of optimistic speculation; amid the popular media coverage 
aforementioned, Robert C.W. “Bob” Ettinger had written the following:  
How strange that the many popular articles on suspended animation have  
mentioned chiefly its possible use by astronauts on long interstellar voyages!  
This aspect is trivial.  Its importance lies not in travel to the stars, for the few,  
but in travel to the future, for the many.
255
 
 
Taken from the opening pages of Ettinger’s The Prospect of Immortality, this passage has been 
passed over in absolute silence by existing interpretations of cryonic suspension. Significant an 
oversight though this is, it would nevertheless be a serious mistake to take this passage as 
evidence of Ettinger simply lifting the freezing technique from popularized aerospace proposals 
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and arguing for analogous application to the recently deceased.  While this is what he seems to 
be doing; while this is what he seems to believe he is in fact doing, there is a something of a 
(false) rhetorical equivalency being perpetrated here, under the auspices of “suspended 
animation,” which elides, quite confusingly, the complexity of cryonic suspension, masking the 
fact that the practice is quite different from suspended animation.   
 How and to what extent this is so are matters best arrived at by way of considering a 
related set of issues, which existing treatments of cryonic suspension have likewise passed over 
in silence.  In the course of outlining the contours of the Ettinger origin narrative in Chapter 1, I 
noted that Ettinger, in 1962, mailed draft versions of The Prospect of Immortality to several of 
those listed in Who’s Who in America.  Among those who endorsed his proposal, ultimately 
helping Ettinger secure a contract for commercial release and circulation with Doubleday & Co., 
were Isaac Asimov and Frederik Pohl.  Subsequently, in 1963, Doubleday sent out pre-
publication copies of Ettinger’s manuscript for review.  Among those who received copies were 
Robert W. Prehoda, chemist and aerospace industry consultant, and Dandridge M. Cole, futurist 
and aerospace engineer for General Electric.  Prehoda and Cole were close friends, drawn 
together by an “intense interest in space exploration.”256  Prehoda and Cole, moreover, like 
Ettinger, believed that suspended animation for purposes of interstellar travel was a realizable 
possibility; they also believed that the technique would eventually have widespread medical 
applications.  To these ends, both men furthermore wrote about suspended animation; indeed, 
speculations about the technique’s development, applications, and potential benefits turn up in 
Cole’s Islands in Space: The Challenge of the Planetoids (1964) and Beyond Tomorrow: The 
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Next 50 Years in Space, as well as Prehoda’s Designing the Future (1967) and especially his 
Suspended Animation (1969),
257
 as the title evidences.   
It was Cole, however, who was most notably taken by Prospect, Ettinger’s proposal to 
subject the deceased to freezing techniques.  Cole is known to have expressed his “desire to be 
frozen after death” to several friends, co-workers and relatives,258 believing that an effective 
means by which to achieve suspended animation in humans would be realized well within his 
lifetime.  Indeed, Prehoda recalls having had with Cole a “long discussion on the subject,” in the 
summer of 1965, approximately one year following the commercial release of Ettinger’s text.  
Only a few months later, however, on October 30, 1965, Cole, at forty-four years of age, suffered 
a heart attack in his office and later, en route to the hospital, died of a coronary thrombosis.  One 
of Cole’s associates, aware of his desire to be frozen, contacted Ettinger in search of guidance.  
Despite the significant time lapse following Cole’s death, Ettinger nevertheless counseled that 
Cole be frozen all the same.  Because nothing resembling a cryonic suspension infrastructure 
was yet in place, however; because no formal arrangements had been made prior to his death, 
Cole’s family in the end decided not to pursue freezing and had him buried.259  
Prehoda later wrote of Cole that he would not have desired freezing, nor would he more 
broadly have advocated freezing, under such circumstances.  This is so for two principle reasons.  
First, due to the cellular damage incurred in the significant lapse of time following his death:  “I 
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distinctly recall [Cole] stating,” Prehoda wrote, that for this reason, “suspended animation would 
not be valid unless instigated before or at the point of death.”  Second, Cole certainly wanted to 
be frozen, but only after suspended animation had been achieved with scientifically verifiable 
results. The techniques for freezing humans that prevailed in the 1960s caused irreversible 
cellular damage, such that “freezing now,” as Ettinger advocated in Prospect, destroyed the 
integrity of those who were to be preserved over the long term, thus as well precluding any 
realistic hope of eventual revival.   
Though less enthusiastic than Cole, Prehoda nevertheless was initially receptive to 
Ettinger’s text, seeing it as a potential vehicle through which to incite serious discourse and 
public support for increased government expenditures on cryobiological research broadly, and 
medical applications of suspended animation specifically, but only—and here is the rub—“if his 
[Ettinger’s] proposals were completely changed.”260  In the course of extensive telephone and 
written correspondence, subsequent to having reviewed the prepublication copy of Prospect that 
he was sent, Prehoda pleaded with Ettinger to redirect the argumentative focus of the text to the 
importance of pursuing basic research, with the immediate aim of achieving non-damaging 
freezing techniques, thus placing Ettinger’s claims in accordance with the field of cryobiology.  
The actual freezing would have to come later.  For to do otherwise, in the absence of such 
techniques; to “freeze now,” as Ettinger advocated, would place him significantly at odds with 
cryobiology’s research priorities.  Indeed, to “freeze now,” Prehoda notes, would simply amount 
to nothing more than wasting vast sums of time, energy, and money on the “elaborate 
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preservation of cadavers,”261 which ultimately have no hope of future revival—resources, in 
other words, that would be much better directed towards basic cryobiological research.  
And yet “freezing now” is precisely what Ettinger advocated; none of the modifications 
Prehoda suggested Ettinger make to Prospect were carried through.  This points to far more than 
a mere difference in opinion, for in proceeding as such Ettinger broke step with governing 
scientific conventions.  And with this we begin to arrive at the real crux of the matter.  For 
Ettinger’s call to “freeze now” was not staked upon criteria that could be tested or verified in 
accordance with traditional scientific measures.  Rather it was based upon an expectation that 
future technologies would be capable of repairing the damage incurred by freezing, in the course 
of curing whatever “caused” the frozen to die in the first place.  Indeed, here is Ettinger, sparring 
with critics of his call to “freeze now,” on the grounds that freezing would cause irreparable 
brain damage:  
There seems a good chance that the supra-molecular circuitry [of the brain] can be 
read well enough after freezing.  Hence it may well be that only a small 
percentage of the brain cells need escape with little damage; this may be 
enough for reasonably faithful reconstruction of the brain with freshly 
generated tissue. The robot surgeons of the future will have powers now only 
faintly foreshadowed, but beginnings have already been made…if brute-force 
methods are necessary, it is not inconceivable that huge surgeon-machines, 
working twenty-four hours a day for decades or even centuries, will tenderly 
restore the frozen brains, cell by cell, or even molecule by molecule in 
critical areas.
262
 
 
This passage throws into relief two crucial issues.  The first is the equivalence Ettinger’s 
speculation necessarily posits between the human brain and computational machinery—“…the 
supramolecular ‘circuitry [of the brain]’”—and thus as well the attendant assumption that the 
former is (in theory) somehow amenable to “rescue” and “repair” by the latter.  I will return to 
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this issue momentarily.  The second issue, which I will take up presently, is Ettinger’s appeal to 
the envisioned capabilities of technologically advanced “robot surgeons of the future,” which is 
the principle angle through which he attempts to justify his call to “freeze now.”  Ettinger, in 
other words, appeals to the development of an expected future in the absence of actually 
effective, non-damaging freezing techniques—as if the eventual arrival of the former, in the 
future, effectively substitutes for the nonexistence of the latter, in the (then) now; as if the former 
render proscriptions against freezing deceased humans moot, and thus justify his call to “freeze 
now.”  The anticipatory logic is at one with that espoused by Evan Cooper in Immortality. The 
source of Ettinger’s anticipation, moreover, is shared with Cooper.  Ettinger writes:  
Everyone who reads the papers or watches TV knows by now that, whereas the 
first industrial revolution involved the replacement of human and animal muscle 
by machines, the second industrial revolution will involve the replacement of 
brains by machines.  The computers already have remarkable problem-solving 
capacities, and it really appears to be only a matter of time before they can really 
think.
263
  
 
As in Cooper’s Immortality, Ettinger’s Prospect is permeated with predictions regarding the 
coming of “intelligent machines.”  The preceding passage, which appears under a chapter 
subheading titled, quite tellingly, “The Solid Gold Computer,” is especially significant, in that it 
is a clear reference to, if not a paraphrase of, Norbert Wiener’s prophetic announcement 
regarding the coming of the “second industrial revolution,” originally set forth in his landmark 
Cybernetics.   
 Moreover, and as again in Cooper’s Immortality, the predictions at play in Ettinger’s 
Prospect necessarily presume equivalence between humans and machines.  For example, 
Ettinger endorses, notably, British cybernetician W. Grey Walter’s contention, which follows 
from Wiener’s base cybernetic argument, that humans and machines are differentiated from one 
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another only in terms of complexity.
264
  The predictions and posited equivalences furthermore 
bleed into speculations about human enhancement by way of human-machine coupling or 
symbiosis.   Most significant in this respect, Ettinger appropriates claims deriving from a cluster 
of research briefs appearing in the Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers (IRE). Citing 
a report entitled “Biomedical Electronics-2012 A.D.,” for instance, prepared by IRE Fellow Lee 
B. Lusted, Ettinger offers that “within fifty years, it will be possible to replace nearly all of the 
body organs by compact artificial organs with built-in electronic control systems.”265  Poaching 
from a somewhat lengthier report entitled “Man-Machine Coupling-2012 A.D.,” prepared by 
IRE fellow R.M. Page, Ettinger predicts that “ultra-rapid communication between man and 
machine,” enabled by a “sort of electronic-mind reading,” will be realized by 2012.  Ettinger 
goes on to write that “all the resources of a huge computer may someday be in the direct service 
of a man’s mind; it might even be said to be part of his mind, when hooked in on either a 
temporary or permanent basis.”266   
 The remaining three reports in the IRE cluster anticipate the realization of machine 
intelligence, broadly understood.  Following Marvin Minsky’s “Steps Toward an Artificial 
Intelligence,” Ettinger writes that “we are on the threshold of an era that will be strongly 
influenced, and quite possibly dominated, by intelligent problem-solving machines.”267  Ettinger 
supplements his appropriation of Minsky with predictions lifted from Jerome B. Wiesner’s 
paper, “Electronics and Evolution,” which posits that “one should ultimately be able to create 
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‘thinking machines’ much brighter than the smartest human being.”268   Finally, Ettinger appeals 
to Marcel J.E. Golay’s “The Biomorphic Development of Electronics,” which advances the 
argument that size, speed, and complexity will “play the main part in transforming the ‘stupid 
computers of today into thinking machines that will teach us new concepts’”269  
 Thus Ettinger’s call to “freeze now,” to freeze anyway, despite the damage incurred, is to 
be understood as having played out within a space of anticipation, a space given shape by 
predictions regarding the arrival of “thinking machines,” heralds of the “second industrial 
revolution” proclaimed by Norbert Wiener.  Revealing the true extent of what he ultimately 
anticipates “the machines” being capable of, Ettinger writes: 
The invention of thinking machines, of automata with genuine intelligence, will 
of course have an importance difficult to exaggerate […] This invention will 
obviously be in one sense the most important ever made, since it is equivalent to 
the invention of a magic lamp from which will stem other wonders without 
limit.
270
 
 
Ettinger, then, contrary to Prehoda’s insistence on research aimed at achieving viable freezing 
techniques, appeals instead to predictions, on the grounds that “the people who are dying right 
now cannot, and need not, wait for 100 per cent mastery” of the problems associated with 
existing freezing techniques. Despite the damaged caused, Ettinger continues, these are problems 
that “can be left to the more distant future,” where they will be resolved by thinking machines, 
the “robot surgeons of the future.”271  
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Cybernetic Sorcery 
Considered within the space of optimistic speculation opened up by Smith and 
colleagues’ experimental successes, Ettinger’s hopes for suspended animation techniques were in 
no significant way different from the hopes expressed and the ends imagined by Prehoda and 
Cole, Clynes and Kline and those at NASA more broadly.  What sets Ettinger apart (and Cooper 
as well, as should be evident) is that where these likeminded others noted the limitations and 
quite damaging effects of existing freezing techniques, and thus called for further research, 
Ettinger issued a call to freeze anyway, to “freeze now,” despite these limitations.  In so doing, 
Ettinger set himself at odds with his would be allies, not to mention the entire field of 
cryobiology—he argued human resuscitation to be possible when reigning cryobiological 
consensus was that it was impossible.  It is this basic transgression that in part differentiates 
suspended animation from what would ultimately become cryonic suspension.  Despite their 
overt similarities, as noted above, Ettinger’s proposal to “freeze now” disregarded evidence and 
extant limitations that equally enthusiastic, equally fantastic proposals for suspended animation 
nevertheless respected, which is why the latter never made it beyond the proposal stage.  
 Cryobiology is not the only instance in which Ettinger and Cooper operated and 
imagined within a field of relatively widespread and optimistic technoscientific speculation and 
expectation, only to then to proceed, uncritically, a few steps too far, too seemingly 
enthusiastically.  In the case of cybernetics, as with cryobiology, the expectations to which they 
appealed regarding Wiener’s anticipated arrival of “thinking machines” were during the early 
1960s very widespread, as was enthusiasm for cybernetics generally. Following from this, as 
discussed much earlier above, Cooper and Ettinger were likewise hardly unique in appealing to 
and enrolling cybernetics, and more broadly the computational metaphor, the cybernetic 
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language of human-machine equivalence, as a cultural source through which to open up, 
imagine, and pursue new, often quite different ways of thinking and doing (scientific legitimacy 
and technical feasibility notwithstanding).   
In fact, Cooper and Ettinger, in setting forth their respective proposals to “freeze now,” 
were in effect at one with Kline and Clynes’ cyborg spaceflight proposal—both the cyborg and 
“freeze now” proposals are to be interpreted as outcomes of bringing cybernetics to bear upon 
the human body in different domains, and in relation to different sets of (then) emergent 
problems.  Each proposal, moreover, following from this, ultimately called for the creation of a 
new kind of (cybernetic) entity: on the one hand, the cyborg astronaut, on the other, the 
terrestrial cryonaut.  In response to the problem of facilitating (interstellar) space travel, Clynes 
and Kline, as we have seen, called for the direct incorporation of exogenous material 
technologies into astronauts’ bodies, thereby adapting them to hostile extraterrestrial 
environments under the guise of cybernetic “enhancement”—the creation of “self-regulating 
man-machine systems,” or “cybernetic organisms,” for which Clynes coined the term cyborg.  
Kline and Clynes’ proposal to hybridize humans and machines—“cyborgs”—derived entirely 
from the root ontological equivalence, posited by cybernetics, between humans and machines.  
Controlled human hypothermia, or “suspended animation,” is in the context of their proposal 
simply one of many proposed entailments, i.e. one of many “cybernetic aids for space life;” one 
method of “artificial homeostasis” by which to control and optimize the bodily processes of 
cyborg astronauts.   
Ettinger and Cooper arrived at arguably the same technique—freezing as a means by 
which to achieve artificial homeostasis in the form of biostasis—and it is here their proposals 
most evidently parallel if not intersect with Kline and Clynes’ cyborg.  Cooper and Ettinger, 
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however, arrived at freezing as a consequence of mapping the computational metaphor onto the 
human body in a different domain; elaborating its ontology relative to a different problem—
death.  This is most evident in Cooper’s fixation on the cybernetic notion of the human as 
“pattern,” and its purported “parallel operation” to machines, which is of course the basis of the 
“message about immortality” he infers from Wiener.  The metaphor is less explicit though 
equally at play in Ettinger, as evidenced above in his speculative discussion of enhancement by 
way of human-machine symbiosis, the equivalence he presumes to exist between the human 
brain and computational machinery, and especially in his contention that the damage incurred in 
the course of freezing, as with all other “causes” of death, are in theory problems of a sort 
amenable to technological solution—that is to say, they are cast as technological problems. 
Ettinger and Cooper alike, then, articulate the computational metaphor with themes from 
cryobiology, prospects of human enhancement and human-machine symbiosis, with Wiener’s 
prediction of a “second industrial revolution” to be heralded by the arrival of cybernetic 
“thinking machines,” each issuing a call to “freeze now.”   The call, I maintain, evidences a 
magical impulse, magical thinking.  For magic, as Richard Stivers reminds us, following Marcel 
Mauss, resides in the domain of wishful thinking; it is essentially about “wish fulfillment.”272  
In both Ettinger and Cooper magical thinking is clearly at play in at least two registers, 
the first being expectation.  Ettinger and Cooper exhibit a clear tendency to enlarge upon the 
virtues of certain objects, specifically “thinking machines,” especially in the anticipated ability of 
the latter to repair damage incurred in the course of freezing, and eventually to reverse any given 
“cause” of death.  Indeed, as Mauss argues, “the art of the magician involves suggesting means, 
enlarging on the virtues of objects, anticipating effects, and by these methods fully satisfying the 
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desires and expectations which have been fostered by entire generations in common.”273  Here, in 
this sense, “wishful thinking” creates the space of anticipation in which the call to “freeze now” 
is issued; in which Ettinger and Cooper penned their respective manifestos.   
Within this space of anticipation—this is the second register in which magic is at play, 
taking shape in terms of how the manifestos are constructed; how Ettinger and Cooper attempt to 
legitimate their calls to “freeze now.”  Both Ettinger’s Prospect and Cooper’s Immortality clearly 
evidence a form of bricolage.  While Claude Lévi-Strauss employed the term to denote the 
process by which myths are culturally constructed, many latter day theorists see bricolage as 
referring more broadly to a “do-it-yourself job, a nonprofessional assembly of odd pieces into 
something new and unexpected.”  Bricolage in this sense denotes “cutting and pasting,” a 
cementing together of “recognizable themes from a culture,” though the ultimate product of this 
process “emerges unpredictably because it does not follow established patterns.”274  Grounded in 
and elaborating the computational metaphor, the “freeze now” manifestos draw from and stitch 
together familiar themes from cryobiology, cybernetics, and prospects of human enhancement.  
The computational metaphor, in that it elides ontological distinctions between organism and 
machine, does the work of glossing discontinuities.   As noted at the outset of this section, 
however, in drawing from and repurposing themes from these fields, Ettinger and Cooper 
regularly transgress governing scientific conventions and disregard extant limitations. In part, 
this is what makes their proposals so confusing, so difficult to pin down—both Prospect and 
Immortality are the products of a magical impulse, magical thinking, coming up through, finding 
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a medium of expression in, by way of the computational metaphor, what are at base 
technological fields of endeavor.   
It is here, perhaps, that the internal discord between the “freeze now” manifestos and the 
forms of technoscience they draw from, by way of the computational metaphor, is thrown into 
sharpest relief.  Ettinger and Cooper at base propose to carry out a form of material technological 
activity—freezing the recently deceased anticipating future revival.  Now a given technology, in 
the strictest material sense, and while beliefs certainly play a role in its emergence, nevertheless 
works objectively (for want of a better term).  Or rather, a given technology works regardless of 
whether or not I believe in it.  Belief has nothing to do with the operation, say, of my microwave 
oven, my computer or car, despite the fact that these technologies are set within webs of cultural 
meaning and thus belief.
275
   An entirely different logic is at play with what Ettinger and Cooper 
propose, however.  For cryonic suspension, while a material technique, ultimately represents a 
form of anticipatory material activity, proposed and carried out vis-a-vis predictions, belief in the 
arrival of a certain future, to be heralded by the arrival of intelligent machines.  Insofar as the 
practice, as discussed above, causes catastrophic cellular damage, it cannot be said to “work” in 
the sense just noted.  The fact that it does not “work,” however, is by Ettinger and Cooper 
believed to be inconsequential relative to the arrival of future technologies that will undo the 
damage incurred and make it work, retroactively.  Thus, there is an undeniable presence of a 
strong element of belief in its (potential) efficacy, which differentiates the practice from 
technology in the material sense of the term.  Externally, however, in terms of its form, its 
appearance, the practice is insinuated as an objectively operating material technology; it 
simulates material technology.  And yet there is a different internal logic at play, which suggests 
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that cryonics is a magical means masquerading as the technoscience it simulates.  The external 
scientific form, which derives from the work of bricolage performed by Ettinger and Cooper, 
carried out through the computational metaphor, lends the appearance of, insinuates objective 
operation, to the point of excess, masking, quite confusingly—quite uncannily—the abrupt 
internal discord between the essentially magical technique and its putative technoscientific 
model.  Recalling the engagement with Deleuze from the first chapter, Prospect and Immortality 
are simulacra of Cold War technoscientific proposals, cryonic suspension itself a simulacrum of 
Cold War technoscience.  
 This internal discord can be thrown into even sharper relief.  While I noted above that  
Ettinger and Cooper, by way of the computational metaphor, arguably arrived at the same 
freezing technique as Clynes and Kline, it must be underscored that the cyborg proposal and the 
freeze now manifestos, while both elaborations of the computational metaphor, referred to 
different problems in different domains—interstellar travel and death, respectively—and were 
furthermore carried out in quite different institutional contexts.  Ettinger and Cooper were 
uncredentialed amateurs, “lay” scientists at best.  Unlike their “freeze now” manifestos, 
moreover, the cyborg spaceflight proposal was carried out by noted and credentialed 
professionals, within the formal structures of Cold War technoscientific production, solicited and 
backed by the institutional weight and legitimacy of NASA, and spurred by the cold war 
impetus, in the wake of Sputnik, to “think the unthinkable.”276   
And yet while the cyborg itself, the cybernetic entity proposed, was never realized in the 
sense envisioned by Kline and Clynes, the “cryonaut,” the cybernetic entity harbored in 
Ettinger’s and Cooper’s “freeze now” manifestos, very much was.  Because of Ettinger’s and 
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Cooper’s marginal status as “lay” scientific actors, however, the only viable institutional spaces 
through which they could push and pursue the “freeze and wait idea” were mortuary and 
cemetery operations.  The actual freezings, as I chronicle in the next chapter, the actual cryonic 
suspensions, ultimately rendered concrete a very strange set of articulations between Cold War 
technoscience and mortuary practices.  The degree of internal discord that follows from such 
contextual considerations adds further weight to the interpretation of cryonics as a simulacrum, 
while at the same time underscoring the status of the practice, as I  argue in Chapter 4, as a 
(magical) survival strategy—an attempt to “keep death at bay through a strategic maneuvering 
between various life options.”277  The practice ultimately fails in terms of legitmating 
technoscientific criteria, but it provides nevertheless a recipe for action vis-a-vis death; a way of 
knowing death and acting, even though at base “wishful thinking,” magic.    
While all of this highlights the internal discord between the “freeze now” manifestos and 
Cold War technoscientific proposals; between cryonic suspension and Cold War technoscience, 
there remains an important element of kinship, which ought not to escape consideration, between 
the cyborg, the cryonaut, and what Andrew Pickering calls “cybernetic monsters.”  As a prelude 
to concluding the present chapter, and in an effort to more broadly situate cryonic suspension in 
the cultural milieu in which it emerged and was seemingly at home, I turn to this kinship now.  
 
Uncanny Entities: Cryonauts, Cyborgs, and Other Cybernetic Monsters 
 The postwar science of cybernetics, and more broadly the computational metaphor, 
opened up a space through which cryonic suspension could emerge.  In the broadest sense, 
cybernetics’ relationship to cryonics, thus understood, has everything to do with how cybernetics 
                                                            
277 Shilling, The Body and Social Theory, 166.  
 
107 
 
brought about and formalized changes in the classification of matter, during and subsequent to 
WWII.  Prior to WWII, the classification of matter had long proceeded in dichotomous fashion: 
it was either alive or it was dead.  The study of living matter, correspondingly, fell to the 
biological sciences, just as the study of dead matter fell to the natural sciences.
278
  Cybernetics, 
by contrast, as has been demonstrated throughout the preceding several sections, brought 
organisms and machines into equivalence, thereby undermining this dichotomous scheme.   
Crucially, during and subsequent to WWII, the cyberneticians perpetrated this 
undermining conceptually as well as materially, by creating a variety of “monsters”—Andrew 
Pickering’s apt term—which performed and thus instantiated, in the real time of material 
practice, the ontological flattening of organisms and machines that cybernetics otherwise 
established theoretically.  Among the devices to be found in what Pickering describes as a 
veritable “gallery” of cybernetic monsters are Wiener and Bigelow’s anti-aircraft (AA) predictor, 
W. Ross Ashby’s homeostat, and W. Grey Walter’s cybernetic tortoises.279  Each monster 
operated as a “prototype of other sorts of systems and of cybernetic principles more generally.”  
For instance, Wiener and Bigelow’s AA predictor, as we have seen, modeled aircraft trajectories, 
as well as the probabilistic nature of all kinds of systems (i.e. natural, social, technological).
280
  
Ashby’s homeostat, a “machine for staying the same,” modeled the ability of living organisms to 
self-regulate relative to fluctuating environmental conditions.
281
  Walter’s cybernetic tortoises, 
lastly, modeled the brain as an “‘acting machine’ rather than a ‘thinking machine,’” thus 
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illuminating how the brain, as a “performative” organ, interacts with and adapts to unknown 
environments.
282
   
Looking beyond the question of their efficacy as prototypes, Pickering regards these and 
other cybernetic monsters as “beautiful if horrible instances of matter behaving badly.”  Indeed, 
he maintains that they produce a disconcerting affect precisely for this reason—“they are 
instances of inanimate matter acting as if it were alive.”283  Norbert Wiener himself was 
cognizant of this affect, and was furthermore quite troubled by it, as evidenced by his repeated 
references to witchcraft, sorcery, black magic, and the figure of the Golem—the artificial man of 
Jewish legend
284—when discussing cybernetic automation and its implications.285  Wiener’s 
references to the occult are apt, for the cybernetic monsters’ strange performativity, in eliding 
any hard and fast distinction between organisms and machines, necessarily collapsed as well the 
distinction between the living and the dead.   
Earlier in this chapter I noted that NASA, by 1964, had all but abandoned the cyborg 
spaceflight project, and hade even dropped the term cyborg itself, officially citing lack of 
feasibility given that the requisite kinds and levels of (bio)technology did not exist.  There is 
reason to suspect, however, that there is far more to the story.  Quite tellingly, as Ronald Kline 
has documented, the cyborg in some ways proved far too drastic.  One reader of Life, for 
instance, identifying only as a “technologist,” having read the magazine’s coverage of Kline and 
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Clynes’ proposal, wrote to the editors that “he was ‘profoundly shocked by the inhuman proposal 
[…] for the manufacture of ‘Cyborgs,’ artificially dehumanized, mechanized monsters.’”286  
To this point, Chris Hables Gray has suggested that NASA ultimately terminated the program for 
reasons not at all dissimilar to those expressed by the disaffected reader of Life.  
A cyborg is potentially a post-human; a human modified beyond being human.  I 
think this is why, without any conscious decision I can find record of, NASA 
refused the term cyborg so completely.  Because at every level of the 
organization, from the astronauts who were being cyborged to the bureaucrats at 
the top who always had to worry about the public perception of the program, the 
idea of the cyborg was very threatening.
287
 
 
The threat posed by the cyborg, of course, in many ways analogous to the uncanny affect 
produced by Pickering’s cybernetic monsters, derives principally from the fact that the entity 
merges human and machine, living and dead, and is thus a potential source of profound cognitive 
distress, which at base is attributable to the fact that the cyborg is an entailment of the 
computational metaphor.  
It is this space of collapsed dichotomies, then, perpetrated in theory by the computational 
metaphor, and materially instantiated by the cyberneticians’ monsters, which in no small 
measure fed and facilitated the emergence of both the cyborg and cryonic suspension.  And like 
the cybernetic monsters and the figure of cyborg, cryonic suspension produces a strangely 
disconcerting affect because the performance of the practice ultimately eventuates in the material 
instantiation of liminal entities that are seemingly neither alive nor dead.
288
  Cryonics is a death 
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practice, but it is one that entails managing corpses over the long-term as if they were potentially 
alive—i.e. subject to technological repair and eventual rebirth.  As will be recalled from Chapter 
2, “doubt as to whether an apparently living being is inanimate and, conversely, doubt as to 
whether a lifeless object may not in fact become animate,” is a key source of the cognitive 
distress, the anxiety that Ernst Jentsch identified so closely with the experience of the uncanny—
being “ill at ease,” not quite “at home.”289   
Ettinger’s and Cooper’s “freeze now manifestos,” entailments and elaborations of the 
computational metaphor, emerged and circulated throughout the American 1960s as outlines of a 
(magical) survival strategy; an attempt to “keep death at bay through a strategic maneuvering 
between various life options.”290   In the next chapter, attending to the plights of those frozen, I 
demonstrate that the manifestos essentially operated as “how to” guides for the production of 
uncanny entities, seemingly neither alive nor dead—cryonauts.   In so doing, I also move the 
cybernetic dimension of the argument developed in this chapter into dialogue with the death 
dimension taken up in the next.  Just as I have attempted to demonstrate here the kinship of 
cryonic suspension with other cybernetic entities, in the next chapter I demonstrate that the 
practice both assumes and replicates the much more pervasive magical logic that Zygmunt 
Bauman sees at play under conditions of western modernity more broadly, namely the notion 
that every death has a “cause,” which is in theory surmountable by technoscience.  I then move 
to recount the catastrophic failures of the early cryonic suspension efforts, failures which in no 
small created the necessity for a now decades-long rehabilitation effort, which in 2004 garnered 
the support of Manfred Clynes himself.  
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Chapter 4: Ghosts of Chatsworth 
 
 
The preceding chapter set forth a series of interpretive claims with respect to how the 
postwar science of cybernetics figured quite prominently in the writings of Evan Cooper and 
Robert C. W. Ettinger, facilitating the emergence of cryonic suspension in the American 1960s.  
Thus, it attended to a key dimension of the conditions under which the call to “freeze now” was 
issued by Ettinger and Cooper, and ultimately codified in their respective manifestoes, The 
Prospect of Immortality and Immortality: Physically, Scientifically, Now.  While the present 
chapter remains in the register of interpretation occupied by the preceding chapter, it moves to 
focus on a different yet intimately related set of concerns and characters—the grim adventures of 
those who subsequently answered the call to “freeze now,” and thus as well and primarily the 
lives of those who were frozen and ultimately lost between 1967 and 1979.  
Just as I used Cooper in Chapter 3 to decenter Ettinger, thereby subverting the Ettinger 
“origin narrative” (outlined in Chapter 1), so as to then attend to the matters of historical context 
it has tended to elide, in the present chapter I focus principally on the early cryonics patients, in a 
similar effort to subvert the cryonics “atrocity tale,” which tends to attribute the horrors of the 
so-called “Chatsworth Scandal” (also outlined in Chapter 1) to the flawed character and 
misdeeds of Robert F. “Bob” Nelson.  As the decentering of Ettinger ultimately led to an 
engagement with cybernetics, the decentering of Nelson ultimately calls for attending to the 
circumstances which prompted the patients (and their families) to pursue cryonic suspension; 
which prompted them to believe and act.  This in turn requires attending to the fact that cryonic 
suspension, understood in the broadest possible sense—from those who issued to the call to 
“freeze now” to those who were frozen and those who froze them—itself emerged, was realized 
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in practice, and ultimately met with catastrophic failure in a context shaped and defined by 
modernity’s institutional sequestration of death.   
This of course returns to the foreground the historically contingent affinity that, as I have 
argued throughout preceding chapters, defines the conditions under which cryonic suspension 
emerged—an affinity between, on the one side, the cultural malaise surrounding death and dying, 
and, on the other side, the circulation and appropriation of cybernetic concepts and predictions 
throughout the broader culture of the American 1960s.  One of the principle takeaway points 
from the previous chapter offers a measure of interpretive leverage in getting ahold of this 
affinity, with respect to what can be termed cryonic suspension’s “hybrid” status:  While the 
“freeze now” manifestos penned by Cooper and Ettinger ultimately fail in terms of legitmating 
technoscientific criteria, they nevertheless offer recipes for action vis-a-vis death; a way of 
knowing death and acting, even though at base “wishful thinking,” i.e. magic.  It is in this sense 
precisely that cryonics is at once both a simulacrum of cold war technoscience and, as I argue 
below, a member of an emergent class of (magical) practices that Bauman has termed survival 
strategies. The patient centered narratives that I develop below are in the concluding chapter 
pressed into the service of (dialectically) mediating this affinity, and thus the hybrid status of 
cryonics; offering an interpretation of cryonics as an abundant phenomenon; ultimately tying the 
emergence of cryonics to the fact that modernity’s institutional sequestration of death has and 
will continue to fall short.  Before proceeding to the patient narratives, however, and in 
anticipation of these concluding interpretive claims, I first want to pick up threads of 
argumentation that I introduced in Chapter 2, specifically with respect to modernity’s 
institutional sequestration of death and cryonics’ status as a magical practice.  
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Modern Magic and the Sequestration of Death 
 
I noted in Chapter 1 and again in Chapter 2 that the presence of a well-defined subfield 
devoted to the sociology of death, dying, and bereavement both reflects and reinforces the 
tendency of academic sociologists proper to regard death as being only marginally important to 
the study of the modern social write large.  This charge is worth exploring, for the division of 
academic labor to which it points is in fact difficult if not impossible to maintain if one takes 
seriously the prominence, indeed the centrality, of death in the “existential human condition.”291  
Perhaps no one has grasped the existential dilemma presented by death better than Søren 
Kierkegaard.  Since those of us among the living are, for Kierkegaard “absolutely excluded from 
the possibility of approaching death in any sense whatever”—i.e. since we “cannot sacrifice 
[ourselves] upon the altar of [our] own experiment”—“[we] learn nothing from it.”292  Thus a 
profound existential contradiction: we are finite creatures who are certain of death’s inevitability, 
though given the absolute nature of death we are barred from attaining certain knowledge of 
what death ultimately holds in store.
293
  Borrowing from many of Kierkegaard’s insights, Ernest 
Becker has most famously written of the existential terror produced by this contradiction, which 
he regards as “a mainspring of human activity—activity designed largely to avoid the fatality of 
death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny for man [sic].”294  Of 
course, the material and symbolic activities provoked by death vary quite radically, both within 
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and across cultures and historical periods.  The point to be underscored here, however, is that 
death, a “biological fact,” is one of the few “universal parameters” in and through which social 
worlds and individual lives are constructed.
295
  Thus to attend to a “way of life”—the hopes and 
fears, the ways and wants of a people—is to attend simultaneously, if only indirectly, to a way of 
death, and vice versa.  
Such an understanding of life and death is threaded through the highly influential 
theorizing of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann,
296
 whose existential-phenomenological 
sensibilities, shaped largely by the influence of Alfred Schutz, led them to characterize the 
“onslaught of nightmare” presented by death as a primary source of the material and symbolic 
activities through which humans work to construct, legitimate, and maintain social realities.  
Indeed, writing subsequently about the place of religion in legitimating “socially constructed” 
realities in The Sacred Canopy, Berger went so far as to claim that “every human order is a 
community in the face of death,”297 a “barrier against naked terror”298; “every society is, in the 
last resort, men [sic] banded together in the face of death.”299  As Mellor has pointed out, 
although his text is subtitled Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, Berger’s account of 
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religion is entirely predicated upon a theory of the centrality of death in the constitution and 
maintenance of the social.
300
  
These are startling claims.  Sociologically, to regard death as such is uncomfortable yet 
somehow seemingly basic; disturbing yet undeniably crucial.  These are startling claims, in large 
measure because they suggest a messy and mutually constitutive tension between life and 
death—an ambiguous intermingling of terms and spheres that modernity would have us place in 
unambiguous bifurcation.  To hold death in abeyance relative to the “apparently familiar topics 
of social and cultural life,”301 then, as sociologists proper are wont to do, is to conspire in the 
reproduction and maintenance of this bifurcation—and thus as well the distinctly modern modes 
of power whose operation it both reflects and enables.
302
  
Zygmunt Bauman, as noted in Chapters 1 and 2, has to this end called for a departure 
from sociologies “of” death—i.e., with death conceived narrowly, in modernist terms, as an 
“end-of-life” event—in favor of sociologies that set out to apprehend major sociocultural 
processes as “arising from (triggered by) the prominence of death in the “existential human 
condition.”303  Bauman’s call is emphatic, and for good reason.  While Bauman, like 
Kierkegaard, Becker, Berger and Luckmann, Shilling and Mellor, recognizes death as the 
absolute, the unimaginable “Other” of life, he is at great pains to stress that death is nevertheless 
“the Other of modern life.”304  Relative to modernity’s “drive to mastery,” writes Bauman, that 
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“mode of being shot through with hope, ambition, and confidence”; up against the modern 
impulse to declare all manner of constraint “illegitimate,” and all impediments to human 
omnipotence “unwarranted,” death—mortality—is the “major scandal,” the “ultimate 
offence.”305  Bauman regards the inevitability, the fatefulness of death, as the outright “denial” of 
modernity, above all its “arrogant promise of the indivisible sovereignty of reason.”306  The 
faculty of reason is exercised in the making of choices, “but death is not a matter of choice.”307  
Under the sign of modernity, death is scandalous precisely because it does not yield to reason—
death “loudly declares reason’s lie.”308  Death, consequently, is modernity’s “guilty secret.”309  
Thus the concealment, the exclusion of death, is for Bauman the principle constitutive feature—
the Other—of modern social life.  
As I discussed at some length in Chapter 1, Bauman’s account of death as modernity’s 
excluded and disparaged Other has powerful resonances with the broad institutional trends that 
Anthony Giddens has referred to as the “sequestration of experience” and, more narrowly for our 
purposes, the sequestration of death.
310
   I want to recapitulate in order to build upon these 
resonances here.  First, Giddens’ sequestration of death thesis is important insofar as it marks a 
significant departure from sociological treatments of death and, in keeping with Bauman, 
identifies the sequestration of death as one of modernity’s principle constitutive features.  
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Second, both Giddens and Bauman clearly understand and articulate that the exclusion of death 
from conditions of life under western modernity is at once both a necessary and unrealizable 
project.  For Bauman, it is a “necessary” project only from the sovereign vantage of reason; as 
noted above, death threatens to undermine reason’s sovereignty.311  For Giddens, sequestration is 
“necessary” because death poses profound existential questions which modernity’s internally 
referential systems of knowledge are incapable of answering.
312
  In this sense both Giddens and 
Bauman echo Michel Foucault in underscoring that death reveals the outer limits of reason; it is 
that which resides beyond rational control.
313
  Following from this, both Bauman and Giddens 
see death’s sequestration as a “necessary” project which is at the same time ultimately 
unrealizable; it is a modernizing project that will always fall short.
314
   
Third, both Bauman and Giddens are attuned to the precarious situation this creates for 
the living.  As discussed in the previous chapter, and as intimated again above, for Bauman 
especially reason renders problematic and ultimately places under suspicion those forms of 
intersubjective meaning and ritual practice which have historically worked to make sense of and 
assuage the existential terror that death necessarily presents.  By virtue of reason’s sovereignty 
death becomes reason’s responsibility.  Reason, however, standing alone in the cultural-cum-
epistemic lacunae its sovereignty ultimately carves out, is in no way up to the task it has created 
for itself, for again, death does not yield to reason.  Though ultimately unable to replace with 
scientific certainties the religious certainties it has placed on the defensive, Bauman finds not, 
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per se, the retreat of reason in the face of death, but rather recourse taken, paradoxically, to 
decidedly non-rational measures that create and maintain the illusion of reason’s capable 
handling of death (fostering reassurance among the living) and thus as well the illusion of 
reason’s sovereignty (for the two illusions are ultimately at one).  Bauman, in other words, 
charges that reason here ultimately fosters and gives way to magic.
315
  Because death is 
ultimately unresolvable, moreover, this means that reason requires an ongoing magic show to 
maintain its sovereignty.  The ongoing nature of the magic show thus parallels the ongoing 
nature of modernity’s institutional sequestration of death.  The former perpetrates the illusion of 
control at those moments and in those spaces where the latter, an ongoing and ultimately 
unrealizable project, inevitably comes up short.   
The extent and nature of the modern magic show vis-à-vis death are best arrived at 
through a consideration of what Bauman terms survival strategies, that is to say, “attempts to 
keep death at bay through a strategic maneuvering between various life options.”316  Survival 
strategies are for Bauman magical in that they produce and maintain the illusion of reason’s 
control over death, thus preserving the illusion of reason’s sovereignty under modern conditions 
of institutional sequestration.  What Bauman regards as the most apparent survival strategy, the 
modern medicalization and deconstruction of death, is to be understood as magical in precisely 
this sense; it perpetrates a sleight of hand.  For as Bauman stresses, under modernity people no 
longer officially “die” of death.  Rather, he discerns, “they die only of individual causes, they die 
because there was an individual cause.”317  If death is ultimately unavoidable, assigning causes 
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to each and every individual death renders said deaths explainable, and thus as well said causes, 
if only in theory, surmountable.   Each and every newly discerned “cause” of mortality 
furthermore operates as an impetus to mobilize (medical) technoscience for the purpose of 
preventing death and extending life.
318
  Indeed, as Bauman puts it, the “whole of life” comes to 
“serve the purpose of war against ‘causes of death’; “fighting the causes of dying turns into the 
meaning of life.”319 
Without going so far as to endorse some or another variant of the secularization thesis, 
Bauman underscores that once hegemonic religious survival strategies, traditionally understood, 
are nevertheless giving way to what he terms a policy of “self-care.”320  As a survival strategy, 
self-care is both bound up with and extends throughout modern life more broadly the 
individuating logic and magic of death’s biomedical deconstruction.  At base, self-care works to 
elide the ultimate limit of the human body, that is to say death, by way of “breaking, 
successively, its currently encountered specific limitations.”321 In other words, as Shilling 
elaborates, the policy of self-care plays a crucial role in the maintenance of death’s institutional 
sequestration by steering people to “engross themselves in projects geared towards their own 
survival, which are increasingly focused upon maintaining the health of their bodies.”322  The 
inroads of self-care with consumerism are here glaringly apparent.  Indeed, by way of self-care, 
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Shilling has tied the emergence of myriad fitness, dietary, and body-building regimes, as well as 
cosmetic surgery, to the sequestration of death.
323
  Céline Lafontaine has in a very similar vein 
called attention to the concomitant medicalization and denigration of aging and the elderly that 
the sequestration and medical deconstruction of death have engendered, pointing to an “entire 
arsenal of professions and products,” the expressed aim of which is the attenuation (and implied 
eradication) of aging: “…anti-wrinkle creams, vitamins, … drugs such as Viagra or growth 
hormones.”324  Mike Featherstone’s work, following from this, suggests that the (dialectical) 
underside of consumer culture’s celebration of youth, self-preservation, and beautiful bodies—
envisioned outcomes of Bauman’s policy of self-care—is in fact death; the uniquely modern 
terror of death and dying shapes self-caring consumers of magical objects in the here and now; 
consumption as self-care, as survival strategy.
325
   
What follows from all of this is that the root magical impulse I explicated in Chapter 3, in 
the writings of Ettinger and Cooper, is decidedly (though paradoxically) modern and thus quite 
pervasive, and as such is hardly unique to the practice of cryonic suspension.  Indeed, magic 
links cryonic suspension to what Bauman regards as the principle constitutive feature of modern 
social life.  Ettinger and Cooper not only presumed these magical logics, however, but in their 
writings replicated and compounded them at a second-order level.  Cryonic suspension is thus 
related to the preceding survival strategies, but it represents a different act in the modern magic 
show that Bauman has discerned.  Just as reason, in Bauman’s interpretation, ultimately gives 
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way to magic at those moments and in those spaces where the institutional sequestration of death 
inevitably comes up short, cryonic suspension, I maintain, while tied to the survival strategies of 
self-care and death’s medicalized deconstruction, takes shape precisely where these survival 
strategies, in turn, inevitably come up short—it is a policy of self-care that entails anticipating, in 
the here and now, the emergence and success of future survival strategies.  Cryonic suspension is 
thus a second-order survival strategy.  In accord with the magical logic of death’s medicalized 
deconstruction, cryonic suspension is undertaken on the premise that whatever causes one to 
“deanimate” is in theory surmountable.  Thus the practice at base is a strategy by which to defer 
recognition of technology’s inevitable shortcomings vis-à-vis any given “cause” of death, in any 
given present, on the grounds that these shortcomings will in time be overcome.  Indeed, 
consider here Robert Ettinger himself, on what he regards to be the “essence of the main 
argument” for the pursuit of cryonic suspension: 
…we need only arrange to have our bodies, after we die, stored in suitable 
freezers [until] the time when science may be able to help us. No matter what kills 
us, whether old age or disease, and even if freezing techniques are still crude 
when we die, sooner or later our friends of the future should be equal to the task 
of reviving and curing us.
326
  
 
Technology, Bauman writes, “promises … what it cannot deliver.”327  The expectations at play 
in Ettinger’s argument coupled with his focus on causes of death—“no matter what kills us…”— 
together translate what technology cannot deliver into what technology “cannot deliver today,” 
“has not yet delivered,” or “one day will deliver.”  The fulfillment of technology’s otherwise 
unfillable promises is thus perpetually deferred to the future.  As detailed at length in the 
previous chapter, the mechanism that both makes possible and legitimates this deferral; indeed, 
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the mechanism which produces the cognitive orientation by which Ettinger and thus as well 
Cooper come to expect technology to deliver upon the promises it has made, is the computer—or 
more precisely, Norbert Wiener’s famed prediction of a “second industrial revolution” to be 
heralded by the arrival of cybernetic “thinking machines.” Indeed, through their work of 
articulating the pervasive, base magical logics of medicalized “causality” and “self-care” with 
the temporal orientation of Wiener’s prediction, Ettinger and Cooper produced cryonic 
suspension as a second-order survival strategy.   While on the one hand the practice is a 
simulacrum, which approximates but ultimately fails in terms of legitimating technoscientific 
criteria, as a second-order survival strategy it nevertheless has a practical import in that it offers a 
recipe for action vis-a-vis death; a way of knowing death and acting, even though at base 
“wishful thinking,” magic.    
While this throws into relief the status of cryonics as a survival strategy of the second 
order, the timing of the practice’s emergence, i.e. the moment in which the work of articulation, 
manifest in Ettinger’s and Cooper’s manifestos, was carried out, merits consideration here to 
round out the context.  For the American 1960s mark a moment in which the sequestration of 
death broadly and its attendant strategies of biomedical deconstruction and combative 
technoscience came up especially short.  As Stephan Timmermans has observed, there was 
during this time an “emerging recognition that something had gone profoundly wrong with the 
way people died.”  Indeed, American ways of death and dying during the 1960s, Timmermans 
writes, were “examined critically and found wanting.”328  Echoing Timmermans, Jill Lepore 
offers a distillation of what became increasingly apparent in the American 1960s:  
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When death moved to the hospital, it got scarier: so far from home; so many 
machines; so many strangers; instruments that poke and prod; bright lights; 
sleepless nights.  The more successfully medicine staved off death, the less well 
anyone, including and maybe especially doctors and scientists, has accepted 
dying.
329
 
 
In accord here with Lepore, medical technology, Timmermans notes, and to a somewhat lesser 
degree the institution of the hospital itself, have long been singled out as the “sources of 
distortion” for the experiences of death and dying that came to a head in the 1960s.330  Following 
David Wendell Moller, Timmermans writes of modern medicine’s decidedly technoscientific 
approach to death and the dying, and its eventuation in “‘aggressive,’ ‘dehumanizing,’ and 
‘depersonalized treatment’”331 of the terminally ill. 
Coupled with the void produced by modernity’s systematic undermining of those shared 
normative practices that once guided the living through matters of death, medical technoscience 
had by the 1960s eventuated in the isolation, the alienation, what Norbert Elias has called the 
“loneliness of the dying” in modern societies, and thus as well pervasive confusion and anxiety 
with respect to how the living should relate the dying and the dead.
332
  It is in response to this 
context that the hospice movement, initiated by Cicely Saunders, and Elizabeth Kubler-Ross’s 
attention to the plight of the dying, largely took shape, as well as bereavement care and grief 
counseling for the terminally ill and the bereaved alike.
333
  Many have hailed these developments 
as effective protests against and alternatives to the dehumanizing orientation, the power of 
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medical technoscience.  It is far more likely, however, especially given their overwhelmingly 
therapeutic-cum-managerial focus on the dying and the bereaved, that they represent instead 
simply another layer of medical power in modernity’s ongoing sequestration of death, a set of 
therapeutic policy of self-care which compliments medicine’s objectification of the patient’s 
body with the integration of psychotherapeutic appeals to and management of the patient’s 
subjective experiences.
334
  
While an in-depth consideration of these developments gestures in a direction that would 
take us beyond the remit of the present work, it should nevertheless be noted here that cryonic 
suspension emerged in tandem with these techniques of self-care, in tension with same 
sociohistorical context.  Whereas the preceding developments evidence therapeutic policies of 
the self that have long since come to supplement medical technoscience in its ongoing 
sequestration and biomedical deconstruction of death, facilitating the management of death as an 
“end of life event,”335 cryonic suspension evidences something related but slightly different.   
As a second order (magical) survival strategy, the practice not only presumes the logic of 
“cause” and the policy of “self-care,” but by virtue of its articulation of these with cybernetic 
concepts and predictions, replicates and thus compounds them at a second-order level.  Here, 
taking recourse to a future that, as discussed in the previous chapter, cannot be tested or verified 
in accordance with the scientific measure to which biomedicine defers, the issue is not the 
construal and therapeutic management of death as an end of life event, but rather the 
management of the dead over the long-term as if they were potentially alive, amenable to rescue 
by the technoscience of an envisioned though thoroughly unverifiable future.  We have seen that 
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while the “freeze now” manifestos penned by scientific laymen Cooper and Ettinger ultimately 
fail in terms of legitmating technoscientific criteria, in their transgressive appeal to a future they 
nevertheless offered a recipe for action, vis-à-vis death, at an especially low point in modernity’s 
ongoing process of institutional sequestration—the manifestos took shape in a space produced by 
the shortcomings of modernity’s sequestration of death.  In what follows, then, the focus is 
shifted from those who issued the call to “freeze now,” understood as such, to those who 
answered the call in practice, and thus evidenced their hope in the eventual arrival of the 
cybernetic future conjured by Ettinger and Cooper by way of Wiener—those who froze and thus 
as well and primarily those who were frozen and ultimately lost between 1967 and 1979, the first 
cryonics patients.  
 
The Patients 
 
My decision to foreground and narrate here the lives and shared fate of the first cryonic 
suspension patients in part takes root in the recognition that the early history of cryonics tends 
overwhelmingly to be read anachronistically, that is to say, back through the outcomes of 
subsequent events, specifically those that transpired at Chatsworth.  The so-called “Chatsworth 
scandal,” as will be recalled from discussion in Chapter 1, refers to the discovery, in 1979, of 
nine abandoned, thawed, and decomposed cryonics patients, who were interned at the (long-
since defunct) Cryonic Society of California’s (CSC) underground crypt at the Oakwood 
Memorial Park Cemetery in Chatsworth, California.  Foregrounding the patient narratives 
facilitates a departure from the narrative conventions established by the Nelson “atrocity tale.”  
In a manner analogous to the Ettinger “origin story,” it will be recalled, with its attendant 
canonization of Robert C. W. Ettinger as the “father” and sole originator of cryonic suspension, 
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the “atrocity tale” pins the lion’s share of responsibility for the events at Chatsworth on the 
misdeeds of Robert F. “Bob” Nelson, cryonics pioneer and (then) President of the CSC.  As with 
the Ettinger origin story, with respect to Evan Cooper, moving beyond the Nelson “atrocity tale,” 
with an eye to the early cryonics patients, facilitates the recovery of context, which in turn lends 
itself to constructing a more nuanced and substantive set of narratives about cryonic suspension, 
several facets of which I will briefly mention here.  
 The patient narratives set forth below take shape in response to the following questions:  
Who were they?  When and under what circumstances did they or their families come to learn of 
cryonic suspension?  How did the patients come to fall under the watch of Bob Nelson and the 
CSC?  What ultimately happened to them?  Constructing the patient narratives in response to 
these questions serves several ends.  First and foremost, shifting the focus from Nelson to the 
reasons the patients and their families acted has the effect of humanizing them.  To be sure, as 
will become especially evident in what follows, Nelson’s conduct was nothing if not shady.  As 
will be recalled from Chapter 1, a California civil court found Bob Nelson guilty of “fraud and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress,”336 and ultimately ordered him to pay upwards of one 
million dollars in damages to those who brought the suit against him—the adult children of the 
CSC patients who under his watch were left to thaw and decompose at Chatsworth.  In no way, 
however, does this legal verdict obviate the fact that the patients and their families espoused and 
acted upon a hope that was to them and others quite real, and understandably so given the nature 
of the historical moment in question, as discussed above, with respect to death and dying in the 
American 1960s.  It is this hope, then, that I aim to recover in humanizing the patients, in 
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constructing the patient narratives below.  And it is precisely the recovery of this hope that is in 
keeping with the present study’s opting for a sociology centered about death’s sequestration, an 
abundant sociological history.  For however false a hope it may be, its root (magical) logic 
nevertheless pervades the modern world, evidenced most apparently in modernity’s impulse to 
sequester death.  To read cryonic suspension in terms of the conventions set by the Nelson 
atrocity tale, as an anomalous scam perpetrated by a conman, is to miss this link.  Thus the 
recovery of the hopes espoused and acted upon ties the plight of the patients to what Zygmunt 
Bauman regards as the principle constitutive feature of modern life—the sequestration of death.  
Constructing the patient narratives as such carries with it several additional insights and 
contributions.  For one, it shows how the “freeze–now” manifestos circulated and brought the 
patients and their families into a shared space of anticipation, of hope, ultimately showing the 
material instantiation, the performance of cryonic suspension, as a second-order (magical) 
survival strategy.  It also brings into focus the ties that existed between Nelson’s CSC and the 
other cryonics organizations that actually carried out suspensions, during the period in question: 
the Cryonics Society of New York (CSNY), headed by (one-time) attorney Curtis Henderson and 
Hunter College student Saul Kent, and the Cryo-Care Equipment Corporation (Cryo-Care) of 
Phoenix, AZ, headed by Edward Francis “Ed” Hope.   These men are the principle actors who 
answered Ettinger and Cooper’s call to “freeze now.” And like Ettinger and Cooper, they were 
all of them “lay” scientific actors, aspiring amateurs at best.  This point is significant in that it 
both further contextualizes Nelson’s questionable conduct while at the same time broadening 
responsibility for the events at Chatsworth.  Just as Ettinger and Cooper were shunned by and 
excluded from participating in the medical-technoscientific mainstream from which they drew 
their ideas and inspiration, so also were those who answered the call to “freeze now.”  
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Consequently, mortuary and cemetery operations were the only viable institutional spaces 
through which to “answer,” in practice, the call the “freeze now,” and to store the frozen over the 
long-term.  The CSC partnered with mortician Joseph Klockgether, the CSNY with mortician 
Fred Horn.  (Though Hope performed several freezings, Cryo-Care was principally a supply-side 
equipment endeavor, thus he never formally partnered with a mortuary operation.
337
)  These 
partnerships had the effect of rendering concrete a very strange set of articulations between a 
seemingly yet decidedly non-technoscientific-cum-medical practice, one modeled on the 
speculative technoscience of the Cold War, with existing mortuary practices, techniques, and 
cemetery spaces.  A principle point that I aim to highlight in what follows, however, specifically 
with respect to Nelson, is that the relatively lax surveillance of mortuaries and cemeteries, 
compared, for instance, to that of hospitals, in no small measure enabled Nelson’s conduct, thus 
facilitating the horrific events at Chatsworth.    
 To sum up before proceeding, the overriding aim of developing the patient narratives 
below is to move beyond the conventions of the Nelson “atrocity tale,” ultimately with an eye to 
recovering the hope that cryonic suspension held for the patients and their families, regardless of 
Nelson’s intentions and misdeeds.  While the patient narratives have the effect of showing the 
events at Chatsworth “in the making,” offering an “explanation” of the scandal is not my aim 
here.
338
  Rather, the patient narratives are ultimately what make it possible to bring together my 
interpretation of cryonic suspension as a second-order (magical) survival strategy with the 
broader trend and, indeed, the shortcomings of modernity’s ongoing process of sequestering 
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death.   The narratives in this sense most effectively tie cryonic suspension to what Bauman 
regards as the principle constitutive feature of modern life—the sequestration of death. 
Demonstrating, to this end, that processes of institutional sequestration produced the conditions 
in which cryonic suspension emerged, was instantiated, and ultimately failed catastrophically, is 
to offer as well an account of cryonics that moves beyond those sociologies “of” death  that 
replicate sequestration in theory and research practice.  In this sense, it is also to develop and 
offer an abundant sociological account of cryonic suspension.  I return to these matters in the 
concluding chapter.  
 
Genevieve 
 
On January 25, 1972, at 6:50 am, a little girl died at Los Angeles Children’s Hospital.  
Her name was Genevieve Marie Ann de la Poterie, and she was eight years old.  Six months 
earlier, the physicians treating Genevieve at St. Justine’s Hospital in Montreal informed her 
parents, Guy and Pierrette de la Poterie, that there was no chance of saving their daughter from 
the cancer that was decimating her bowels and kidneys.  The grim prognosis prompted the de la 
Poteries to move Genevieve to California, not to seek alternative medical treatment but rather to 
achieve proximity to the unique services offered by the Cryonics Society of California.  The de 
la Poteries, that is to say, made arrangements to have Genevieve chemically perfused and frozen 
upon the pronouncement of her death, in the hope that she might one day be revived and 
rejuvenated, if and when the medical scientists of the future discover a cure for cancer.
339
  “I felt 
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if there was even the slightest chance for her to come back some day and complete her life,” 
Genevieve’s father later recalled, “then it must be taken.”  “If I found out ten years from now 
they had found a cure for cancer and could revive frozen people who died of cancer, then I 
would want to kill myself if I had not had her suspended.”340  
Guy de la Poterie, like many others during the (North) American 1960s and 70s, first 
encountered cryonic suspension in the pages of the popular press; he later viewed a television 
special about the practice.  Upon receiving the news of his daughter’s condition, de la Poterie 
recalled imagery of an emergency vehicle with “Cryonics Society of Michigan” (CSM) painted 
on the side, which initially led him to contact the Detroit-based Robert C. W. “Bob” Ettinger, 
CSM President, community college physics instructor, and author of The Prospect of Immortality 
(1964), the popular science text credited with sparking the so-called “cryonics movement.”  
Ettinger steered de la Porterie west, to Robert F. “Bob” Nelson, then President of the Cryonics 
Society of California (CSC), one of the three organizations offering cryonic suspension services 
at the time.
341
   
Nelson, a television repairman by trade and former prizefighter, had risen to prominence 
in cryonics circles years earlier, in January of 1967, when he coordinated the first cryonic 
suspension to be carried out under “controlled conditions,” that of Dr. James H. Bedford, UCLA 
Professor of Psychology Emeritus, the details of which Nelson later recounted in his 
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questionable 1968 memoir, We Froze the First Man.
342
  Bedford’s suspension was anomalous 
among the first cryonic suspensions, for several reasons.  First, his suspension was backed by a 
sizable estate.   Second, soon after he was frozen, Bedford was removed from Nelson’s care.  
Third, and most significantly, in addition to being the first person to be placed in cryonic 
suspension under “controlled conditions,” of all those frozen before 1974, Bedford is the only 
cryonics “patient” who remains in suspension today.343   Genevieve de la Poterie would be the 
first child and the fifteenth person to be placed in cryonic suspension, marking the sixth case to 
be handled by Bob Nelson under the auspices of the CSC and its partner corporation, Cryonic 
Internment.
344
   
While it was doubtful that little Genevieve would even survive the flight from Montreal 
to Los Angeles, she did.  With the aid of Nelson and others affiliated with the CSC, Genevieve’s 
parents soon had her admitted to the Los Angeles Children’s Hospital.345  There, physicians quite 
unexpectedly disputed the prognosis of their Montreal colleagues.  They removed Genevieve’s 
second kidney, placed her on dialysis, and administered alternating treatments of chemotherapy 
and radiotherapy to subdue the cancer.  Genevieve lost all her hair, half her body weight, and 
suffered temporary blindness.  By September of 1971, however, though her long-term survival 
would require continued dialysis and, ultimately, a kidney transplant, Genevieve’s cancer had 
been subdued.  When she was well enough, before returning to Montreal with her parents, 
                                                            
342  Robert F. Nelson with Sandra Stanley, We Froze the First Man: The Startling True Story of the First Great Step 
Toward Human Immortality (New York: Dell, 1968); Anonymous, “Chill Strikes the Cryonics Business,” 
Newsweek, July 7, 1980, 9.   
 
343  Bedford is presently in the care of the Alcor Life Extension Foundation in Scottsdale, AZ.  
 
344 Anonymous, “Genevieve de la Poterie Suspended,” 1; Perry, “Table of Cryonic Suspension Patients,” 4 
5; Bob Nelson and Saul Kent, “Bob Nelson Speaks Out,” an Interview with Bob Nelson, Cryonics Reports 4, no. 4 
(April-May 1969):25. 
 
345 Perry, “Death at the Edge of Forever,” 36. 
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Genvieve was treated to a day at Disneyland, courtesy of Bob Nelson.
346
  Nelson recalled years 
later, “I never saw [Genvieve] smile till we took her to Disneyland […] I told her mother I was  
going to speak French to [her] to make her smile, and that was the only time I saw her smile.  
Heartbreaking.”347    
 
        
             Figure 3.  Guy de la Poterie and Susan Buccelli (Robert 
                   Nelson’s daughter) with Genevieve at Los  
            Angeles Children’s Hospital, ca. 1971.   
  
                               Source:     Alcor 
 
Genevieve’s cancer returned months later, and again the de la Poteries made the trek to Los 
Angeles with their ailing daughter.  At 5:43 am, on January 25, 1972, at the Los Angeles 
Children’s Hospital, Genevieve experienced sharp pains and was administered morphine.  At 
6:48 am, the de la Poteries were joined by a priest.  It is said that Guy de la Poterie had 
                                                            
346 Ibid; Anonymous, “Genevieve Better, Going Home”; Anonymous, “Review and Directory,” 4; Aron, “The New 
Ice Age,” 11.  
 
347 Platt, “Robert Nelson and the Chatsworth Scandal,” 11.  
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previously explained to his daughter that being in cryonic suspension is like being asleep for a 
very long time, only to be awakened years later.  He explained to Genevieve that Walt Disney 
himself had been interested in cryonic suspension, but was unable make arrangements before he 
died.  “Many times in those final days she would say how sad she was for poor Walt.”348  At 6:50 
am, Genevieve died.  Her small body was immediately placed in a plastic bag, surrounded with 
ice, and injected with the anticoagulant heparin.  She was carried to an ambulance, equipped with 
a heart-lung machine, which maintained the circulation of oxygenated blood through her system 
as she was rushed to the Buena Park funeral home of Bob Nelson’s assistant, mortician Joseph 
Klockgether.  There, they drained her blood and perfused her body with dimethyl sulfoxide 
(DMSO), a substance known to protect the integrity of biological tissue at low temperatures by 
inhibiting the formation of ice crystals.  As the perfusion proceeded, Genevieve was packed in 
ice, and then eventually dry ice, as she was cooled gradually, over the course of twenty-seven 
hours, to -140˚F (-60˚C).349  
 
Steven 
 
Years before Genevieve’s freezing, early on the morning of July 28, 1968, a young man 
died of enteritis and adrenal failure at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital in Manhattan.  His name 
was Steven J. Mandell, and he was twenty-four years old.
350
  Steven was a photographer, a 
                                                            
348 Aron, “The New Ice Age,” 10-11. 
 
349 Aron, “The New Ice Age,” 11.    
 
350 The present account of Steven J. Mandell has been constructed with principle guidance taken from the following 
sources: Anonymous, “Cryonics News,” Cryonics Reports 3, no. 9 (September 1968):161-166; Anonymous, 
“Cryonics News,” Cryonics Reports 3, no. 10 (October 1968):182-189; Anonymous, “New York: Soul on Ice,” 
Newsweek, August 12, 1968, 29; Article, Harvey Aronson, “The Fine Art of Living Forever,” 1978, pg. 2,  original 
source unknown, Alcor.   
134 
 
guitarist, and a student of aeronautical engineering at New York University (NYU).  Steven was 
also an aspiring poet:  
Shimmering sky peeks in,  
  Shatters dark, eats through  
   Soul 
       Body 
          Heart 
Only love leaves hope. 
  Shadows cover only life and dreams; 
 But ‘twinkle-gong’ of night destroys          
  Men’s minds,      
               Brings bitterness:      
    
   need: 
hate     
  
Cold eyes burn, hurt- 
  No help in life. 
Perhaps beyond- 
Perhaps. 
 
Not now, none left.  
  Sad thoughts, foolish quests.   
We succumb like fools.  
  We die alone.
351
 
 
Steven discovered cryonics in the pages of a science fiction magazine that happened to 
contain information about the Cryonics Society of New York (CSNY).  The CSNY began to take 
shape in 1965, when Curtis Henderson, an attorney then working as an insurance claims adjuster, 
read a favorable review of Robert C. W. Ettinger’s The Prospect of Immortality in the New York 
Times Book Review.
352
  Intrigued by what at first was variously called the “freezer program,” the 
                                                            
351 Steven J. Mandell, “The Essence,” Cryonics Reports 3, no. 10 (October 1968):196.  
 
352 Mike Perry, “Interview with Curtis Henderson: May 24, 1987,” Cryonics 30, no. 3 (Third Quarter 2009):8. 
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“freeze-and-wait idea,” or “freeze-wait-rejuvenate,” Henderson wrote to Ettinger, who directed 
him to other interested New Yorkers who had likewise initiated correspondence.  On July 13, 
1965, the CSNY was incorporated as a non-profit service organization.
353
  Among the founding 
members were Hunter College student Saul Kent and future Scientologist Karl Werner, the man 
who is widely believed to have coined the term “cryonics” (from the Greek kryos, “cold”).  The 
CSNY was the first organization to use the term in its name.
354   
   
On November 20, 1967, less than a year before he died, Steven applied to the CSNY for 
student membership.  Steven’s mother, Pauline Mandell, recalled “being very annoyed” when 
CSNY materials would arrive in the mail for her son. “After a while he got me to read some of 
[it].  But I really didn’t want to discuss it with him, because when a person is ill, you don’t want 
to go into anything that deals with death—you don’t even want to believe it.”355  “Mom,” Steven 
attempted to persuade her, “wouldn’t you want even the least tiny bit of a chance if you could 
have it?  Isn’t it better than being put under the earth and knowing there is nothing left?”356  
Though she “felt it was morbid […] something he shouldn’t be thinking about,” Mrs. Mandell 
“didn’t fight” Steven’s interest in cryonics, recognizing that the practice provided her son with 
“peace of mind.”357  This is not to say, however, that Steven anticipated an optimal outcome.  He 
recognized, for instance, that the freezing process would very likely cause brain damage, so he 
prepared an audiotape recording of “the little things he wanted to remember about his life, the 
                                                            
353 Mike Perry, “Impressions of Curtis Henderson,” Cryonics 30, no. 3 (Third Quarter 2009): 6.   
 
354 Werner parted ways with the CSNY on August 21, 1968, on the grounds that cryonics and Scientology have 
opposing goals.  See Anonymous, “Cryonics News,” Cryonics Reports 3, no. 9 (September 1968):161.   
 
355 Pauline Mandell, “If my son, Steven…” Cryonics Reports 4, no. 3 (March 1969):18.   
 
356 Ibid., 19.  
 
357 Ibid.   
136 
 
experiences he might otherwise forget.”  Steven marked the tape “private—hands off,” and asked 
that it be placed with him in his cryopreservation capsule.
358
  Steven J. Mandell would be the 
seventh person to be placed in cryonic suspension overall, and the first case to be handled by the 
CSNY.
359
 
Mrs. Mandell was at Steven’s bedside when he died.  She recalled her son’s words, “Now 
don’t forget, mom, if anything happens make sure they put ice cubes around me real fast.”360   
 
      
                                          Figure 4.  Pauline Mandell and Steven. 
 
                                              Source: Article, The National Tattler, 
            November 1970, PAMD. 
 
The attending physician, Dr. John Prudden, who was aware of Steven’s wishes, disputed the 
credibility of cryonic suspension, but nevertheless cooperated.
361
  “This is what he wanted,” Mrs. 
                                                            
358 Nancy L. Ross, “In search of forever,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, August 13, 1972, D-5. 
 
359 R. Michael Perry, “List of Cryonic Suspension Patients,” Cryonics 11, no. 10 (October 1990): 4. 
 
360 Mandell, “If my son, Steven…” 18.  
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Mandell explained, “what he believed in.”362  Mrs. Mandell phoned CSNY President Curtis 
Henderson, who set in motion the process that eventuated in Steven’s cryonic suspension.  
Steven was packed in ice and relocated to St. James Funeral Home, where he was chemically 
perfused with glycerol by the owner and CSNY affiliate, mortician Frederik W. “Fred” Horn.   
 not for her son 
 earth’s slow decay  
 sullen roots and granite grey 
 to lure his form down to the loam 
 until mud voidness is his home 
  
              not for her son 
                          fire’s greedy flash 
                           snatching all but bone and ash 
                           consuming with relentless burn 
                             until his beauty’s in an urn 
     
                 but for her son 
                                   cool sheets of ice 
                        halt departing in a trice 
                      his being hopes as snowy lace 
                  for an unreckonable space
363
  
 
 
Mr. Hope 
 
 The outcome of the CSNY procedure underwent by Steven J. Mandell was not in any 
significant way dissimilar from that of the CSC procedure underwent by Genevieve de la Poterie, 
save for one crucial detail.  On September 5, 1968, days following Steven’s cool-down and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
361 See Anonymous, “Cryonics News,” September 1968, 161; David B. Weissman, “Science is on the Verge of 
‘Conquering’ Death,” Bluebook Magazine, November, 1968, 65.  
 
362 Anonymous, “Cryonics News,” September 1968, 163.   
 
363 Michelle Navarette and Jerry White, “Tribute to Mrs. Mandell,” Cryonics Reports 3, no. 10 (October 1968):197. 
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funeral service, CSNY personnel transferred him from a short-term containment vessel, which 
was lined with dry ice (-79˚C, -110˚F), to a long-term storage vessel: a liquid nitrogen-filled 
“Cryocapsule” manufactured by Cryo-Care, a human cryopreservation equipment corporation, 
which was owned and operated by Edward Francis “Ed” Hope of Phoenix, Arizona.364  A self-
professed “promoter and wheeler and dealer,” Hope had owned a racetrack, delivered oil, 
operated a New Jersey nightclub called “Chubby’s, and established a very lucrative career in wig 
making before starting Cryo-Care in 1965.
365
  Here is Hope, self-promoting, wheeling and 
dealing, in 1966:  
I always tried to promote something or other.  I was the first and only guy to walk 
into Phoenix with wigs.  And now just look.  No other industry in the United 
States grew like wigs.  I happened to hit it at the right time.  Now I sell wigs 
wholesale across the United States.  I have two wig colleges and a government 
contract to teach the Hopi Indians wigmaking [sic].  I wheeled and dealed because 
I had the right thing at the right time.  Actually, that’s what we’re hoping to do 
with Cry-O-Care.
366
 
 
 Hope freely and openly admitted his every intention to “‘make a buck’ in the body 
freezing business.”  And in this he was not alone.  Hope’s Cryo-Care foray ultimately found him 
partnered with two “MIT graduate engineers,”367 as he described them, Ted Kraver and Frank 
“Rick” Rickenbacker.368  Kraver recounted years later, “our intention upon starting Cryo-Care 
was to simply build a product and sell it—if a market developed”—to the likes of the CSC and 
                                                            
364 Anonymous, “Cryonics News,” Cryonics Reports 3, no. 10 (October 1968):183.  The present remarks on Ed 
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the CSNY, the organizations that were actually performing cryonic suspensions.
369
  Somewhat 
eerily echoing the plight of the de la Poteries; in a move revealing the close kinship of business 
acumen and poor taste, moreover, the Cryo-Care partners initially focused their venture on 
children—“their first creations were Kiddie Capsules.”  Here is Ed Hope, barking, disappointed 
that a market for freezing dead children ultimately didn’t emerge: “I thought that a husband and a 
wife losing a daughter would just come the hell down to Phoenix and take care of that daughter.  
But it’s turned out to be just older people.”370 
 A key moment in the promotion of Cryo-Care’s line of post-Kiddie Capsule products, 
the full-sized “Cryocapsules,” came on New Year’s Day 1966, at the third annual Freeze-Wait-
Reanimate (FWR) conference in Washington, D.C.  The event was organized and hosted by 
Evan “Ev” Cooper, who years prior, in January of 1963, founded the Life Extension Society 
(LES), the first organization to actively promote the “freeze-wait-reanimate hypothesis.”371 As 
with the previous two FWR conferences, which had also convened on New Year’s Day, 
attendance was quite modest, with some twenty-five people partaking.  Cryocare had completed 
construction of a Cryocapsule late that December, which afforded Hope the opportunity to 
showcase it as one of the conference’s key attractions.  The design of the capsule was relatively 
straightforward: the cryonics “patient” resided in an insulated aluminum tank (24” by 80”), set 
within in a larger thermos-like cylinder (34¼” by 48” by 121”).  The capsule had a bold-on lid; 
when affixed, thermal insulation was achieved by evacuating the space between the two 
cylinders, the patient tank then filled with liquid nitrogen.  The exterior of the capsule displayed 
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an inner container pressure gauge, a liquid level indicator, temperature sensors with readout, and 
a liquid nitrogen boil off gauge.
 372
  The capsule, which sat horizontally, was furthermore 
equipped with a set of rollers.  In fact, Ed Hope believed mobility would be one of his 
Cryocapsule’s strongest selling points: “Hell, you could put it in a crypt in your front yard if you 
wanted to.  Any place.  It only needs to be serviced every seven or eight months.”373   
 And so it ultimately came to pass that on the morning on January 1, 1966, in the 
parking lot of Marty Laffal’s Restaurant, the FWR conference venue; for an audience of eager 
conference goers and members of the press, Ed Hope gave a demonstration of his product.  With 
the aid of Robert C.W. Ettinger, a patient was transferred from a temporary storage vessel to the 
Cryocapsule: a frozen dog.  She was a beautiful, healthy, black Labrador retriever-mix.  On 
December 22, in anticipation of the conference spectacle, she was anesthetized, chemically 
perfused, and frozen by LES President Ev Cooper and a local veterinarian.  Her name was Bel. 
 By the time Steven Mandell was suspended by the CSNY, some two years following 
the LES conference spectacle, the model of Cryocapsule in which Bel was placed had undergone 
several modifications.  Within this window of time, however, five more freezings had taken 
place: all of them, in one way or another, ultimately involved the use of Cryo-Care 
“Cryocapsules”; three of them were carried out by Ed Hope himself.  The first took place in 
April of 1966, just months after Bel was frozen.
374
  This time, however, the subject was not a dog 
but an elderly woman.  Little about her is known beyond the fact that she had requested 
“cryogenic internment” upon death but, due to last-minute familial objects, was embalmed 
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instead.  Only subsequent to this did the woman’s son, overwhelmed with guilt, proceed to have 
her frozen in accordance with her dying wishes.
375
   
 Roughly a year later, however, following a stay at Ed Hope’s Cryo-Care headquarters 
in Phoenix, the woman’s son had her removed from the Cryocapsule, thawed and buried 
conventionally, somewhere in southern California.
376
  While technically the first human 
“freezing,” this was not the first cryonic suspension, as the procedure, carried out by Hope, was 
done for “cosmetic” reasons alone, and as such did not entail chemical perfusion and slow 
cooling.  It is in this sense that James H. Bedford, on January 17, 1967, is to be understood as the 
first human to be placed in cryonic suspension.  While Hope did not directly participate in 
Bedford’s suspension, Bedford, as noted above much earlier, did ultimately come to rest in one 
of Hope’s Cryocapsules, the cost of which was covered by Bedford’s sizable estate.377    
 Hope’s Cryo-Care outfit was involved in the “freezing,” thusly understood, of two 
others: Marie Phelps-Sweet, CSC member, LES coordinator, and civil rights activist, who died 
and was frozen in August of 1967 at the age of seventy-four,
378
 and Louis Tom Nisco, Michigan-
based chef and amateur criminologist, who died and was frozen in September of 1967 at the age 
of fifty-five.
379
  Helen Kline, lastly, a founding member of the Cryonics Society of California, 
died in May of 1968; under the auspices of the CSC (not Cryo-Care) she was perfused and 
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placed in temporary storage at Joseph Klockgether’s Buena Park funeral home, entrusted to the 
watch of Bob Nelson.
380
  As we will see later below, Nisco and Sweet soon fell under Nelson’s 
care at Chatsworth as well.  Nisco, Sweet, and Kline, furthermore, would all ultimately come to 
rest in one of Ed Hope’s Cryocapsules.  
 By the time of Steven Mandell’s cryonic suspension, then, some two years following 
the LES conference spectacle, the model of Cryocapsule in which Bel was placed and in which 
the frozen others would ultimately come to rest had undergone several modifications.  First, the 
inner tank of the capsule, where the patient resides, came to be made of steel, not aluminum.  
With this, instead of simply bolting the tank shut, it was now welded, which had the effect of 
reducing liquid nitrogen boil off.   The maintenance of the essential vacuum between the patient 
tank and the outer cylinder, however, now required an additional piece of machinery: an electric 
pump.  If for any reason the pump lost power, the vacuum would fail in a matter of hours, 
meaning no thermal insulation for the patient, significantly heightened liquid nitrogen boil-off, 
and eventual depletion.  Moreover, if the vacuum failed, the end-cap of the apparatus would fall 
off, exposing the inner-patient tank.   
 Steven Mandell was placed in this latter model of Cryocapsule and stored at liquid 
nitrogen temperatures (-196˚C, -320˚F) in the space rented by the CSNY’s partner corporation, 
CryoSpan, at the Washington Memorial Park Cemetery in Corum, Long Island.
381
  When 
Genevieve de la Poterie was frozen, Bob Nelson did not place her in such a Cryocapsule—at  
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3, no. 6 (June 1968), 120-122.  
 
381 Anonymous, “Cryonics News,” Cryonics Reports 3, no. 10 (October 1968):182-189. 
143 
 
least not initially; with a five thousand dollar price tag, the de la Poteries could not afford one.  
Nor could they pay for the base freezing process itself.  Nor the monthly fees for liquid nitrogen 
refills.  Nelson, however, anticipating the publicity that would be garnered for the burgeoning 
cryonics movement, “couldn’t say no to [freezing] the first child.”382  Moreover, Nelson 
expressed seemingly genuine concern for Genevieve: “I loved that little girl.”383  “I adopted her 
like my own child […] and I watched her slowly get sicker and sicker.”384  While Nelson froze 
Genevieve at no financial expense to the de la Poteries, he did not have at his disposal a spare 
 
                 
     
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Figure 5.  Ed Hope placing Bel in his Cryocapsule, January 1,  
                                     1966.   
 
                     Source:   William Grigg, “Life Extensionists Meet: Frozen Dog  
                                     is Placed in Capsule,” The Sunday Star, January 2, 1966,  
                                     reprinted in Freeze-Wait-Reanimate 3, no. 20 (January  
                                     1966):4.   
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Figure 6.  Mandell’s capsule outside at the   Figure 7:  Mandell’s capsule, with operational   
                 Cryo-Care facility in Phoenix.      electric pump, being filled with   
   The previous model is behind it.      liquid nitrogen at the CSNY       
         storage facility on Long Island  
Source:   Cryonics Reports 3, no. 9  
  (September 1968):165.     Source:   Photograph by Curtis Henderson,  
       PAMD. 
 
Cryocapsule in which to store her for long-term cryogenic internment.  After he froze her in late 
January of 1972, therefore, Nelson kept Genevieve at Joseph Klockgether’s Buena Park 
mortuary, packed in dry ice, which had to be replenished quite regularly.
385
 
 As for Steven, the CSNY expected the costs of his cryonic suspension to be covered by 
the proceeds of a ten thousand dollar life insurance policy, which he had taken out with the 
Aetna Insurance Company.
386
  The policy’s two year contestability period had not expired at the 
time of Steven’s death, however, and as such Aetna refused to pay.  Even if it had expired, Aetna 
still would have had solid legal grounds upon which to contest the claim, given that Steven had 
already entered the final stages of enteritis when he took out the policy.  In any event, CSNY was 
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burdened with the costs of Steven’s cryopreservation, Cryocapsule, and continued care, the 
overwhelming majority of which Curtis Henderson, Fred Horn, and CSNY cofounder Saul Kent 
paid out of pocket over the course of approximately four years.
387
  Not insignificantly, as this 
period of was drawing to a close, Pauline Mandell transferred Steven and his Cryocapsule to the 
care of Bob Nelson, who moved them west: to the CSC’s underground cryopreservation facility, 
at the Oakwood Memorial Park Cemetery in Chatsworth, California. 
If my son, Steven, would be one of the lucky ones who could be brought back and 
made physically well 200 years from now, I think he'd have a ball.  He’d love to 
learn anything that was new and futuristic.  He was the kind of kid who would 
have liked to have been in the first rocket to the moon and he’d have a ball.  I 
hope that it will be a good and better world.  We don’t know, of course.  But I 
think he’d love it.388  
 
 
Mildred and Gaylord 
 
 On Sunday, September 20, 1970, two years after Steven’s suspension, and two years 
prior to Genevieve’s freezing, a terminally-ill woman, stricken with bone cancer, died at her 
home in Des Moines, Iowa.  Her name was Mildred E. Harris, and she was fifty-five years old.
389
  
Over the course of the week leading up to Mildred’s death her two sons, Terry and Dennis 
Harris, had been busy making arrangements for their mother’s cryonic suspension.  “We loved 
her so deeply,” Terry Harris lamented, “she wanted to go through this process for us.”390  The 
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brothers wanted their mother to be “perfectly preserved.”391  The Harrises opted for the CSC, not 
the CSNY, as their service provider.  With this Bob Nelson came to Des Moines on Friday, 
September 18, to make contractual arrangements with the Harris brothers, and to make physical 
preparations for their mother’s suspension.392  At the time of Nelson’s arrival, Mildred’s 
physician had predicted that she would live for several more weeks.  Around 11am on Sunday, 
September 20, however, Nelson telephoned Robert C. W. “Bob” Ettinger in Detroit to report that 
Mrs. Harris had taken a drastic turn for the worse, and that the perfusion chemicals required to  
 
                        
                 Figure 8.   Terry Harris and mother Mildred.   
           
                                               Source:     Article, The National Tattler, 
                                   November 1970, PAMD.   
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proceed with her suspension were not yet on hand.   “Air freight was not available until the next 
day,” Ettinger recalled, so he “agreed to fly [to Des Moines] and bring the chemicals as 
baggage.”  At 1:50pm, as Ettinger made arrangements to depart, Mildred died and was 
“immediately packed in ice.”393  Ettinger arrived in Des Moines around 8 pm, followed by Bob 
Nelson’s partner, mortician Joseph Klockgether.  With the assistance of Ettinger and Nelson, and 
the consent of local mortician Robert Major, Klockgether perfused Mrs. Harris in the embalming 
room of Arnold’s Highland Park Funeral Home.  The procedure was completed by 4 am, with 
Mildred packed in dry ice.  Later that morning, a closed-casket “affirmation of life ceremony” 
was held for Mildred.
394
  On the morning of the following day, Bob Nelson had Mildred flown 
west, to California.
395
  
 Like Genevieve, Mildred was not placed in a liquid nitrogen-filled cryocapsule—at 
least not initially.  Rather, Mildred was placed in a capsule-like box, which was constructed, 
presumably by Nelson,
396
 according to specific instructions, and which contained, somewhat 
disturbingly, “a see-through window.”397  (A reporter characterized Mildred as “resplendent,” 
                                                            
393 Ibid.   
 
394 Los Angeles Superior Court Case C-161229, Deposition of Terry Ray Harris, February 4, 1980, 99, Alcor; 
Ettinger, “Mrs. Mildred Harris,” 1.  
 
395 On Mildred Harris’s cryonic suspension and life affirmation ceremony, see Joseph Klockgether, “Report on the 
Perfusion of Mrs. Mildred E. Harris,” prepared for the CSC, December 4, 1970, 3pgs., Alcor; David M. McBride, 
M.D., “Certificate of Death,” prepared on CSC letterhead, Alcor; Deposition of Terry Ray Harris, 99, Alcor; Robert 
C.W. Ettinger, “Mrs. Mildred Harris,” The Outlook 1, no. 10 (October 1970):1-2.  See also Ross, “In Search of 
Forever,”D5;  Tom Tiede, “This Cemetery Offers a Choice of Cremation, Freezing,” Cape Girardeau Southeast 
Missourian, November 2, 1970, 19; David Walker, “Cryonic sleep remains afloat in sea of mystery,” The Valley 
News, June 13, 1979, 10; Myrna Oliver, “Man tells of hopes for ‘reanimating’ mother,” The Los Angeles Times, 
May 19, 1981, C1-6; William Scobie, “California’s deep freeze bodies left to melt,” The Observer, April 27, 1980, 
12; Anonymous, “For these ‘cryonic survivors,’ a 2nd chance at life is no longer possible.” 
        
396  Mike Darwin, phone interview by the author, 18 March 2014.  
  
397 David Walker, “Cryonic sleep remains afloat in sea of mystery,” 10.  
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dressed “in a purple robe and glittering jewels, awaiting rebirth.”398)   Months later, in December 
of 1970, Terry Harris traveled to California, to Joseph Klockgether’s Buena Park funeral home, 
to see how his mother was being maintained.
399
  Terry was reportedly quite satisfied with the 
setup; he was “happy” that when he peered through the window he could see his mother’s 
“freckles beneath her makeup.”400   
 
  Figure 9.  “Terry Harris Viewing Mother Mildred.”  
   
  Source:   Alcor 
  
                                                            
398 Walker, “Cryonic sleep remains afloat,” 10.  
 
399 Depositon of Terry Ray Harris, 104. 
 
400 Ross, “In search of forever,” D-5.  
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 It was in the course of this visit that Bob Nelson engaged Terry in conversation about 
the fate of his father, Mr. Gaylord Dunbar Harris.  Mr. Harris had died just months earlier, on 
July 8, 1970; at the age of fifty-six, he had suffered a heart attack while waterskiing.
401
  Nelson 
ultimately persuaded Terry, who in turn persuaded his brother, Dennis Harris, to disinter and 
ship Mr. Harris’s remains to California; Nelson promised that the CSC would “submerge [Mr. 
Harris’s] body in the chemicals and super-cool him to prevent further decay,” on the grounds that 
he might one day be cloned.
402
  For six thousand dollars—a sum in addition to the fifteen 
thousand dollars that the Harrises would ultimately pay to cover the costs of a Cryocapsule, long-
term liquid nitrogen storage and maintenance for their Mother—Nelson arranged to have Mr. 
Harris exhumed from the Violet Hill Cemetery in Perry, Iowa, and flown west, to California, 
where his remains, or so Nelson told the Harris brothers, would join their mother in cryonic 
suspension.
403
 
 
Andrew 
 
 On Tuesday, November 19, 1968, a “heavy-set” man suffered a heart attack at his home 
in Vestal, New York.  He was rushed to the emergency ward at nearby Ideal Hospital, where he 
was pronounced dead upon arrival at 7:26 pm.  His name was Andrew F. Mihok, and he was 
forty-eight years old.  A veteran of World War II, Mr. Mihok served in the United States Navy.  
After the war he found employment with the General Aniline & Film Corporation, where he 
                                                            
401 Oliver, “Man Tells of Hopes for ‘Reanimating’ Mother,” 6. 
 
402 Ibid.; Deposition of Terry Ray Harris, 25-26.  
 
403 Ibid; Form V. S. No. 9 – PB-16409, Burial Transit Permit for the Remains of Gaylord Dunbar Harris, Division of 
Vital Statistics, Iowa State Department of Health, Alcor; Form VS-9, Permit for Disposition of Human Remains, 
Gaylord Dunbar Harris, State of California – Department of Public Health, Alcor.  
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worked as a drill press operator until ill-health forced him into early retirement in April of 1968; 
he had sustained chest and heart injuries in an automobile accident three years prior.  It was 
around this time that Andrew and his wife, Mrs. Mildred Mihok, first read about the practice of 
cryonic suspension—but made no formal arrangements.  Upon Andrew’s death, however,  
Mildred requested that her husband be frozen.
404
  “I love him so,” she cried, “I want him 
back.”405 
 The staff at the Allen Memorial Home in Endicott, New York was “stunned” by 
Mildred’s request.406  “We were caught flat-footed,” a spokesperson said.407  Though familiar 
with cryonics, the Allen staff was “not prepared to carry out the procedure.”408  The June issue of 
 
         Figure 10.  Andrew F. Mihok 
         Source: Alcor 
                                                            
404Anonymous, “CSNY Calls Off Suspension of Heart Attack Victim,” Cryonics Reports 4, no. 1 (January 1969), 4-
6; Steve Hambalek, “Vestalite’s Body Frozen for Future,” source unknown, date and pages unkown.  
   
405 Hambalek, “Vestalite’s Body Frozen for Future.”  
 
406 Ibid.; Anonymous, “CSNY Calls Off Suspension,” 4. 
 
407 Hambalek, “Vestalite’s Body Frozen for Future.”  
 
408 Anonymous, “CSNY Calls Off Suspension,” 4.  
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the funeral trade-magazine, however, Casket and Sunnyside,
409
 a copy of which they luckily had 
on hand, contained information about cryonic suspension, which, through a series of frantic late-
night phone calls, by 10:30 pm put Mr. Ward Allen, director of the funeral home, in touch with 
CSNY cofounder and treasurer Saul Kent.  Early the following morning, on November 20, Kent, 
accompanied by Fred Horn and CSNY member Paul Segall, departed for Endicott in Horn’s 
station wagon at approximately 6:00 am, with the requisite cryonic suspension equipment in tow.    
Seventeen hours and some two hundred miles later, the CSNY suspension team, having endured 
rain, sleet, and fog, finally arrived in Endicott, where Mr. Mihok lay in waiting, in the 
refrigerated morgue at Ideal Hospital.  By 8:30 pm on November 21 the perfusion process was 
complete: Mr. Mihok was sealed in a rubber pouch, packed in dry ice and rock salt, and loaded 
in the back of Horn’s station wagon for the return trip to St. James Funeral Home on Long 
Island, whereupon arriving at 3:30 am the following day he was placed in a temporary  
styrofoam-insulated storage vessel, lined with dry ice.
410
  Mrs. Mihok followed, driving the long 
distance through the night, in the company of her three young children: Nancy, Mildred, and  
Andrew Jr.
411
  You can hear Mrs. Mihok: “I hope it works.  He’s got to come back to me.”412   
 But Andrew’s freezing was halted and ultimately terminated.  He was not placed in one 
of Ed Hope’s Cryocapsules.  He was not submerged in liquid nitrogen.  The CSNY requested 
consent, in writing, from all members of the immediate family before they would agree to 
                                                            
409 The subtitle of the periodical boasts: “The Foremost Journal of the Funeral Profession since 1871.” 
 
410 Anonymous, “CSNY Calls Off Suspension,” 5.  
 
411 Hambalek, “Vestalite’s Body Frozen for Future.”  
   
412 Anonymous, “Family Bars Freezing for Heart Victim,” Suffolk Sun, date and pages unknown.   
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            Figure 11.  Mrs. Mildred Mihok consenting to the cryonic suspension of  
               husband Andrew. 
  
               Source:     Photograph by Leo Fahey, “Vestalites Body Frozen for Future,”  
               date and source unknown, PAMD.  
 
commence with the next phases of Mr. Mihok’s suspension.  Only Mildred consented.  Maria 
Mihok, Andrew’s mother, as well as his three sisters, Mary, Matilda, and Julia, refused to sign, 
in no small measure because Andrew had not agreed to the process when he was alive.  To 
proceed with the suspension, moreover, would have cost upwards of ten thousand dollars.  And 
though while Mildred was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy for this very amount, she was 
without another source of income; with Andrew gone, she was furthermore left alone to support 
and raise three young children.  With this Andrew was removed from the temporary CSNY 
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refrigeration vessel and placed in a conventional casket.  He was taken to Saints Philip & James 
Roman Catholic Church in St. James, New York, where on December 5, 1968, a funeral mass 
was held for him.  Andrew was then taken to Long Island National Cemetery and given a 
military burial.
413
 Andrew F. Mihok would have been the tenth person placed in cryonic 
suspension, the second case handled by the CSNY.   You can still hear Mrs. Mildred Mihok: “I 
feel […] dreadful … I didn’t want it this way.”414  
 
Ann, Paul & Herman 
 
 On Friday, January 3, 1969, a woman died of breast cancer at New York University 
Hospital in Manhattan.  Her name was Ann DeBlasio, and she was forty-three years old.  As was 
the case in the suspension of Stephen J. Mandell, hospital physicians were willing to cooperate 
with CSNY and CryoSpan personnel, but hospital administrators would not authorize the 
emergency use of a heart-lung machine, which would have enabled the performance of an 
optimal on-site perfusion.  Thus, at the request of her husband, retired New York Police Officer 
Nicholas “Nick” DeBlasio, Ann was packed in ice at the pronouncement of clinical death and 
moved to the hospital’s refrigerated morgue.  Hours later, she was taken by Fred Horn and Saul 
Kent to the basement of St. James Funeral Home, where she was chemically perfused, cooled, 
and packed in dry ice.  There she remained for seven months in a short-term containment unit.   
                                                            
413 Anonymous, “ CSNY Calls Off Suspension,” 6; Anonymous, “Family Bars Freezing.”  
 
414 Anonymous, “Family Bars Freezing.”   
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                     Figure 12.  Ann DeBlasio 
         Source:  Alcor  
On August 15, 1969, Ann was transferred to a long-term, liquid nitrogen-filled storage vessel 
housed at the facility rented by CSNY-CryoSpan at Washington Memorial Park Cemetery in 
Corum, Long Island, placing her in close proximity to Steven J. Mandell.
415
 
Ann’s vessel, however, dubbed a “Forever Flask,” was considerably different from the 
Cryocapsule in which Steven was sealed.  For one, the Forever Flask was the product of a 
company called Minnesota Valley Engineering (MVE), not Cryo-Care.  CSNY President Curtis 
Henderson had become acquainted with Edward Schuster, founder and majority shareholder of 
MVE, through the cryobiology conference scene in 1967.   The vessel itself was large enough to 
accommodate two cryonics patients. The principle improvement of Schuster’s MVE Forever 
Flask over Hope’s Cryocapsule, however, and what Henderson found most attractive about it, 
was that the former boasted a permanently-sealed vacuum jacket (guaranteed for ten years), 
                                                            
415 On the cryonic suspension of Ann DeBlasio see Ross, “In Search of Forever,” D-5; Anonymous, “Mrs. Ann 
DeBlasio, Cancer Victim, Frozen in New York,” Freeze-Wait-Reanimate 4, no. 2 (December 1968):2; Anonymous, 
“Woman Suspended by Cryo-Span Corporation,” Cryonics Reports 4, no. 2 (February 1969): 3; Curtis Henderson, 
“Cryonic Suspension of Ann DeBlasio,” Cryonics Reports 4, nos. 9-10 (September-October 1969):10-15. 
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eliminating the tedium and added expense of the continuous electric pumping required to 
maintain the operational integrity of the latter.  This feature furthermore took the vessel’s lid out 
of the loop: it no longer played a role in maintaining the vacuum, and as such could be removed 
at any time for purposes of viewing and maintenance, doing away with the need for external 
gauges and displays.  The lid itself was thus quite modest, unsealed and foam insulated.  This 
ultimately resulted in a higher liquid-nitrogen boil off rate, but the costs of this were offset by the 
fact that the Forever Flask’s vacuum did not require continuous electric pumping.416   
 And yet, perhaps the most striking difference between the two vessels was that Ann’s 
Forever Flask, unlike Steven’s Cryocapsule, stood vertically, not horizontally.  Because it stood 
as such, and at eight feet tall was quite inaccessible, Henderson had to construct a “six-sided, 
four-foot high platform” around it for added stability, and to enable maintenance and top-down 
observation of Ann.  As it came time to transfer her to the flask and submerge her in liquid 
nitrogen, Henderson’s ad hoc platform also aided, somewhat unexpectedly, in the performance 
of a consecration ceremony.  As the DeBlasio’s were members of the Catholic Church, on the 
day of Ann’s transfer a priest was in attendance: Reverend Saverio C. Mattei.  Henderson, 
having placed Mrs. DeBlasio inside, began to fill the Forever Flask:  
Striking the bottom of the inner vessel, the liquid nitrogen boil off began 
with a deep roar that resonated in the giant tank.  White clouds of 
condensed water vapor were formed upon contact with the rising tide of 
ultra cold [sic] liquid nitrogen, and the sudden eruption from the tank 
enveloped all of us in a chilled embrace.  In the midst of this spectacle, 
Reverend Mattei calmly climbed onto the platform and proceeded to 
consecrate the flask.
417
  
 
 
                                                            
416 Henderson, “Cryonic Suspension of Ann DeBlasio,” 11-15. 
 
417 Ibid., 15.     
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 Figure 13.    Left to right: Nick DeBlasio (sunglasses), Fred Horn, and Reverend 
        Mattei, consecrating Ann DeBlasio’s MVE Forever Flask at the 
        CSNY-CryoSpan storage facility, August 15, 1969. 
 
      Source:    Photograph by Curtis Henderson, PAMD. 
 
Ann DeBlasio was the tenth person to be placed in cryonic suspension overall, and the third case 
to be handled by CSNY-CryoSpan.   
 Early on Nick DeBlasio visited Ann daily.  In the course of doing so, he became 
acquainted with Pauline Mandell; Steven was being stored in the same facility.  The relationship 
between Mrs. Mandell, herself a widow, and Mr. DeBlasio soon became romantic.
418
  After two 
years, however, they fell out with one another, and with Curtis Henderson, from whose care Ann 
and Steven were ultimately removed.  These events took shape as a series of conflicts developed 
and played out.  First, following changes in management at Washington Memorial Park 
Cemetery, CSNY-CryoSpan’s rent was raised significantly.  The cryonics operation had for 
                                                            
418 Ross, “In Search of Forever,” D5; Mike Darwin, phone interview by the author, March 18, 2014.   
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some time drawn considerable and unwanted media attention to the cemetery.  “Camera crews 
and journalists,” Curtis Henderson recalled, “were always coming around, and reporters would 
always enquire about cryonics at the cemetery offices.  It was a terrible hassle for them.”  Thus, 
raising rent was a way to force CSNY-CryoSpan to halt operation and, ultimately, quietly nudge 
them out of the cemetery all together.
419
   
 Second, there was a severe disconnect between the polished technoscientific aesthetic 
cultivated by CSNY’s brochures and monthly newsletter, Cryonics Reports, and the actual 
conditions of the CSNY-CryoSpan facility—which also housed unclaimed cremains and served 
as storage space for groundskeeping tools and other cemetery supplies.  It was essentially a 
garage.  The cemetery groundskeepers had full access to the facility, and furthermore took their 
lunches there: they would tell jokes about the patients, leave food strewn about the storage 
vessels, and throw cigarette butts on the floor.  This did not at all sit well with DeBlasio and 
Mandell, as well as other CSNY members, who attributed the poor state of the CryoSpan facility 
to negligence on the part of Henderson, who they furthermore blamed, somewhat unfairly, for 
provoking cemetery management to raise rent so as to squeeze CSNY-CryoSpan out.
420
  
 Third, in the spring of 1970, amid these growing tensions, Henderson took on another 
suspension case, despite the admonishment of cemetery management not to do so.  The patient 
was a forty-two year old heart attack victim named Herman Greenberg.  The freezing request 
itself, however, came from Herman’s daughter, a young and artistically talented woman named 
Beverly Greenberg (aka Gillian Cummings).  Serious complications were present at the outset, 
                                                            
419 Henderson, “Thus Spake Curtis Henderson,” 34; Aronson, “The Fine Art of Living Forever,” 90; Anonymous, 
“New Storage Facilities,” The Outlook 2, no. 9 (September 1971):1-2.   
 
420 Henderson, “Thus Spake Curtis Henderson,” 35; Beverly Greenberg Article in ALCOR. Cf. Arlene Sheskin, 
Cryonics: A Sociology of Death and Bereavement (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1979), 52-53.  
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though they were not of a financial sort: an eight thousand dollar insurance policy covered 
Herman’s suspension and storage.  Rather, the problem was that Herman had been dead, 
embalmed and buried for a good while before Beverly contacted the CSNY.  As Beverly herself 
explained in an interview, “I simply could not go on with my own normal existence thinking of 
my father decomposing in the ground […] I probably would have been a basket case if I hadn’t 
done this, just thinking of him decomposing.”421  The call having been made, Henderson and 
Horn traveled to the Philadelphia cemetery where Herman was buried.  Accompanied by Beverly 
and her mother Doris (Herman’s widow), and with the aid of a backhoe, Herman was disinterred 
by Henderson and Horn and trekked back to Long Island, where in the basement of St. James 
Funeral Home he was chemically perfused, cooled, and packed in dry ice.  Henderson’s attempt 
to bring Herman to the storage facility proved to be the last straw with cemetery management, 
however: CSNY-CryoSpan and their patients were finally evicted from the premises.
422
  
 Within these developments, though beginning well before Herman’s suspension in the 
spring of 1970, Deblasio, Mandell, and eight other CSNY members who had grown disappointed 
with Henderson formed a new organization, the Cryo-Crypt Corporation, and set out to find a 
new storage site for Steven, Ann, and future suspension patients.
423
  Each of the ten members put 
one thousand dollars toward the venture, which was ultimately used to purchase an old 
Methodist Episcopal Church in the town of Brookhaven, Long Island, just two miles south of the 
CSNY-CryoSpan facility.  Their plan was to renovate the church’s cellar and use it as a crypt, 
                                                            
421 Beverly Greenberg, “Tape Transcript: Freeze-Wait-Reanimate,” transcribed by Brian Shock, Cryonics (First 
Quarter 1998):17, 21.  
 
422 Ibid.; R. Michael Perry, “Remembering Beverly Greenberg,” Cryonics (Second Quarter 1998), 41-42; Aronson, 
“The Fine Art of Living Forever,” 91-92; Henderson, “Thus Spake Curtis Henderson,” 39-41.   
   
423 It merits underscoring here that Mandell and DeBlasio were the only two members of Cryo-Crypt who actually 
had relatives in cryonic suspension at the time, i.e. Steven and Ann, respectively.   
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and to this end they applied for and were granted a building permit.  Their intentions, however, 
were not spelled out in the permit application.  The permit itself, moreover, was granted after 
construction had already begun.  The Cryo-Crypt Corporation thus found itself in violation of 
Brookhaven’s town zoning ordinances, and their building permit was revoked just as the storage 
site neared completion.  Though a very short-lived endeavor, Cryo-Crypt’s demise was strikingly 
dramatic.  On the night of October 31, 1970—Halloween—an angry mob of some thirty 
Brookhaven conservatives gathered around the church carrying torches.  They held a 
demonstration against Cryo-Crypt and cryonic suspension and called for the resignation of 
Albert Carnes, the town building inspector who had issued the group a building permit.  The mob 
leader, attorney Donald W. Leo, represented several of the church’s trustees, who claimed they 
were neither notified of nor consented to the sale of their church to Cryo-Crypt.
424
   
 By the time of Cryo-Crypt’s demise, Curtis Henderson had secured a new rental space 
for CryoSpan operations: an industrial bay in West Babylon, New York.  There, Herman 
Greenberg was finally transferred from temporary storage to an MVE Forever Flask, which he 
occupied with Paul M. Hearst Sr. (CSNY-CryoSpan’s third patient, frozen some three months 
after Ann Deblasio, but about whom very little is otherwise known).
425
  DeBlasio and Mandell,  
                                                            
424 On Brookhaven and the formation and demise of Cryo-Crypt, see Bob Keeler, “Brookhaven Bars Frozen-Body 
Site,” Newsday, November 8, 1971, 16; Anonymous, “After-Death Freezing Stirs Town on L.I., New York Times, 
Nov 21, 1971, A14; Anonymous, “Notes From Here and There,” The Outlook 2, no. 3 (March 1971): 2-3; 
Anonymous, “New Storage Facilities,” 1-2; Henderson, “Thus Spake Curtis Henderson,” 35; cf. Sheskin, Cryonics, 
53-55.   
 
425 The historical record is especially thin on Paul M. Hearst Sr.  Indeed, the only information I have been able to 
turn up about this patient is that at sixty-two years of age he was frozen by the CSNY on March 14, 1969, at the 
behest of his son, Paul M. Hearst Jr., a biologist employed by the University of Pennsylvania.  The MVE Flask in 
which Herman Greenberg was placed, which was designed to accommodate two patients back-to-back, was 
purchased by Mr. Hearst Jr. for his father.  See Anonymous, “Cryo-News Capsules,” Cryonics Reports 4, no. 3 
(March 1969):6; News Brief, “Cryo-Span Freezes Thirteenth Human,” PAMD; Anonymous, “These 12 Lie Frozen 
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Information Service, 1970), Section D; “Henderson, “Thus Spake Curtis Henderson,” 30.   
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                         Figure 14.  John Bull, treasurer of the short-lived Cryo-Crypt  
                              Corporation, standing at the ramp entrance to the storage  
               facility under the Brookhaven church.  
 
             Source:   Keeler, “Brookhaven Bars Frozen-Body Site,”  
               photograph by Mitch Turner.  
 
however, given their already failing relationship with Henderson, opted not to move Ann and  
 
Steven to the new CryoSpan site, and instead turned to Bob Nelson for assistance.     
 
 
Mr. Nelson 
 
 On August 17, 1971, Ann Deblasio was removed from the care of CSNY-CryoSpan 
and relocated to Mt. Holiness Cemetery in Butler, New Jersey.  There Nick DeBlasio, in 
partnership with Bob Nelson,
426
 had purchased a plot of land and constructed a long-term,  
                                                            
426 In an interview with Charles Platt, Curtis Henderson indicated that the Mt. Holiness facility was financed by a 
two-hundred thousand dollar settlement that Nick DeBlasio had received following the wrongful death of Ann.  This 
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       Figure 15.  The top shell of the facility         Figure 16.  The Mt. Holiness Cryonics 
                          being lowered into place,                       storage facility upon 
                          ca. summer 1971.                         completion ca. fall 1971                 
                                                                                                 (unidentified man). 
         
         Source:       Alcor      Source:       Alcor 
 
underground cryonics storage facility, which was opened under the auspices of the CSC’s sister 
corporation, Cryonic Internment, Inc.  The facility’s construction was somewhat crude: two 
Concrete shells, one placed atop the other, formed a rectangular underground crypt 
(approximately10’ x 8’ x 16’) that housed Ann’s MVE Forever Flask.  Access to the Flask (for 
maintenance) and the crypt itself was achieved through one of two manholes cut in the top 
concrete shell.  The manholes, which were capped with lids boasting decorative Christian 
crosses, were surrounded by (approximately 8’ x 4’ x 1’) brick boxes, each with a sliding metal 
roof.   In contrast to CSNY-CryoSpan’s new industrial-bay facility, DeBlasio likened his and  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
is a spurious claim on two counts: in regard to the nature of Ann’s death and the source of the money.  As to the 
former, I have found no other archival reference to Ann DeBlasio’s death as wrongful; all simply note that she died 
of breast cancer.  In turn, the absence of evidence to this effect throws into question Henderson’s claim about the 
settlement that supposedly financed the construction of the new facility.   What matters most presently, in any event, 
is that DeBlasio partnered with Nelson under the auspices of Cryonic Internment, Inc.  See Henderson, “Thus Spake 
Curtis Henderson,” 32.   
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Nelson’s Mt. Holiness facility to a finished basement.  Indeed, the walls inside the crypt were  
lined with wood paneling, decorated with photographs of Nick and Ann.  Somewhat curiously, 
Nick DeBlasio is also reported to have placed in the crypt next to his frozen wife a “perpetual 
Christmas tree.”427 
 
  Figure 17.  Left to right: Bob Nelson, Pauline Mandell,  
      and Nick Deblasio in the Mt. Holiness facility, 
      ca. 1971.  Ann’s “forever flask” stands in the  
      background. 
   
  Source:    Alcor 
 
Pauline Mandell had initially made arrangements with Bob Nelson and Nick DeBlasio to have 
Steven stored in the Mt. Holiness facility with Ann.  By the time the facility was operational, 
                                                            
427 Ross, “In Search of Forever,” D5.  On DeBlasio and the Mt. Holiness facility see Anonymous, “New Storage 
Facilities,” The Outlook 2, no. 9 (September 1971):1-2; Anonymous, “Private Storage Offered,” The Outlook 10, no. 
10 (October 1979):1-2; Anonymous, “From Nicholas DeBlasio,” The Outlook 19, no. 3 (March 1979):2; cf. Sheskin, 
Cryonics, 52-65.   
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however, the romance between Mrs. Mandell and DeBlasio had ended.  Thus, while Ann 
remained in New Jersey under the watch of her husband, Pauline Mandell entrusted Steven to the 
care of Bob Nelson, who had her son’s frozen body and Cryocapsule shipped to California.428     
 The opening of the Mt. Holiness facility was featured in the September 1971 issue of 
the CSC’s irregular monthly newsletter Cryonics Review, the front page of which boasted, “New 
East Coast Facility Opened.”  The story went on to indicate that the facility was “designed to 
accommodate 24 persons [i.e. twelve two-person capsules] at liquid nitrogen temperature,” and 
that it would furthermore serve as a compliment to the “first long-term multiple-storage unit in 
operation in Chatsworth, California.”429  It is now evident in retrospect that this publication 
conspired in producing imagery of Mt. Holiness and Chatsworth that was significantly at odds 
with the actual states and capacities of both facilities at the time.  For one, while the Mt. Holiness 
facility was designed to accommodate multiple cryonics patients, twelve two-person capsules 
(twenty-four patients) would have made for remarkably cramped quarters.  Indeed, it would have 
been next to impossible to maintain and provide regular liquid nitrogen service to twelve 
capsules given the quite modest dimensions of the facility (noted above).  In fact, according to 
Nick DeBlasio himself, the facility could only accommodate ten patients (i.e. five two-person 
capsules), less than half of what the CSC had advertised.
430
    
 From here the discrepancies only mushroom.  The very first issue of Cryonics Review, 
which appeared in January 1969, announced the opening of “the world’s first commercial, long-
term cryonic suspension facility in Southern California,” located at the Oakwood Memorial Park 
                                                            
428 Ross, “In Search of Forever,” D5.      
 
429 Anonymous, “New East Coast Facility Opened,” Cryonics Review (September 1971): cover and inside cover.  
PAMD.   
 
430 Anonymous, “From Nicholas DeBlasio…” The Outlook 10, no. 3 (March 1979):2.   
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Cemetery in Chatsworth, just outside of Los Angeles—Steven J. Mandell’s final destination.  
Ironically, the write-up underscored the CSC’s use of the model of Cryocapsule in which Steven 
was suspended: “the facility utilizes high-reliability, multiple-patient, vacuum storage units that 
will maintain […] patients at temperatures in the liquid nitrogen range.”  When Bob Nelson took 
possession of Steven’s capsule, he managed to have it crated and shipped to California by air—in 
no small measure by neglecting to inform the shipping company of the frozen body inside.  
Doing so, however, meant that the electric pump which drew and maintained the vacuum on 
Steven’s Cryocapsule had been removed from a source of power for the duration of a coast-to-
coast flight at the very least, and quite likely more.  Based on failure tests carried out by the 
Cryo-Care Equipment Corporation, Steven’s cryocapsule would have likely been depleted or 
nearly depleted of liquid nitrogen, and his body temperature up to between -50 to -80˚C, by the 
time he arrived in California.
431
   
 While Steven J. Mandell thawed under Bob Nelson’s watch, en route to long term 
storage at the CSC’s Chatsworth facility, his Cryocapsule arrived operational.  There is little to 
dispel the suspicion that this may have been in keeping with Nelson’s plans all along, as the 
arrival of Steven and his Cryocapsule coincided with the freezing of Genevieve de la Poterie in 
early 1972.  By this time, moreover, Mildred Harris had been on dry ice, residing in her 
temporary storage vessel for approximately two years, despite the fact that her sons, Terry and 
Dennis, had paid Nelson fifteen thousand dollars to cover the costs of a Cryocapsule, long-term 
liquid nitrogen storage and maintenance, as well as an additional six thousand dollars, 
subsequently, to handle the disinterment, shipping, suspension and storage of their father’s 
                                                            
431 Mike Darwin, phone interview by the author, March 18, 2014; Darwin and Platt, “Thus Spake Curtis 
Henderson,” 18, fn. 26.   
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remains.  What happened to the money allotted by the Harrises remains a mystery,
432
 but one 
thing is certain: Nelson did not use it to purchase Cryocapsules for Mildred and Gaylord Harris.  
Indeed, upon its arrival in California, early in 1972, Nelson, unbeknown to Joseph Klockgether, 
opened Steven Mandell’s Cryocapsule, placed Genevieve and Mildred inside with the recently 
thawed Steven, resealed and (presumably) refilled the capsule with liquid nitrogen, and moved it 
to the CSC’s storage facility in the Chatsworth cemetery: an underground concrete chamber, 20’ 
long, 10’ wide, 12’ deep, with a steel-paneled roof and a hatch for access.  (A far cry, in other 
words, from the state of the art facility Nelson conjured in Cryonics Review and elsewhere.)  
While Nelson claimed, moreover, to have maintained the capsule for some two years, this was 
doubtful the case considering that the CSC’s Chatsworth facility—again, Cryonics Review 
pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding—was not equipped to supply the electricity 
required to draw and maintain the cryocapsule’s vacuum.  By 1974 the capsule had been more or 
less abandoned, with Genevieve and Mildred thawed, Steven thawed for a second time, and all of 
them radically decomposed.
433
  As for Mr. Gaylord Dunbar Harris… 
 
Marie, Helen, Russell & Louis 
 
 This preceding nightmare scenario is tied to another.  In November of 1971, about a 
year after Mildred’s arrival at Chatsworth and a year before Steven’s arrival and Genevieve’s 
freezing, Nelson had already ceased liquid nitrogen maintenance on another capsule, one in 
                                                            
432 Platt, “Robert Nelson and the Chatsworth Scandal,” 11.   
 
433 The preceding remarks take considerable guidance from Platt, “Robert Nelson and the Chatsworth Scandal”; 
Perry, “Suspension Failures”; and Perry, “Death at the Edge of Forever,” all of which were read up against the 
Deposition of Terry Ray Harris, Alcor, and personal notes of Joseph Klockgether, “Typed Notes—Important,” 7 
pages, Alcor.     
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which he and Joseph Klockgether, in May of 1970, had crammed four cryonic suspension 
patients.
434
   
 While the freezing of the first man, James H. Bedford, was backed by a sizable estate, 
the first woman to be frozen died all but destitute of resources.  Marie Phelps-Sweet died in her 
sleep sometime between the night of August 26 and the early morning of August 27, 1967.  She 
was seventy-four years old.  Her lifeless body was discovered in the bed of a Santa Monica hotel 
room, early in the afternoon of August 27, some ten hours after she had checked in.  The reason 
for Sweet’s stay at the hotel remains a mystery.  What is known is that a local mortician from the 
undertaking firm Gates, Langley, and Gates, upon summation from the authorities to remove 
Marie’s body, discovered her Life Extension Society (LES) membership card, which carried 
“instructions to freeze her body.”  Marie’s body was ultimately taken into custody by the county 
coroner, who in keeping with the LES instructions placed her in a “refrigerated storage facility at 
30 degrees [Fahrenheit], just below freezing.” In the course of these events, as Marie was an 
active member of the CSC as well as Evan Cooper’s LES, Bob Nelson was informed of the 
situation, and began making preparations to have her suspended.
435
  The lack of funds available 
to carry out Marie’s suspension, however, complicated matters, to say the least.  
 Marie Phelps-Sweet’s involvement with cryonic suspension represented a small 
fraction of what can only be described as a lifelong career of social activism.  In an appeal for 
donations to fund Marie’s suspension, her husband, artist Russel Le Croix Van Norden, wrote 
the following:  
                                                            
434 Klockgether, “Typed Notes—Important,” 4.  
 
435 On the death and freezing of Marie Phelps-Sweet: Anonymous, “Cryonics News,” Cryonics Reports 2, no. 9 
(September 1967), 1; Anonymous, “Marie Phelps-Sweet, Pioneer Activist for Justice and Progress, Dies and is 
Frozen in California,” Freeze-Wait-Reanimate 3, no. 38 (September 1967), 1-3; Rose, “Dead Men’s Hopes Put on 
Ice,” 4.   
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As I sorrowfully sort thru packet after packet of the miscalaneous [sic] papers of Marie 
Phelps-Sweet, Organizational identification cards in amazing numbers come to light … I 
am humbled that I have done so little.   Tears dim my eyes and anguish wrenches at my 
heart as I recall with crystal clarity the many (tho [sic] still comparative few) crusades for 
the peaceful communication for mankind in which a kind fate permitted me participation 
with so wonderful a person.  Here in the recorded minutes of many an organization I find 
the note “Marie Phelps-Sweet offered to pay for the Charter, the equipment or other 
urgent need.  How could she have done so much and had so little?
436
  
 
 The passion that drove Marie’s involvement with a myriad of social causes clearly 
found expression in her commitment to and advocacy for cryonic suspension.  In one of the 
several letters she sent over the years to Robert C. W. Ettinger, Marie wrote:  
Even I, way out here on the rim, feel that all my energies should be devoted to this life 
extension advance.  But how to do it escapes me at the moment.  For the first time in my 
entire career, I yearn to be wealthy and free to endow an essential work.  Formerly the 
idea of the responsibility of physical wealth made me shudder—in a world mad for the 
quick buck.  Honesty, via which there are a few if any millionaires, seemd [sic] to me the 
more precious value.  Now—it seems we have the power and method to change for the 
better.  “Remove the fear of limited life—and remove the greed and ruthlessness.”  … I 
want to see it happen—with all possible speed!  Yet here I sit.  More or less helpless, to 
speed things up.
437
 
 
 In 1964, accompanying what appears to be the first letter Sweet sent to Ettinger, she 
enclosed two pictures of herself.  Ettinger recalls, “One face showed 71 years of care, the other a 
young woman full of hope and vigor.”438  Sweet identified with the latter image, taken in 1940,  
                                                            
436 Van Norden goes on: “The list is long and without doubt incomplete, remembering only those more recent 
ventures.”  He then lists the following organizations in which Marie was active: Color Research Institute, World 
Cultural Center, Enchanted Boundary, Committee for a World Constitution, Women United Against War, WISP, 
Sane Nuclear Policy, NAACP, American Civil Liberties Union, American National Red Cross, International 
Platform Association, VISTA, National Congress of American Indians, Santa Barbara Historical Society, Citizens 
International Exchange Corps, The Assistance League of Southern California, The “INFINITES,” World Future 
Society, Foundation for Anti-Aging Research, Cryogenic Society of California, Life Extension Society of 
California.  Russel Le Croix Van Norden, “2-Page Typed Letter,” September 1967, PAMD.  
 
437 Marie Phelps-Sweet to Robert C. W. Ettinger, “6-26-64,” Excerpts from Letters of Marie Sweet, pg. 3, complied 
by Robert C. W. Ettinger, PAMD.  
 
438 Robert C. W. Ettinger, “A Young Woman’s Trust,” pg. 1, no date, PAMD.   
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           Figure 18.   Image of Marie Phelps-Sweet, ca 
                               1940.  The handwritten instructions  
                               are Sweet’s:  “This is as I wish to be 
                 ‘Restored!.’ I believe it can be done  
                 in time!” 
  
                              Source:    PAMD 
 
and included handwritten instructions: “This is as I wish to be ‘restored!’  I believe it can be 
done in time!”439  This exchange, and well as excerpts from the several other letters that Sweet 
sent to him over the years, were included in an appeal for suspension funds that Ettinger, at the  
                                                            
439 Marie Sweet to Robert C.W. Ettinger, cited in Ibid.; see also Anonymous, “Marie Phelps-Sweet, Pioneer 
Activist for Justice and Progress, Dies and is Frozen in California,” 1.    
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                       Figure 19. Marie Phelps-Sweet in her temporary storage vessel at 
     CryoCare, wrapped in aluminum foil (at left) and packed  
     with dry ice (at right). 
 
             Source:      ALCOR 
 
 
 
         Figure 20.  CryoCare employees (most likely Fred Rickenbacker  
              and Ted Kraver) layering dry ice atop Marie Sweet 
              as they prepare to place the cover on her temporary 
              storage vessel. 
   
            Source:      ALCOR 
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request of Bob Nelson, prepared and circulated  through the CSC, the CSNY, the LES, and the 
Cryonics Society of Michigan.
440
   
 While the actual amount raised over the long-term remains elusive, enough money was 
on hand initially to prepare Sweet for long-term storage in cryonic suspension. While the 
preparatory work was carried out under the auspices of the CSC, all of this took place prior to  
Nelson’s partnering with Joseph Klockgether.  In order to have Marie Sweet chemically perfused 
and placed in temporary dry-ice storage, then, Nelson had to liaise with Ed Hope’s Phoenix-
based CryoCare Corporation, where following the completion of the preparatory work Sweet 
was also momentarily stored.
441
  It was not until November of 1967 that Marie Sweet arrived at 
Klockgether’s Buena Park mortuary operation, rendering concrete the latter’s (unofficial) 
partnership with Nelson and the CSC.
442
  Indeed, Marie Sweet was the first cryonics patient to be 
stored at Klockgether’s mortuary.  “At this point,” Klockgether recalls, “the building used as a 
garage prior to being used for storage of caskets was converted for storage of Marie Sweet.”  She 
was wrapped in aluminum foil and stored in a “large a large insulated wooden shipping case that 
dry ice was placed in periodically to maintain her temperature.”443  Marie Phelps-Sweet would 
remain in such a state for two years and six months, until she was finally placed in a 
Cryocapsule, for long-term storage, in May of 1970.
444
    
                                                            
440 Robert C. W. Ettinger, letter to Saul Kent, September 19, 1967.   PAMD.  
 
441 Rose, “Dead Men’s Hopes Put on Ice,” 4.  
 
442 Klockgether, “Typed Notes—Important,” 2-3. 
 
443 Ibid., 3. 
 
444 Ibid., 4; R. Michael Perry, “Nelson, Nisco, and the ‘Cryotorium,’” Cryonics 13, no. 3 (March 1992), 6. 
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 In the interim, with Marie in temporary storage, her ultimate fate uncertain, the 
campaign to raise funds to secure her long-term cryonic suspension carried on.   Russell Le 
Croix Van Norden, as his wife was placed in temporary storage, recalled, and pleaded:  
I [touched] her hair and kissed  her now cold lips in a farewell for what may well be on a 
few short years when swiftly developing science may remove her from her minus zero 
suspended animation and have her here among us her enthusiasm [undimmed].  If you 
would dare to believe that it could be, the need is now for funds for Cryogenic care until 
the days pass with the final ceiling of her enclosing capsule for the long wait of months 
or years ahead … Fears only hover at the outer edge of my consciousness.  For I believe 
and some of you in steadfast earnestness believe that she will come back to us.
445
  
 In his grief, in his ongoing efforts to raise funds for and revive his frozen wife, Van 
Norden also took to writing poetry:  
Only when I awaken 
In silence of a deepening night 
And listen for your little sigh 
Somehow made up a part 
Of consciousness and fleeting dream 
So like the sound of wayward leaf aflutter 
Falling thru space or endless time 
When no sigh or faintest sound 
Of You can come to me 
But only the strange hum of nighted silence 
Then like encroaching fog 
My loneliness bears in on me 
From every compass point 
By your ill-fated absence 
The price we pay, perhaps 
For some rewarding future yet unseen 
So I must be consoled to know 
That farawayness is a shortening span 
And that the price is not too high to pay 
For possible environmental change 
Of new creative growth 
 
                                                            
445 Van Norden, “2-Page Typed Letter,” 2.  
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An even brighter prospect looms 
A kind of glimpsed glad immortality
446
 
 
 Among those who made donations to aid with Marie Sweet’s cryonic suspension were 
fellow CSC members Helen Kline and C. Russell Stanley: each gave fifty dollars.
447
   Kline and 
Stanley were also the next two people to be frozen by Nelson. The historical record is somewhat 
thin on Kline and Stanley, unfortunately, excepting a few significant details about the 
circumstances of their respective deaths and subsequent freezings.    
 A founding member of the CSC, Helen Kline died of lung cancer on the morning of 
May 14, 1968, in the Burlington Convalescent Hospital in Los Angeles.
448
  She was fifty-five 
years old.
449
  The Burlington staff cooperated with the CSC, and Helen was chemically perfused 
and placed in temporary dry ice storage.  Like Marie Sweet, however, Helen died without the 
necessary funds allocated to secure a Cryocapsule and long-term storage.  As such, a “Helen 
Kline Fund” was set up, with appeals for donations issued through the same channels they were 
issued for Marie Sweet.
450
  
 CSNY President Curtis Henderson had anticipated such an unfavorable set of 
circumstances developing with Helen Kline months before she died.  Russell Stanley, who was 
Helen’s close friend,451 in a letter to Saul Kent dated October 13, 1967, mentioned in passing that 
                                                            
446 Russell Le Croix Van Norden, untitled, 1 page., dated September 15, 1967.  PAMD.  
 
447 C. Russell Stanley, letter to Evan Cooper, September 18, 1967.  PAMD. 
 
448 Anonymous, “The Cryonic Suspension of Helen Kline,” Cryonics Reports 3, no. 6 (June 1968), 120.   
 
449 Permit for the Disposition of Human Remains, State of California—Department of Public Health. Form VS9, 
Death Certificate of Helen Kline.  Alcor;   
 
450 Anonymous, “The Cryonic Suspension of Helen Kline,” 122.  
 
451 Ibid., 121.  
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Helen was “far from well.”  As Kent (and Henderson) had briefly met Helen during a trip to 
California many months prior, Stanley suggested:  
If you have the time, a postcard saying HELLO would be appreciated.  She is a fine 
person and a good friend and her interest is genuine and lasting.  It is always money that 
is lacking unfortunately.
452
  
 
Presumably having caught wind the letter by way of Kent, Henderson, incensed, responded.  In a 
letter dated November 22, 1967, Henderson wrote to Stanley, on Helen’s behalf:  
Now if “not being well” means that she is in danger of dying in the near future, then you 
had better do more than send [her] a postcard.  Is the Marie Sweet experience to be 
repeated again and again?  The time is now to make financial arrangements, to get her to 
sign a body authorization, her relatives to sign affidavits, to discuss the matter with 
Nelson, to [make] provisions to keep in close contact with her … Condolences and 
sympathy cards are a mockery and an insult, now that something can be done.  We will 
do more than send a card. … We will extend you any help we can in this matter.453 
 
                                       
             Figure 21.  Helen Kline               Figure 22.  C. Russell Stanley 
 
              Source:     Alcor                          Source: Earlham College  
                                         yearbook photo, ca.  
            1932.  Alcor 
                                                            
452 C. Russell Stanley, letter to Saul Kent, October 13, 1967.  PAMD.  
 
453 Curtis Henderson, letter to C. Russel Stanley, November 22, 1967, emphasis original.  PAMD.   
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 Henderson’s admonishments notwithstanding, the “Marie Sweet experience” was in a 
sense, of course, repeated in the case of Helen Kline.  It was not, however, repeated in the case of 
Russ Stanley himself—at least not entirely.  A pioneering cryonics advocate and founding 
member of the CSC, Charles Russell Stanley died of heart failure on September 6, 1968, at the 
Santa Fe Memorial Hospital in Los Angeles.
454
  He was sixty years old.  A former Assistant 
Chief Clerk for the Santa Fe Railroad, Stanley had amassed retirement savings, and early on put 
up a sizable sum of money to the CSC, between five and ten thousand dollars,
455
 to secure his 
cryonic suspension and long-term storage in a Cryocapsule.  Nelson, however, unbeknown to 
Stanley, had been using this money to construct the cryonic suspension storage facility at 
Oakwood Memorial Park Cemetery in Chatsworth.
456
  Russ Stanley, consequently, like Helen 
Kline and Marie Sweet before him, was chemically perfused and placed in a temporary storage 
container—a “wooden insulated case”457—and packed in dry ice, which required regular 
replenishment.  Both Russel and Helen were stored and presumably maintained as such for 
nearly two years at Klockgether’s mortuary.458 As with Marie Phelps-Sweet, neither Russell nor 
Helen would be placed in a Cryocapsule until May of 1970.   
 Enter Louis Nisco.  As with Russell Stanley and Helen Kline, the historical record is 
quite thin on Louis Nisco himself.  What details there are with respect to his death and especially 
his subsequent freezing are quite significant, however.   
                                                            
454 Permit for the Disposition of Human Remains, State of California—Department of Public Health. Form VS9, 
Death Certificate of C. Russell Stanley.  Alcor.   
 
455 The only point of record I have been able to turn up on Stanley’s finances is Charles Platt, “Robert Nelson and 
the Chatsworth Scandal,” 10.   
 
456 Ibid.; see also Perry, “Death at the Edge of Forever,” 38.  
 
457 Klockgether, “Typed Notes—Important,” 4.   
 
458 Ibid., 2, 4.   
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 A long-time resident of Detroit, Michigan, Louis Tom Nisco
459
 worked as a chef for a 
number of local country club restaurants, and is furthermore rumored to have been something of 
an amateur criminologist.  Nisco died of a heart attack on September 7, 1967.   He was seventy-
seven years old.  Nisco’s daughter Marie Bowers (née Nisco), years prior to his passing, had 
kindled a strong interest in having herself and her parents placed in cryonic suspension.  No 
arrangements were in place, however, at the time of her father’s unexpected death.  Upon Louis’s 
passing, therefore, Marie contacted Robert Ettinger at his Detroit-based Cryonics Society of 
Michigan.  In something of an ad-hoc partnership between Ettinger and the Phoenix-based Ed 
Hope, Marie managed to have her father chemically perfused, frozen, and placed in Cryocapsule 
for long-term storage. To raise money for the costly procedure, the capsule, and liquid nitrogen 
maintenance—upwards of five thousand dollars—Marie refinanced her home and her car.  
Coupled with the proceeds of Louis’s five hundred dollar insurance policy, however, Marie was 
still short some two thousand dollars.  Ed Hope, who was storing Louis at his operation’s base in 
Phoenix, agreed to let Marie pay off the balance in monthly payments of fifty dollars, in addition 
to monthly liquid-nitrogen maintenance payments of forty-seven dollars.
460
    
 In the course of both arranging her father’s suspension and negotiating with Ed Hope, 
Marie Bowers had been in contact with Bob Nelson via telephone.  In April of 1969, her father 
having been in storage at Cryo-Care for some eighteen months, it came to pass that Marie 
                                                            
459 The historical record is thin on Nisco.  The present narrative borrows considerably from Perry, “Nelson, Nisco, 
and the Cryotorium,” and Platt, “Robert Nelson and the Chatsworth Scandal.”  Their accounts have been compared 
with all available primary materials, which are cited throughout the following.  
 
460 Platt, “Robert Nelson and the Chatsworth Scandal,” 10.  
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          Figure 23.  Louis Tom Nisco 
          Source:  Alcor 
 
Figure 24.  Artistic rendering of the entrance to the CSC “permanent storage facility” at  
    Chatsworth, circulated by Nelson at the 1969 Cryonics Conference. 
 
Source:     Alcor 
177 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25.  Artistic rendering of the back of the CSC “permanent storage facility” at  
                   Chatsworth, circulated by Nelson at the 1969 Cryonics Conference. 
 
Source:     PAMD 
 
 
encountered Nelson at the 1969 Cryonics Conference, which was being held that year at the  
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
461
  Nelson’s participation in the conference entailed 
showcasing artistic renderings of the CSC’s “permanent storage facility,” which in the course of 
a CSC presentation was described as being “on the verge of completion.”462  In an interview with 
Saul Kent, subsequent to the conference’s proceedings, Nelson offered the following description 
of the facility:  
This is a facility that is built below ground, but it is not a hole in the ground that bodies 
and tanks are thrown into.  It’s a multiple-storage facility that cost in the neighborhood of 
$40,000 to manufacture.  The multiple storage units have a maximum capacity of 20 or 
                                                            
461 Saul Kent, “1969 Cryonics Conference,” Cryonics Reports 4, no. 4 (1969):8-15.   
 
462 Ibid., 12.  
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15 people, depending on the size of the patients.  Each patient is in an individual metal 
container very similar to the units that were used in 2001: A Space Odyssey.  The inside 
is stainless steel.  It’s 14ft. by 6 ft. in width, and the patients are introduced into an 
allotted slot inside the inner chapter similar to a honeycomb u nit.  It doesn’t turn.  Units 
are moved by a series of stainless steel cables that guide them into position and they can 
be introduced and retrieved at will without disturbing the other patients, the liquid 
nitrogen, or the vacuum.
463
 
 
 Nelson’s description was of course far removed from the actual conditions at 
Chatsworth, and is furthermore off with respect to the state in which his “patients” at the time—
Marie Sweet, Helen Kline, and Russell Stanley—were then being stored: wrapped with foil, in 
wooden boxes, packed in dry ice.  With these images in tow, however, Nelson appealed to Marie 
Bowers, who at this time still owed Ed Hope eleven hundred dollars for the vessel that was 
maintaining her father, as well as monthly maintenance fees.
 464
  In addition to the preceding  
artistic renderings, Nelson also is said to have shown Bowers “interior” shots of the storage 
facility, in which “technicians wearing lab coats were standing in front of capsules fitted with 
viewing windows, gauges, and dials”—“similar,” no doubt, to the “units that were used in 2001: 
A Space Odyssey.”   Nelson offered to pay the balance that Bowers owed Hope, who was by this 
time looking to exit the cryonics scene,
465
 provided that she transfer Louis and his Cryocapsule 
to Nelson and the CSC; thereafter she would only be responsible for monthly payments to cover 
liquid nitrogen maintenance.   She agreed, albeit unaware of Nelson’s intentions.   
 
                                                            
463 Nelson and Kent, “Bob Nelson Speaks Out,” 25.   
 
464  See especially Perry, “Nelson, Nisco, and the ‘Cryotorium,’” 5-6. 
 
465 Perry, “The First Cryonics Operation,” 10.    
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     Figure 26.  Artistic rendering of patients in cryonic suspension,  
          taken from a magazine article featuring an interview   
          with Robert F. Nelson.  This image is presumably similar 
          to if not at one with, the image Nelson showed to Marie  
          Bowers.  
 
      Source:  Aron, “The New Ice Age,” 1. Artist unknown.  PAMD.   
 
 Louis Tom Nisco and his Cryocapsule were shipped to Klockgether’s mortuary in May 
of 1970.   Upon arrival the capsule was opened and Nelson, with the aid of a reluctant Joseph 
Klockgether, proceeded to remove Marie Phelps-Sweet, Helen Kline, and C. Russell Stanley 
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from temporary dry-ice storage, cramming them into the capsule with Louis Nisco.
466
  Some 
eighteen months later, in November of 1971, Nelson is believed to have temporarily ceased 
maintenance on the Cryocapsule: all four patients were allowed to thaw and decompose before 
Nelson resumed liquid nitrogen maintenance.   This took place, moreover, as will be recalled 
from above, about a year after Mildred’s arrival at Chatsworth and a year before Steven’s arrival 
and Genevieve’s freezing, all of whom, by 1974, had been abandoned by Nelson.467  
 Still, as late as 1973, Terry Harris, upon making a return trip to California to attend to 
the status of his parents and to pay respects, was allowed to visit the Chatsworth facility.   
Accompanied by Nelson, Harris entered the facility, which by this time housed two of Ed Hope’s 
Cryocapsules—Steven Mandell’s and Louis Nisco’s.   Nelson led Harris to believe that Mildred 
alone was suspended in one Cryocapsule, Gaylord in the other.  This was, of course, hardly the 
case with Mildred.  As for Mr. Gaylord Dunbar Harris, Joseph Klockgether’s notes reflect that 
his disinterred body was never perfused or frozen.
468
  Taking Nelson at his word, however, Terry 
Harris affixed to each capsule one of two brass plaques, which he and his brother Dennis had had 
commissioned, to denote the Harris parents’ tentative resting place and to commemorate them.  
Mildred’s plaque read: “Mildred E. Harris entered suspended animation on September 20, 1970.  
Today is the first day of the rest of your life.”  And Gaylord’s plaque: “Gaylord Harris […]: 
Some Men Look at Things as They Are and Ask Why.  I Look at Things as They Could Be and 
Ask Why Not.”469    
                                                            
466 Klockgether, “Typed Notes—Important,” 4.    
 
467 On this see also Perry, “Death at the Edge of Forever,” 37-38.  
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 Had Harris seen the artistic renderings of the facility that Nelson had shown to Marie 
Bowers, he may not have concluded that the facility, in the course of his 1973 visit, was “very 
pretty inside.”  In any event, upon his return to Chatsworth once again in 1980, this would no 
longer be the case: Terry Harris found the Cryocapsules and his parents’ plaques on the floor, the 
carpet of the facility rotted, and the white paneling warped and cracked.
470
  By this time, the 
nature of Bob Nelson’s misdeeds at Chatsworth had become known and made public.  The 
Harris brothers, partnered with Marie Bowers, would ultimately enroll Los Angeles attorney 
Michael Worthington to pursue a civil suit against Robert Nelson for damages perpetrated. 
 
Clara  
 
 Amid the storm brewing at the CSC Chatsworth facility on the west coast, Bob Nelson 
nevertheless continued to accept suspension patients in conjunction with the Mount Holiness 
facility on the east coast, partnered with Nick DeBlasio.  Clara Dostal died of cancer on 
December 10, 1972, at George Washington University Hospital in Washington, D.C.  She was 
sixty years old.
471
  The extent of Clara’s involvement with cryonics prior to her death is 
unknown.  Quite significantly, however, she had signed a contract which allocated twenty-
thousand dollars from her estate to CSNY-CryoSpan.  The funds were to cover the costs of her 
perfusion and a Cryocapsule, with the remainder being placed in a trust to for purposes of 
ensuring her long-term maintenance and storage.   Upon her death, then, Clara was covered in 
ice and eventually transported to the CSNY-CryoSpan facility on Long Island.  Upon her arrival, 
Clara was chemically perfused and placed in a temporary storage vessel under dry-ice, in 
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preparation for long-term storage in a Cryocapsule, which she would enter several months 
later.
472
   
 Clara’s estate was riddled with complications.  While her children, Claire Halpert (née 
Dostal) and Richard Dostal, wanted to follow through with their mother’s request to be placed in 
cryonic suspension, Clara’s medical bills were significant.  Halpert, the executrix, was to say the 
least reluctant to pay CSNY-CryoSpan twenty-thousand dollars out of the estate in lump sum.  In 
an attempt to negotiate with Curtis Henderson, the Dostal children proposed a month-to-month 
payment arrangement, hoping to curb the initial cost to the estate while still honoring their 
mother’s wishes.  Henderson declined.473   
 CSNY-CryoSpan was at the time of Dostal’s suspension on its way out.  In the wake of 
the CSNY member exodus and coterminous formation of the shortly-lived Cryo-Crypt, and with 
Nick DeBlasio and Pauline Mandell defecting to Nelson, leaving only two patients under the 
charge of the CSNY—Herman Greenberg and Paul Hurst, Sr.—the CSNY received yet another, 
ultimately fatal series of blows with the mysterious death of Herman Greenberg’s daughter 
Beverly (aka Gillian Cummings).  Following her father’s suspension, Beverly became deeply 
involved in the operations of the CSNY, at one point assuming the duties of vice-president.
474
 
While the details are murky, it is known that Beverly would regularly visit the CSNY storage 
facility in New Babylon.  A one-time industrial bay, converted by Henderson to suit the needs of 
CSNY-CryoSpan, Beverly would often pull her car into the facility, and with her father’s 
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Cryocapsule close and in sight, spend the night there.  One such night, on November 15, 1973, 
Beverly died from carbon-monoxide poisoning in the CSNY-CryoSpan facility.  With her car 
running, trying to stave off the cold New York November, she fell asleep.  Despite her 
involvement with CSNY, Beverly had made no arrangements for cryonic suspension.  The fate 
of her remains ultimately fell to her mother, Doris Greenberg, who had her cremated.
475
   
 Making matters worse, amid the ensuing investigation into Beverly’s death, the capsule 
containing Herman Greenberg and Paul Hearst was discovered by the authorities, and reported to 
the New York State Department of Public Heatlth.  Due to a zoning violation, Henderson was 
ordered to cease and desist operations and dispose of the frozen bodies within fifteen days, under 
threat of being fined one thousand dollars per day until compliant.  Both Herman and Paul were 
removed from cryonic suspension, thawed, and ultimately buried.  CSNY-CryoSpan itself would 
ultimately fold by 1974.
476
  Just prior to this, however, and on the coattails of this storm of 
events, Clara Dostal was placed in cryonic suspension.  Indeed, she was removed from 
temporary dry-ice storage only once Greenberg and Hurst had been vacated from the capsule 
they shared.  Clara was then placed inside. 
 Twenty-thousand dollars from the Dostal estate might have kept the CSNY afloat for a 
bit longer.  Given the circumstances brewing, however, it is hardly surprising that Henderson 
declined to negotiate an alternative arrangement with the Dostal children.   Henderson’s refusal, 
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however, did come with a referral to the services of Bob Nelson, who according to Claire Halpert 
“was delighted to help.”477 
 Nelson offered to transport Clara from CSNY-CryoSpan to the Mount Holiness facility 
in New Jersey, where Ann DeBlasio was being maintained, and to cover storage and 
maintenance for roughly thirty-five hundred dollars annually, to be paid in monthly installments. 
Up front, to get things moving, Nelson was paid a sum approximating twenty-five hundred 
dollars out of Clara’s estate.  After Nelson had been paid, however, and for unknown reasons, the 
Dostal children ultimately decided to forego Clara’s cryonic suspension and instead had her 
conventionally buried.
478
   The Dostal children ultimately had to hire an attorney in order to 
recover the funds paid out of the estate to Nelson and the CSC.
479
  In their suit against Nelson, 
they would ultimately come into partnership with the Harris brothers and Marie Bowers.
480
  
 
Dorothy 
 
 On November 13, 1972, roughly a month before Clara Dostal’s death, a woman died of 
cancer in her home in Beverly Hills, California.  Her name was Dorothy B. Labin, and she was 
fifty-one years old.
481
  Like Clara Dostal, the historical record is virtually silent on Dorothy 
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Labin’s involvement with cryonics.482  There is some indication, however, that she came into 
awareness of the practice, some ten months before her death, through the publicity that attended 
the suspension of Genevieve de la Poterie.
483
  In any event, sometime prior to her passing, 
Dorothy Labin made arrangements with Bob Nelson, under the auspices of the CSC, to be placed 
in cryonic suspension.  Labin’s perfusion appears to have taken place at Klockgether’s mortuary.  
Interestingly, however, and quite tellingly, on November 17, just days after her death, Nelson 
shipped Dorothy Labin east, to be stored at the Mount Holiness in Butler, New Jersey.
484
  The 
reason for the otherwise impractical move of a California-based patient to the east coast is not 
difficult to fathom given the timing of Labin’s death—Nelson’s ability to accommodate at 
Chatsworth had grown increasingly limited.  Upon her arrival at the Mt. Holiness facility, then, 
Dorothy Labin entered long-term storage with Ann DeBlasio, whose MVE forever flask, as will 
be recalled from above, could accommodate two patients, back-to-back.   
 Dorothy and Ann remained in the Mt. Holiness facility until July of 1980, when their 
remains were removed and conventionally buried.   In the interim, Nelson resigned from the 
CSC, which by 1974 had folded, and had furthermore ended his involvement with the Mt. 
Holiness operation.
485
  Consequently, the maintenance of Ann and Dorothy fell to the charge of 
Nick DeBlasio, who reportedly arranged for the vessel to be refilled with liquid nitrogen every 
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is unknown, and a man named Pedro Ledesma.   Beyond the fact that Ledesma and the boy were placed together in 
the same cryocapsule, the historical record is painfully silent on these two cryonic suspension patients.  On this see 
Perry, “Suspension Failures,” 5-8.  
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seven or so weeks.
486
  The vessel was apparently modified to accommodate the needs of a bulk 
liquid nitrogen delivery service: two “fill pipes” were added to the capsule.  While the pipes 
expedited the filling process, by virtue of their connecting the inside of the storage vessel with 
the outside they also served as a heat conductor.  This had the effect of speeding up the rate of 
liquid nitrogen level boil-off, which in turn had the effect of producing a cap of ice over the top 
of the vessel, making it difficult to open for inspection.
487
   In order to do so, the ice had to be 
chipped away.  On one occasion, DeBlasio or a liquid-nitrogen service employee—it is not clear 
who—took a hammer and chisel to the ice, and in so doing inadvertently damaged the vessel’s 
vacuum seal, causing all the liquid nitrogen to rapidly deplete.   Long before the damage was 
recognized, Dorothy and Ann and thawed and begun to decompose.  There is some record of an 
attempt to repair the vessel,
488
 but ultimately the remains of Ann and Dorothy were removed 
from MVE Forever Flask and conventionally buried.
489
 
 All in all, between the efforts of the CSC, the CSNY, and the Cryo-Care Corporation, 
seventeen cryonic suspensions were in some sense attempted or initiated between 1967 and 
1976.  Of these, only James H. Bedford remains in cryonic suspension today.   Nelson had been 
found out by 1979.  By June of 1981, a California civil court had found him guilty of “fraud and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress,” and ultimately ordered him to pay upwards of one 
million dollars in damages to those who brought the suit against him—Terry and Dennis Harris, 
Marri Bowers, and Claire Halpert, the adult children of the CSC patients who under his watch 
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were left to thaw and decompose at Chatsworth.   Some thirty-four years later, Nelson has yet to 
pay a cent. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 
 I began this interpretive venture with an endorsement of Jonathan Z. Smith’s insight, 
derived from Viktor Shklovky, that an “extraordinary cognitive power” comes with the strategy 
of “defamiliarization’—making the familiar seem strange in order to enhance perception.”490   
My engagement with the practice of cryonic suspension has been based on the wager that the 
other side of this is also true—that there is an extraordinary cognitive power that comes with 
rendering the seemingly strange familiar, part of the ordinary every day.  It is time now to pull 
together the interpretive claims threaded through the preceding chapters; to see if my wager has 
paid off.  
 The most basic claim yielded by the interpretive labors resting upon this wager is that 
cryonic suspension becomes increasingly intelligible to the extent that the pervasive yet 
ultimately futile impulse to sequester death under western modernity is thrown into question, and 
is furthermore recognized, following Zygmunt Bauman, as the principle constitutive feature of 
modern social life.
491
  Indeed, cryonic suspension emerged at a moment when the sequestration 
of death came up especially short—the American 1960s.  Following from this, the difficulty in 
pinning down cryonic suspension, in contextualizing and linking the practice to extant strands of 
scholarship, in large measure derives from the fact that modernity’s impulse to sequester death 
tends overwhelmingly to be replicated in the epistemic norms and practices that structure 
sociological theory and research proper.  This is nowhere more apparent than with the existence 
of a well-defined subfield devoted to the sociology of death, dying, and bereavement, which both 
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491 Bauman, Mortality, Immortality, and Other Life Strategies (Stanford, CA: The Stanford University Press, 1992), 
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reflects and reinforces the decidedly modern presumption that death is an “end of life event” at 
best marginally important to apprehending the shape of the modern social.
492
  Thus the dilemma 
of cryonic suspension’s (un)intelligibility—a practice that emerged in a space produced by the 
institutional shortcomings of death’s sequestration presents a lived reality that strains the 
conceptual comfort zones of modernist epistemology and historiography.  It is in this sense that 
cryonic suspension, as I have argued following Robert Orsi, evidences an abundant 
phenomenon.
493
  In departing from those epistemic conventions which would prescribe “passing 
over in silence”494 the lived reality of cryonic suspension, then, I have opted instead, following 
Bauman, for a sociology centered about death’s sequestration495; keeping with Orsi, I have 
attempted to offer an abundant sociological history of cryonic suspension.
496
  
 Taking principle guidance from Bauman and Orsi throughout, then, the central 
interpretive claim my labors have developed is that cryonic suspension is at once both a 
simulacrum of cold war technoscience and a second order (magical) survival strategy—it is 
ultimately a magical practice masquerading as the technoscience it simulates.  Cryonic 
suspension’s “hybrid” status, thus understood, compounds the aforementioned epistemic 
disconnect produced by modernity’s sequestration of death, further evidencing the practice’s 
complexity and experiential abundance.  Developing an abundant sociological history of cryonic 
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suspension, of course, entails demonstrating the non-essential, and thus perhaps largely 
accidental, contingency of the practice’s hybrid status.  To this end broadly, I have attempted to 
demonstrate that cryonic suspension appears to be the emergent product of an affinity between, 
on the one side, the “failed containment” of and ensuing cultural malaise surrounding death and 
dying, and, on the other side, the largely undisciplined “wanderings” of cybernetic concepts and 
predictions throughout the broader culture of the tumultuous American 1960s.  Contextualized 
relative to this affinity as such, and with an eye throughout trained upon explicating and 
rendering intelligible the practice’s hybrid status, the architecture of study reflects my effort to 
produce an interpretation that cuts across three different though related moments in the history of 
cryonic suspension: 1) the emergence of the practice, marked by the appearance in 1962 of the 
“freeze now” manifestos penned by Evan Cooper and Robert C. W. Ettinger; 2) the subsequent 
performance and material instantiation of cryonics, marked by the plights of those who froze and 
were frozen throughout the American 1960s and 70s; those who answered the call to “freeze 
now”; and, tied to and fomented by the lattermost especially, 3) catastrophic failure by 1979, 
marked by the conduct of Robert Nelson and the so-called “Chatsworth scandal.”  
 The parameters of the study were thus not arrived at willy-nilly.  At the same time, 
however, they were also developed to point out and counter the combined effects of what I have 
called the Ettinger “origin narrative” and the Nelson “atrocity tale”—the former crediting the 
emergence of cryonic suspension to Robert C. W. Ettinger, the latter attributing responsibility for 
the failure of cryonics at Chatsworth to Robert. F. Nelson.  As caricatured surrogates for 
sociohistorical treatments of cryonic suspension’s emergence and ultimate failure, the origin 
story and the atrocity tale have long conspired in bracketing from consideration matters of 
cultural and historical context.  This is readily evidenced by the pervasive silence that extant 
191 
 
engagements with cryonics, academic and otherwise, exhibit with respect to the conditions of the 
practice’s emergence and eventual failure.497   
 The pervasive silence on these quite critical aspects of cryonic suspension’s history 
underscores all the more the true significance, indeed the novelty, of the uncatalogued and 
largely unutilized historical materials to which I was granted access. These historical materials, 
then, are at root what enabled me to discern the “origin story” and the “atrocity tale” and to 
counter their combined effects, leading me to the position that grasping the nature, complexity, 
and sociohistorical significance of cryonics in many ways follows from their undoing, thus as 
well training my focus on the three aforementioned historical moments that shape the study’s 
overall architecture. The novelty of the historical materials at my disposal, in other words, quite 
crucially informed the periodization of the study, the contributions of which should also be 
understood as sociohistorical interventions with respect to the Ettinger “origin story” and the 
Nelson “atrocity tale.”   
 Thus the study’s principle interpretive claims necessarily follow from my engagement 
with cryonic suspension along these lines; driven principally by previously unutilized historical 
materials, vacillating between guiding concerns with what cryonic suspension “is,” i.e. its hybrid 
status, and how and under what conditions it took shape, played out in practice, and ultimately 
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met with failure.  In proceeding as such, while following the lead of Bauman and Orsi, I have 
also taken methodological guidance from the interpretive “practice of inquiry” that John R. Hall 
terms “specific history.”498  A latter-day iteration of Max Weber’s project of verstehende 
soziologie, the methodological prescriptions of specific history include attention to the 
temporality and context of events and characters, with the overriding aim of teasing out and 
(thickly) describing and interpreting (intrinsically linked) narrative plots; attention to cultural 
elements, i.e. meanings, metaphors, tools, techniques and their sources, travels and linkages to 
plot; and dialogue with social theory.
499
  Given the architecture of the study, the nature of the 
historical materials at my disposal, and my aims in engaging cryonic suspension overall, I have 
been especially reliant upon specific history’s core methodological strategy of sociohistorical 
emplotment, which requires attention to the very basic yet crucial questions: “What happened 
and how?”500  
 The claims advanced in Chapters 3 and 4 especially should collectively be read as 
responses to these questions, mediated by the broader context of the study’s aims, theoretical 
commitments, and overall architecture as an abundant sociological history, and which were 
enabled at root by the novel historical materials to which I was granted access. To these ends, in 
Chapter 3, I attempted to move beyond the conventional traps of the Ettinger origin narrative, 
chiefly by calling attention to the role of Evan “Ev” Cooper in conceptualizing and facilitating 
the emergence of cryonic suspension. With the move to Cooper, then, I decentered Ettinger, 
while at the same time calling attention to the formative place of the postwar science of 
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cybernetics in the “freeze now” manifestos that both men, initially unbeknown to one another, 
privately published and circulated in 1962: Ettinger’s The Prospect of Immortality and Cooper’s 
Immortality: Physically, Scientifically, Now.  Several interpretive claims and contributions 
followed from this move.   
 First, by attending to the manifestos, I demonstrated cryonic suspension’s formative 
ties to the “wanderings” and largely undisciplined appropriations of cybernetic concepts and 
predictions throughout the American 1960s
501—one side of the historically contingent affinity 
that I have argued facilitated the emergence of the practice.  In so doing, I also positioned 
cryonic suspension as a case through which to arrive at contributions to social studies of science 
and technology broadly.  On the one side, I set forth Chapter 3 as evidence in support of Ronald 
Kline’s disunity of cybernetics thesis; on the other, I presented the historical emergence of 
cryonic suspension as a quite striking illustration of how science and technology can acquire 
unintended meanings and give rise to otherwise as unanticipated projects, as they are variously 
consumed, appropriated, and repurposed “downstream,” as it were, by “non-” scientific actors.502   
 Second, underscoring this lattermost point especially, I demonstrated that Ettinger and 
Cooper, lay-scientific actors at best, in constructing their respective manifestos, were beholden to 
a decidedly magical impulse—i.e. “wishful thinking”—which they articulated with and up 
through cybernetic concepts and predictions. With respect to arriving at this interpretation, 
borrowing from Marcel Mauss and Richard Stivers,
503
 I developed and set forth two key sets of 
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claims.  First, I demonstrated that the cybernetic language of organism-machine equivalence was 
a key cultural source and the root ontological-metaphorical basis upon which cryonics was 
constructed by Ettinger and Cooper.  Relatedly, I demonstrated that both Ettinger and Cooper 
issued their respective calls to “freeze now” in light of expectations produced by Norbert 
Wiener’s famed proclamation that systems of computerized control would soon usher in a 
“second industrial revolution”504—a cybernetic “new age” in which machines would outstrip 
human intelligence and capabilities.  In terms of construction, I argued that Prospect and 
Immortality clearly evidence a form of bricolage—magic—piecemeal, unpredictable 
argumentation that fails in terms of legitimating technoscientific criteria (but which, as I argued 
subsequently, nevertheless also serves the pragmatic aim of rendering death in some sense 
knowable and thus manageable).  In terms of expectation, likewise, I argued that magical 
thinking is at play in Cooper and Ettinger’s tendency to enlarge upon the virtues of certain 
objects, specifically “thinking machines,” i.e. computers, in the perceived ability of the latter to 
eventually be capable of reversing any given “cause” of death, and thus as well “repair” the 
damage incurred by the freezing process they advocated. What makes their “freeze now” 
proposal so confusing, I argued, so difficult to pin down, yet so tempting to “pass over in 
silence,” to dismiss as “pseudoscience,” is that both Prospect and Immortality are the products of 
a magical impulse—i.e. wishful thinking—finding a medium of expression in, by way of the 
computational metaphor, otherwise technoscientific fields of endeavor.  
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 Third, this interaction, I argued, goes to the root of one side of cryonic suspension’s 
“hybrid” status—it is a simulacrum.  Drawing from Gilles Deleuze,505 I attempted to demonstrate 
that cryonic suspension is a magical practice masquerading as the technoscience it simulates.  
The practice’s external technoscientific form, deriving from the manner of its construction 
through the cybernetic language of human-machine equivalence, conspires in masking the fact 
that there is a severe discord between its internal (magical) logic and that of its putative 
technoscientific model.  And it is this masked internal difference, it will be recalled, that is the 
principle source of the uncanny affect—i.e. the feeling of being “ill at ease,” not quite  
“at home”506—that is the chief calling card of simulacra broadly.  One key reason for this 
affective quality is that cryonics, by virtue of the fact that it is at once both “removed from and 
proximate to its point of origin,”507 its putative technoscientific model, is remarkably resistant to 
narration.  Thus, I took to narrating the conceptualization and emergence of the practice, with 
an eye to locating and rendering this affective quality intelligible, as a key component of 
advancing an abundant sociological history of cryonic suspension—and thus one of the study’s 
overall contributions toward rendering the practice intelligible.  
 Finally, I also argued that cryonics harbors uncanny potential for an additional 
reason—it eventuates in the collapse of any hard and fast distinction between the living and the 
dead.  Recalling to this point Ernst Jentch, “doubt as to whether an apparently living being is 
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innate and, conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in fact become animate,”508 
this is a key source of the cognitive distress associated with the experience of the uncanny.  To 
sharpen this point, again in the interest of advancing an abundant sociological history of the 
practice, I took to comparing cryonics patients, i.e. “cryonauts,” with two other forms of 
cybernetic entity, both of which emerged in the same sociohistorical context, both of which 
harbor considerable uncanny potential—what Andrew Pickering has aptly called cybernetic 
“monsters”509 and the iconic figure of the cyborg.  As with cryonics, the decidedly uncanny 
affect produced by these entities derives from their rootedness in the language of human-
machine equivalence—an equivalence which perpetrates as well the collapse of any hard and fast 
distinction between matter that is alive and matter that is dead.  Cryonic suspension is both 
predicated upon and instantiates the collapse of this distinction in material practice.  
  This connection, then, as with the interpretive claims set forth in Chapter 3 overall, 
should be understood as the outcome of interpretive guidance taken from Orsi and Bauman with 
respect to previously unutilized and quite novel historical materials.  Absent these materials and 
interpretive guides, all would likely either be “passed over” in silence, dismissed as 
pseudoscience, or otherwise bracketed from consideration by the constraining conventions of the 
Ettinger “origin narrative.”  
 In parallel to my attempt in Chapter 3 to move beyond the Ettinger “origin story” by 
way of Evan Cooper, in Chapter 4 I attempted to move beyond the Nelson “atrocity tale” by way 
training my focus on the early cryonic suspension patients and those who froze them.  Very 
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broadly, just as the move to Cooper in Chapter 3 allowed me to demonstrate the ties of cryonics 
to the widespread and undisciplined “wanderings” of cybernetic concepts and predictions 
throughout the American 1960s—one side of the historically contingent affinity defining the 
practice’s emergence—the move in Chapter 4 to the cryonics patients and those who froze 
required further contextualization of cryonics relative to the widespread cultural malaise 
surrounding death and dying, also in the American 1960s—the other side of this affinity.  
Relatedly, just as the move beyond Ettinger in Chapter 3 ultimately fed my interpretation of 
cryonics as a simulacrum of Cold War technoscience—one side of the practice’s “hybrid 
status”—so also did my move beyond Nelson in Chapter 4 feed my interpretation of cryonics as 
a second order (magical) survival strategy—the other side of the practice’s “hybrid status.”  It is 
here, not only in considering these juxtapositions but in mediating them by way of my theoretical 
commitments that we can begin to throw into shaper relief the overall interpretive payoff of the 
study—as a move away from sociologies “of” death and towards a sociology centered about 
death’s sequestration; as an abundant sociological history of cryonic suspension.  
 The key term in this work of mediation is, of course, magic, i.e. “wishful thinking,” 
specifically its deep-seated relationship to the modern impulse to sequester death. Throughout 
the present study and in Chapters 2 and 4 especially, I relied heavily upon Zygmunt Bauman’s 
interpretation of this relationship, which holds that the sequestration of death is the principle 
constitutive feature of modern social life.  Several of Bauman’s insights merit brief recapitulation 
here.  As will be recalled, the modern impulse to sequester death derives at base from the 
position of sovereignty accorded to reason under western modernity.  Because death does not 
yield to reason, death constitutes a declaration of “reason’s lie,” and thus threatens to undermine 
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reason’s sovereignty.  Reason, then, principally in its instrumental form as science and 
technology, is pressed into the service of excluding death, concealing it from modern life.
510
    
This takes in the institutional process of sequestration, connoting the familiar historical narrative 
by which death, in being shifted from a religious to a medical register of authority, is over time 
removed from communal space, drawn into the technoscientific space of the hospital. 
Sequestration, however, will always fall short, as death is ultimately unresolvable—people die. 
Compounding matters is the fact that the move to sequester death maps onto the demise of the 
efficacy, or at least the perceived legitimacy, of those forms of knowledge and ritual practice 
which have historical served as shared normative guides in the practical matters of confronting 
and dealing with death.  Indeed, this is conterminous with the reason’s rise to sovereignty, the 
ultimate upshot of which, with respect to death especially, is that reason is constitutionally 
incapable of replacing with scientific certainties the moral, religious, and otherwise normative 
certainties it has placed under suspicion.  This places the living in an especially tenuous 
existential situation with respect to death—both one’s own and of others—indicating as well the 
source of a potential threat to reason’s sovereignty.  And yet with this Bauman finds not a retreat 
of reason in the face of death, i.e. at those moments and in those spaces where reason and its 
attendant strategy of sequestration come up short, but rather recourse taken, quite paradoxically, 
to decidedly non-rational measures that create and maintain the illusion of reason’s capable 
handling of death (fostering reassurance among the living) and thus as well the illusion of 
reason’s sovereignty (for the two illusions are ultimately at one).  Indeed, as we have seen, 
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Bauman charges that the sovereignty of reason under western modernity ultimately fosters and 
gives way to magic,
511
 i.e. “wishful thinking.”  
 As I set out to demonstrate in Chapter 4, the magical logic discerned by Bauman 
appears especially distilled in two decidedly modern developments: 1) the medicalization and 
deconstruction of death, and 2) the emergence of a policy of “self-care.”  Both are to be 
understood as what Bauman terms “survival strategies”: “attempts to keep death at bay through a 
strategic maneuvering between various life options.”512  Both evidence magical thinking.  
Medicalization, as we have seen, eventuates in what is arguably the most apparent modern 
survival strategy: the deconstruction of “Death” into individual “deaths,” each of which is 
attributed a “cause.”  This renders any given death explainable, manageable, and, at least in 
theory, surmountable by way of medical technoscience. Thus medicalization, the attribution of 
causality, perpetrates a sleight of hand; it makes Death seemingly amenable to rational control, 
and furthermore operates as a discursive impetus to develop and mobilize medical technoscience. 
Bauman’s policy of “self-care,” following from this, ultimately extends through modern life the 
individuation and technoscientific mobilization wrought by Death’s biomedical deconstruction, 
steering people to “engross themselves in projects geared toward their own survival, which are 
increasingly focused upon maintaining the health of their bodies.”513  Indeed, self-care elides the 
ultimate limit of the human body—Death—by way of breaking down, training focus and work 
upon “its currently encountered specific limitations”514—causes of one’s death, both actual and 
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512 Chris Shilling, The Body and Social Theory (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 166.   
 
513 Ibid.  
 
514 Phillip A. Mellor and Chris Shilling, “Modernity, Self-Identity, and the Sequestration of Death,” Sociology 27, 
no. 3 (August 1993):425.  
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potential.  Whatever their limited successes in extending and prolonging life, techniques of self-
care and the biomedical deconstruction of death broadly will always fall short with respect to 
keeping Death at bay, and thus evidence a pervasive form of wishful thinking, i.e. a modern 
recourse to magic.  
What follows from this, and what calls for heavy underscoring, is that the root magical 
impulse that I explicated in Chapter 3, in the writings of Ettinger and Cooper, is decidedly 
(though paradoxically) modern and thus quite pervasive, and as such is hardly unique to the 
practice of cryonic suspension.  Indeed, magic links cryonic suspension to what Bauman regards 
as the principle constitutive feature of modern social life.  Ettinger and Cooper not only 
presumed these magical logics, however, but in their writings replicated and compounded them 
at a second-order level.  Cryonics, then, is an emergent product of an articulation between, on the 
one side, the logic of “cause” and the pervasive policy of “self-care,” and, on the other side, the 
cybernetic concepts and predictions discussed in Chapter 3. The status of cryonics as a second-
order (magical) survival strategy derives at base from the temporal orientation of the 
technoscientific predictions appropriated by Cooper and Ettinger, chiefly Norbert Wiener’s 
famed proclamation regarding the imminent arrival of a “second industrial revolution” to be 
heralded by the advent of cybernetic “thinking machines.”  The temporal orientation of this 
prediction, i.e. towards a future, opened up a space of anticipation, of hope, in which “thinking 
machines” could be envisioned not only to overcome the shortcomings of (then) extant survival 
strategies, but as well to usher in new and more effective survival strategies—advanced 
technoscientific means through which to address and even envision overcoming “causes” of any 
given death.  Thus cryonic suspension’s “hybrid” status: it is at once both a simulacrum of cold 
war technoscience and a second-order (magical) survival strategy.   In terms of rendering the 
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cryonic suspension intelligible, a pervasive problem introduced Chapter 1 and taken up again in 
Chapters 2 and 4, clearly the present study’s most significant interpretive contribution comes 
with recognizing that while cryonics ultimately fails in terms of legitimating technoscientific 
criteria, inviting dismissal as “pseudoscience, Bauman’s call for a sociology oriented towards 
death, paired with Orsi’s call for empirical studies of abundant phenomena, require recognizing 
that cryonics as embodied in Ettinger and Cooper’s “freeze now” manifestos has a practical 
import, in that it offers a recipe for action vis-a-vis death; a way of knowing death and acting, 
even though at base “wishful thinking,” magic.   Again, with the claims set forth in Chapter 3, 
this interpretation is to be understood as the outcome of guidance taken from Orsi and Bauman, 
coupled with a consideration of quite novel historical materials.   
In Chapter 4 I proceeded to round out this interpretation by discussing the other side of 
the historically contingent affinity that conspired in the emergence of cryonic suspension. I 
argued that the cultural malaise surrounding death and dying in the American 1960s was the 
outcome of the sequestration of death and its attendant strategies of biomedical deconstruction 
and combative technoscience coming up especially short.  In this sense cryonic suspension, as a 
second-order (magical) survival strategy, is to be read in turn as an emergent product of 
modernity’s key survival strategies coming up short against death. Cryonic suspension as set 
forth by Ettinger and Cooper, I argued, while conceived as offering an alternative to the status 
quo through recourse to an envisioned cybernetic future, nevertheless and quite ironically 
evidences a second second-order appeal to the very base logics of sequestration at a moment in 
which they had fallen decidedly short.  Just as Ettinger and Cooper were in this moment moved 
to produce their respective manifestoes, issuing the call to “freeze now,” so also were others in 
this moment moved to consume their arguments, to answer their call, to freeze and to be frozen.  
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With these contextual considerations in mind, in Chapter 4 I set forth a series of deeply 
interdependent narrative accounts of the first cryonic suspension patients, broadly in keeping 
with the methodological dictates of specific history: “What happened and how?”; more 
specifically in response to the following questions: Who were they?  When and under what 
circumstances did they or their families come to learn of cryonic suspension?  What ultimately 
happened to them?  It is here that the novelty of the historical materials at my disposal is 
arguably thrown into sharpest relief, as through these materials I was able to offer 
(re)constructions of the first cryonic suspensions—the families and lives of those frozen and 
those who froze them—and to press the resulting narrative accounts into the service of several 
interpretive ends.   I demonstrated, first of all, how the manifestos produced by Ettinger and 
Cooper circulated and brought together various families and individuals in a shared space of 
anticipation, under the auspices of the first cryonics organizations: The Cryonics Society of 
California, The Cryonics Society of New York, and the Cryo-Care Equipment Corporation.  In 
proceeding as such, I also attempted to demonstrate the material instantiation, the often chaotic 
performance of cryonic suspension, as a second-order (magical) survival strategy.   
The patient narratives also had the effect of showing the horrific events at Chatsworth “in 
the making,”515 and thus as well putting on display the highly questionable conduct of Bob 
Nelson. The principle aim in constructing the narratives, however, was not vilify Nelson but to 
humanize the patients, demonstrating that they and their families espoused and acted upon a 
hope that was to them and others quite real, which is understandable given the nature of the 
historical moment in question, regardless of Nelson’s intentions and misdeeds. Indeed, the 
recovery of this hope, nowhere more plainly evidenced than in the act of freezing itself, should 
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be understood as the outcome of interpretive guidance taken from Orsi and Bauman with respect 
to quite novel historical materials.  As with the interpretive claims set forth in Chapter 3, in the 
absence of either these materials or interpretive guidance this hope would likely remain hidden, 
bracketed from consideration by the constraining conventions of the Nelson “atrocity tale.”  
Indeed, the recovery of this hope links the plight of the first cryonic suspension patients and their 
families to the shortcomings of the otherwise pervasive, modern magical logic that in no small 
measure conspired in producing the historical moment in which they sought an alternative—an 
alternative, however, that simply replicated and compounded the logic of modern magic at a 
second-order level, arguably expressing nothing less than the sequestration of death taken to its 
extreme: the envisioned eradication of any given “cause” of death.   
It is the recovery of this hope precisely, then, that is in keeping with the present study’s 
opting for a sociology centered about death’s sequestration, an abundant sociological history, for 
however false a hope it may be, its root logic nevertheless pervades the modern world. The first 
cryonic suspensions failed; they fell short.  But then so also will reason more broadly, with 
respect to death, continue to fall short, as will its attendant strategies of sequestration, 
medicalized deconstruction, and polices of self-care.  The present study has in part aimed to 
demonstrate, by way of cryonic suspension, that a sociology which fails to recognize the 
sequestration of death as the principle constitutive feature of modern social life will similarly 
come up short.  For in replicating, epistemologically and in governing standards of research 
practice, the logic of death’s exclusion and sequestration, sociology is ill-poised to 
accommodate, account for, and interpret the hybrid entities and abundant phenomena the modern 
impulse to sequester has conspired in creating.  By refusing to pass over in silence the lived 
reality of one such hybrid entity, one such abundant phenomenon, I have attempted to render 
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cryonic suspension intelligible by opting for a sociology centered about death’s sequestration.  If 
my wager has paid off, then perhaps the exclusion of death, dying, and the dead from everyday 
life in the modern world will in time come to appear strange—and cryonic suspension a little less 
so.  
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